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                                                             Abstract 
Due to widespread bank scandals and failures around the world, there has been re-
newed interest in the effect of corporate governance on bank performance. The majority 
of research concerning corporate governance and its effect on bank performance has 
been undertaken in developed countries and markets, particularly the USA and Europe-
an Union but relatively little evidence is provided in Sub Saharan Africa, specifically, 
Ghana. 
This study investigates the effects of corporate governance on financial performance of 
Ghanaian universal banking companies during the period 2006- 2014. This study pri-
marily employs relevant governance theories to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank performance. Multiple regression panel data analysis 
and other appropriate methods are the main tools of analysis in this study. 
The empirical investigation revealed a mixed set of results. The findings showed that 
board size, board composition, bank size and foreign ownership are positively but insig-
nificantly related to profitability in terms of return on asset and return on equity, while 
board committees have a positive and statistically significant impact on financial perfor-
mance which is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis of agency theory which ar-
gues that board committees are an important mechanism of corporate governance in 
Ghana which impact on bank performance. 
This study contributes to the increasing number of research studies on the link between 
bank performance and corporate governance.  The lacked of clarity, mixed and perma-
nent relationships provided, show that the association the association between bank 
performance and different corporate governance mechanisms is complex and dynamic 
optimal governance arrangements may differ from bank to bank in relation to govern-
ance characteristics.. 
Keywords 
Corporate Governance, Financial Performance, Board Characteristics, Foreign Owner-
ship Structure, Bank Size, Universal Banks, Ghana. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Corporate governance has become an increasingly important phenomenon in recent 
years, primarily due to the number of corporate scandals, which have resulted in a de-
cline in shareholder value, a reduction in investor confidence and in some cases signifi-
cant bank failures (Klapper & Love, 2004). Good governance is essential in promoting 
and ensuring fairness, accountability and transparency within organizations (OECD, 
2010, Murphy & O’Donohoe, 2006). Effective corporate governance should fundamen-
tally guarantee shareholders’ value by ensuring the appropriate use of firms’ resources, 
enabling access to capital and improving investor confidence (Denis & McConnell, 
2003). This is related to both internal organization and external market conditions; a 
firm’s responsiveness to external conditions is largely dependent on the way the firm is 
managed as well as the efficacy of the firm’s governance structure (Geogory & Simms, 
1999). Some authors, Rwegasira, (2000); Nam et al., (2004) have argued that good 
corporate governance prevents the expropriation of company resources by managers, 
ensuring better decision making and efficient management. This results in better alloca-
tion of company resources and ultimately, improved performance. 
Concerns have been raised regarding the governance processes of financial systems 
and this is mainly as a result of the increasing government pressure and international 
agencies like the IMF, IFC and the World Bank. These developments are expected to 
have implications for the owners, boards and management of banks. According to Lefort 
& Urzua (2008), boards of directors are the central institution in the internal governance 
of a company. There is a growing call for boards to provide strategic direction as well as 
better monitoring to deal with agency problems in the firm (Lefort & Urzua, 2008). These 
bank boards are expected to adopt a critical role in crafting strategy, implementing and 
executing the strategy and then over time initiate corrective adjustments in the vision 
and objectives of the bank (Thompson & Strickland, 2001). This increased interest is in 
recognition of the fact that effective governance structure can lead to improved perfor-
mance. The effect of ownership structure and concentration on a firm’s performance is 
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an important issue in the literature of finance theory.  La Porta et al., (1998) argue that 
the main conflict is between owners and managers in common law countries due to the 
existence of dispersed control and ownership structure, while in civil law countries, con-
trol and ownership structures are concentrated; thus the main governance problem 
arises between minority and controlling shareholders. Therefore, ownership has greater 
importance in civil law countries where protection of shareholder rights is weak.  In most 
developing economies such as Ghana, there are closely held banks (family or private 
individual, state controlled banks and subsidiaries or branches owned international 
banks) tend to dominate the banking landscape. Concerns have also been raised re-
garding weak institutional environment, poor protection of investors and high ownership 
concentration in emerging economies that have given rise to conflicts between control-
ling shareholder and minority shareholders more often than between managers and 
shareholders. 
 In this regard, La Porta et al., (2002); and Young et al., (2008) stress that, unlike devel-
oped economies where principal–agent conflicts are the major concern of corporate 
governance, principal (controlling shareholder) –principal (minority shareholders) are a 
major issue in developing countries. In Ghana, banks have high ownership concentra-
tion, and higher degree of economic uncertainties coupled with weak legal controls and 
poor investor protection, and frequent government intervention; all resulting in poor per-
formance (Rabelo & Vasconcelos, 2002). There has been a series of calls by interna-
tional agencies such as the IMF, IFC and World Bank on the Ghanaian government to 
create a stable macroeconomic environment, strong investor protection, and a robust 
regulatory and legal framework to help the growth of capital market. 
Several events are responsible for the heightened interest in corporate governance es-
pecially in developing countries such as Ghana. First, there has been a proliferation of 
scandals and crises across the globe in which the behaviour of the banking sector af-
fected entire economies and deficiencies in corporate governance endangered the sta-
bility of the global financial system. Second, the market based investment process is 
now more important for most emerging economies than it used to be, and that the entire 
process is underpinned by better governance. Third, banks execute a crucial function of 
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financial intermediation between savers and investors. Any disruption in this process will 
undoubtedly have a catastrophic effect on the economy (Mitton, 2002). For this reason, 
stakeholders in the financial arena have a strong interest in the good governance of the 
banking institutions. 
In this vein, parliament, governments, regulators and the private sector in many coun-
tries have worked together to build up a strong, reliable and stable financial system 
(Arun & Turner, 2004). The study of banks and other financial institutions is particularly 
relevant given the importance of the financial sector in the modern economy, thus, re-
quiring specific regulations and supervision by market authorities. This importance be-
came very clear during the recent crisis since the banks were subjected to specific in-
terventions from various central banks and governments (Friedman, 2011) aiming to 
maintain confidence in the markets (Zingales, 2008). In a country such as Ghana, 
where the financial sector is dominated by banks, any failure in the sector has an im-
mense implication on the economic growth of the country. 
Following the recent global financial crisis and major bank collapses in the various de-
veloped stock markets, efforts to enhance the efficacy of governance structures have 
been undertaken by international bodies as well as countries via the establishment of 
corporate governance codes and principles (e.g. BCBS, 2010, 2015; OCED, 2010; 
CBN, 2014; UK (FRC) 2014).  These increased interests are in recognition of the fact 
that an effective governance system can lead to improved performance. However, the 
principles outlined in most of the codes are largely derived from recommendations in 
developed countries and may not necessarily be applicable to a developing country 
such as Ghana. 
 Ghana underwent extensive economic and financial reforms in the late 1980s and early 
2000s. An important part of financial sector reform was an attempt to improve the way in 
which banks are governed. Domestic efforts at reforming corporate governance in Gha-
na coincided with the Bank of Ghana attempts at enhancing the efficacy of bank gov-
ernance structures. For instance, the Bank of Ghana made an effort to reform corporate 
governance practices in state owned banks   with the appointment of qualified and 
4 
competent boards of directors, the blending of executive and non-executive directors, 
and internal control and accounting policy manuals (Asiedu –Mante, 1998). As part of 
the liberalization process in the financial sector, a number of new laws and regulations 
aimed at facilitating financial transactions, strengthening and deepening financial sys-
tems were enacted, which included Bank of Ghana Act 2002, Act 612, Banking Act 
2004 Act 673, Ghana Investment Center Promotion Act 1998 Act 478, and Credit Re-
porting Act 2006 Act 726 
Despite these legislative reforms, Ghana had experienced turbulent times with regard to 
its corporate governance practices in the last two decades, resulting in generally lower 
corporate profits across the economy. Arising from high profile bank failures and dis-
tresses, coupled with generally poor performance, across the banking sector, the credi-
bility of the existing corporate governance structures has been put into question. For in-
stance, the collapse of Ghana Cooperative Bank, Bank for Housing and Construction, 
and Securities Discount and Investment Company in the late 2000s was as a result of 
inadequate corporate governance practices such as   ineffective board practices, insider 
related credit abuses, poor risk appreciation and internal control failures (Amidu, 2007, 
Bank of Ghana, 2002). Monks (1998) argues that the numerous cases of corporate fail-
ures are an indictment of the effectiveness of the existing corporate governance struc-
tures. In the aftermath of the financial crises in 2007, OECD (2009) on the corporate 
governance lessons from the crises concluded that , the crises was largely due to fail-
ures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements which could not serve 
their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk taking by the financial institutions.  
Nevertheless, while there is  extensive research on the relationship between corporate 
governance structure and the performance of banks in developed economies, notably 
the United States of America, UK and European Union  (Erkens et al., 2012; Aebi et al., 
2012; Guest, 2008; Busta, 2008; De Andre and Vallelado, 2008). On the other hand, 
there is a dearth of literature in this area of research from developing economies par-
ticularly in Ghana, where there are huge institutional and legal differences, including the 
mechanisms of corporate governance, between Ghana and developed economies. 
More so, it is not known whether existing differences in institutional, regulatory and cor-
5 
porate governance practices also translate into differences in the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank performance. This study to this end seeks to find out 
whether there is a relationship between corporate governance and the financial perfor-
mance of universal banks in Ghana. 
1.2 Motivation for the Study 
The current study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
structures and financial performance with respect to universal banking firms in Ghana. 
Evidence of the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance, or lack thereof, will enable banks to make appropriate choices about cor-
porate governance structures to create and improve bank performance and value. The 
main reasons for undertaking this study are discussed below. First, internationally there 
is a growing recognition of the importance of corporate governance for the success of a 
bank.  Several international agencies and countries have issued guidelines, regulations, 
principles and codes for best governance practices (Cadbury Report, 1992; King Re-
ports, 2002; 2010; BCBS, 2006; 2015; OECD, 2004; 2014, UK FRC, 2012; 2016; Nige-
ria CBN Code, 2014). However, whether banks following the best practices regarding 
corporate governance principles will indeed perform better is a question to be examined 
empirically in the Ghanaian context. 
The second major motivation for this study is that, since 1988 a number of stakeholder 
laws have been enacted with the view of promoting accountability, transparency, fair-
ness and discipline in financial sector in Ghana. Corporate and banking failures and dis-
tresses, high non-performing loans, related party lending, insider dealings, creative ac-
counting and other “self- dealing practices have alerted the government, regulators, in-
vestors and legislators to the danger involved in the absence of constraints governing 
corporate governance practices.. The lack of constraints are viewed as being conduc-
tive to definite losses to shareholders and other stakeholders such as regulators, gov-
ernment, and investors, to destabilize the financial sector, national economy and the in-
vestment climate. All of these have reinforced interest in the enforcement of good cor-
porate governance practices in the Ghanaian banking industry. 
6 
  
The third motivation for this study is that there is the need whether the financial sector 
reforms which were implemented in the late 1980s have altered the efficiency and per-
formance of universal banks in Ghana. These regulatory changes included the privatiza-
tion of public sector banks, listing of banks on Ghana Stock Exchange, the easing of en-
try into the banking market for both foreign and private domestic investors, the introduc-
tion of universal banking concept, and deregulation of interest rates. The effects of the 
changes can be considered as environmental factors or bank specific characteristics 
that can influence the performance of banks. There is a large body of empirical literature 
that had investigated the differences in the relative efficiency and performance dynam-
ics among state, private-domestic banks, and foreign banks (De Young & Nolle, 1996; 
Bhattacharyya et al., 1997; Berger et al., 2009), between universal banks and focus 
banks (Laeven & Levine, 2007), and between listed banks and non-listed banks (Girar-
done et al., 2009; Ray & Das, 2010). These differential factors- (ownership types, uni-
versal banking concept, specialization and capitalization) brought about as a result of 
regulatory reforms impacted positively on bank performance and efficiency. This thesis 
is investigating to find out whether the regulatory reforms impacted positively on univer-
sal banks’ performance or not. 
       The fourth and final motivation for this study is that it is almost three decades since 
the financial sector reform was implemented in Ghana. However, no research to date 
has investigated the relationship between corporate governance practices and financial 
performance of universal banks. In this respect, this study provides the first time oppor-
tunity to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
bank performance in the post sector reform period. 
1.3 Statement of Research Problem 
          The capacity of any government to provide a good bank governance framework is 
considered as one of the important elements contributing to the country’s financial sys-
tem, because banks play a primary role in intermediation of savings and investment, as 
well as in servicing the economic agents with an efficient payment system. Failure of 
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banks due to poor governance mechanisms will mean that their impact on the economy 
could be damaging and destabilizing. The systemic risk from bank failures needs to be 
avoided and hence the study of corporate governance of banks takes priority in an 
economy. Given the importance of corporate governance, several empirical studies 
have been conducted in developed countries on the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and banks’ financial performance and found mixed results 
(Adams & Mehran, 2012; 2005; Erkens et al., 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; Busta, 2008).              
However, most of the prior studies were undertaken on large banks operating within 
well -organized corporate governance mechanisms in developed economic systems 
and well -structured capital markets.  However, there is an increasing awareness that 
theories originating from developed economies such as the USA, EU and UK may have 
limited applicability to emerging markets. Emerging markets have different characteris-
tics such as different political, economic and institutional conditions, which limit the ap-
plication of developed markets’ empirical models. Ghanaian empirical studies have 
been contradictory in theory findings on the relation between corporate governance. and 
firm performance (e.g. Kyereboa-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006; Kyereboa-Coleman, 2007; 
Adusei, 2011). 
       Furthermore, the issue of corporate governance had also received a lot of attention 
from the World Bank ROSC reports (2005; 2007; 2010) and IMF Country reports of 
2011 and 2013. These reports cited weaknesses in the governance mechanisms in the 
banking and non-banking institutions. The identified weaknesses included lax internal 
control system, poor board practices, unsound risk management practices, non-existent 
of code of corporate governance practice for banks, and high state ownership of banks 
and they all have contributed to poor performance of banks in Ghana (IMF, 2011; 2012; 
2013).There has been renewed interest concerning issues of corporate governance in 
Ghana, however, relevant data from empirical studies are still few and far between. This 
has invariably led to limitations in the depth of our understanding of bank governance 
issues.   
        In Ghana, there were a number of studies on banks (World Bank, (1996, 1997); 
Ziorklui-et al., (2001); Bank of Ghana, (2001; 2006); Buchs and Mathisen (2005). These 
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were mostly focused on analyzing the efficiency, stability and accounting performance 
of banks without much attention to the possible effects of corporate governance on the 
financial performance of universal banks. Hence, what are the effects of foreign owner-
ship, board structures, and bank size on financial performance?  It is against these 
backdrops, that this study therefore seeks to investigate ownership structure, board 
characteristics, bank size and its effects on financial performance in the banking sector 
in Ghana. This study focuses on one important African country, Ghana, as it provides 
an interesting setting to investigate the issue of corporate governance and financial per-
formance of universal banks.  This is the gap the current study seeks to bridge. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
          The principal objective of this thesis is to carry out an empirical investigation of 
the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance of universal 
banks over the period 2006-2014. The assessment of corporate governance practices 
in the Ghanaian banking sector aims to provide a mechanism to improve investor confi-
dence and trust in management and promote economic development of the country. 
Therefore, in order to understand the governance practices that contribute to enhance 
the value of universal banks in Ghana, this study aimed to explore the efficacy of corpo-
rate governance practices, which affect bank performance resulting in accountability to 
both shareholders and other stakeholders. This research determined the relationships 
between the corporate governance practices of board structure; ownership structure, 
bank size and bank performance of universal banks in Ghana. In order to achieve the 
principal objective of this thesis, five specific objectives will have to be achieved: 
The specific objectives of this study are: 
1. To examine the relationship between board size and financial performance. 
2. To investigate the relationship between board composition and financial              
performance. 
3. To assess the influence of board committee structures on financial performance. 
4. To find out if there is a relationship between bank size and financial performance. 
5. To assess the relationship between foreign ownership and financial performance. 
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1.5 Research Questions 
             This study aimed to provide evidence on the potential impact of corporate gov-
ernance structure on bank performance in the context of developing country such as 
Ghana. Liu and Fong (2010) posited that one of the most important mechanisms of cor-
porate governance is the board of directors. Members of board of directors are repre-
sentatives of shareholders and their responsibility is to make sure that managers are 
working in the best interest of owners. Corporate governance frameworks should en-
sure the strategic guidance of a company and effective monitoring of management by 
the board of directors (OECD, 2010). The board is responsible for monitoring manageri-
al behaviour to reduce conflict between shareholders and managers to achieve ade-
quate returns for shareholders (OECD, 2010). With the development of the Ghanaian 
banking market, and because of the increase in the number of universal banks since the 
deregulation of banking sector, efforts are required to enhance the board structure of  
Ghanaian banks. 
               Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that ownership of a corporation, especial-
ly the role of equity ownership of managers, is a mechanism to align manager’s interest 
with that of the owner. In developing countries, ownership is highly concentrated, where 
the rights of minority shareholders are weak due to insufficient regulations or absence of 
relevant laws (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., (1999). Furthermore, the litera-
ture on corporate governance argued that the identity, objective function, nature and 
behaviour of shareholders vary for different types of owners, which might affect firm per-
formance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Thomsen & Pedersen 1999; Douma et al., (2006). 
There is an indirect link between bank size and profitability in the study conducted by 
Boyd & Runkle (1993). Berger et al., (1987) opined that bank size has an inverse link 
with larger banks and a direct association with smaller banks’ profitability but intermedi-
ate size banks earn high return on investment. Recently, Adusei (2011), Kyereboah- 
Coleman & Biekpe (2006), Abor & Biekpe (2007) examined corporate governance and 
firm performance in Ghana.  Furthermore, there is still a question over whether corpo-
rate governance practices have actually contributed to the Ghanaian bank market as 
intended. Clearer answers to these questions are very important for policy makers in the 
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development of appropriate corporate governance systems that are optimized for Gha-
naian universal banks. The principal question in this thesis: “To what extent does corpo-
rate governance influence financial performance of universal banks in Ghana?” In order 
to achieve the principal question of this thesis, five specific questions will have to be an-
swered. 
Therefore, this section addresses five main questions: 
1. To what extent (if any) does board size affect the financial performance of universal 
banks? 
2. Does the presence of board composition (non-executive directors) affect universal 
bank performance? 
3. Is there a significant relationship between board committee structures and the finan-
cial performance of banks? 
4. Is there any relationship between bank size and financial performance of universal 
banks in Ghana? 
5. Whether foreign ownership has had a beneficial or detrimental impact on the finan-
cial performance of universal banks? 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
          The Ghanaian setting is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First, this 
study might help us to enhance our understanding of corporate governance in term of 
agency theory in a developing country specifically, in Ghanaian universal banks, and if 
there any possible improvements that could be made to deal with. Second, Ghana is a 
developing country, thus the findings of this study should be seen to benefit many de-
veloping countries with similar political, cultural, environmental, economic conditions, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. Third, the study shall also promote and improve 
good corporate governance practice in governmental outfits. The organizations that 
benefit from the study are the Ghana Bankers Association, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Ghana Stock Exchange, the Chartered Institute of Bankers of Ghana, 
the National Banking College, the Institute of Directors, Financial Institutions, and Train-
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ing centers etc. Other stakeholders that shall benefit from this study are the policy mak-
ers in government and those in the banking sector as well as shareholders, employees 
and the general public, especially at this period that the banking industry is undergoing 
an unprecedented turn around in banking reforms and restructuring. 
          Finally, the findings of this study also provides a window into the prevailing situa-
tion of bank governance in Ghana which is of interest to local and foreign investors, 
managers and academic researchers considering the roles of corporate governance 
frameworks. 
1.7 Contribution of the Study 
     By addressing research questions, this thesis hopes to make several contributions, 
as well as extensions to the existing corporate governance literature. First, the findings 
of this study would contribute to improving or understanding about corporate govern-
ance practices in Ghanaian banking and in what ways the banks can implement good 
corporate governance that aligns with bank performance. The empirical results would 
also provide general indicators of corporate governance useful for both regulators and 
business people in making policies and decisions as well as rewarding or punishing the 
banks that have great or little intention to improve corporate governance aligning with 
managers-owners risk-taking behaviour and bank performance. 
          Second, one of the distinctive contributions is the development of a multi-
theoretical approach to corporate governance which identified specific board character-
istics and their influence on bank performance. In this study, the review of different per-
spectives clarified that there is the need to adopt an integrated approach rather than a 
single perspective to understand and explain the effect of corporate governance on 
bank performance. This study is the first to the best of my knowledge that has devel-
oped a multi-theoretical approach that combined a set of corporate governance mecha-
nisms that influenced the performance of the Ghanaian banking sector. 
           Third, this study represents one of the first attempts at modeling the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms and bank performance within the Ecowas Sub-
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region, with particular reference to Ghana, and thus crucially extends the literature to 
that of Sub Saharan Africa. Fourth, the findings of this study make a case for having 
larger boards. Larger boards tend to be associated with diversity of skills, business con-
tacts and experience that smaller boards may not have, which offers greater opportunity 
to secure critical resources (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Similarly, larger boards offer 
greater access to their firm’s external environment, which reduces uncertainties and al-
so facilitates securing critical resources, such as finance, raw materials, and contracts 
(Goodstein et al 1994; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). 
        Finally, this study established that board committees are related to improved finan-
cial performance. The reasoning is that having board committees enhance corporate 
accountability, legitimacy and credibility by performing specialist functions (Weir et al., 
2002). Also, effective monitoring by the board committee may help minimize financial 
fraud and increase firm value.  Board committees are usually entirely composed of non-
executive directors, making them better placed to protect shareholders’ interests by ef-
fectively scrutinizing managerial actions (Vefeas, 1999; Klein, 1998). 
1.8 Thesis Organization 
           The thesis comprises of six chapters.  Chapter one introduces what the study is 
about, the problem to be examined, motivation of the study, the objectives, research 
questions, significance of the study and research contributions. Chapter two discusses 
the corporate governance definitions, historical development of corporate governance,  
corporate governance mechanisms, bank regulation and central banking, corporate 
governance in the financial sector as well as the role of Bank of Ghana.   The chapter 
three discusses the extant theoretical and empirical literature on corporate governance 
and bank financial performance and the development of hypotheses for this study. 
Chapter four explains the research philosophy and methodology, panel data analysis, 
test of panel regression assumptions, selection of sample and data collection method. 
This chapter also discusses the variables used to measure, conceptualize and opera-
tionalize the hypotheses and which includes a discussions of the statistical technique 
employed to analyze the data. Chapter five presents a summary of the descriptive sta-
tistics of dependent, independent and control variables. In addition, this chapter deals 
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with the main inferences which were drawn from the analyses. Chapter six presents the 
conclusions, research contributions and the recommendations of the thesis. In particu-
lar, the chapter also focuses on the key findings, research limitations and potential are-
as for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Corporate Governance; Banking Regulation and 
Central Banking; Corporate Governance of the Ghanaian Financial 
Sector, and the Role of Bank of Ghana 
 
2.1 Introduction 
      This chapter presents the historical development of corporate governance and vari-
ous definitions of corporate governance introduced by different researchers. According 
to Roche (2005) corporate governance is an evolving subject and is not easy to define; 
definitions vary according to their context.  According to Armstrong and Sweeney (2002) 
there is no single acceptable definition of corporate governance. There is a considera-
ble debate about the definition of corporate governance among researchers and schol-
ars. In regard to the various definitions, researchers and scholars classify definitions ei-
ther narrow or broad sense. Narrow definition is based on satisfying the interest of the 
shareholders, while the broad definition extends the previous definition and include the 
interest of stakeholders (investors customers, employees, unions and the society) (Gil-
lan, 2006; Sternberg, 2004). This study will therefore adopt the broad definition and de-
fines corporate governance in the context of banking as the manner in which systems, 
processes, procedures and practices of a bank are managed so as to allow for positive 
relationships and the exercise of power in the management of assets and resources 
(Ranti, 2011). This is with the aim of advancing the interest of shareholders, and stake-
holders including depositors, investors, and customers with improved accountability, 
monitoring and transparent administration. The chapter also discusses the corporate 
governance variables and financial performance variables relevant to the study 
The chapter further provides an account of literature on bank regulation and central 
banking and different tools of regulation and control.  This section discusses how banks 
are regulated and the rationale and types of regulation. Within this discussion, different 
tools of regulation applied in the financial markets were examined. These instruments of 
regulation include capital requirements, licensing regulation, government safety nets 
and regulatory monitoring.  Also, the chapter discusses the corporate governance of fi-
nancial institutions with particular focus on Ghanaian banks in the financial system.  
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Considering that banks in Ghana are dominant financial institutions in the financial sec-
tor by adopting effective corporate governance practices are essential to achieving and 
maintaining public trust and confidence in the Ghanaian banking system, which are cru-
cial to the proper functioning of the banking sector and economy as a whole. Poor cor-
porate governance can contribute bank failures, which can in turn pose significant public 
costs (BCBS, 2010).  
 This chapter also provides account of the supervisory and regulatory structures in 
Ghana. In this section, the discussions covers institutional regulation which maintains 
separate regulatory agencies across segregated business lines of financial services 
such as banking, capital market, insurance and pension funds (Group,30, 2008). In the 
discussions, the supervisory and regulatory functions are carried by the Bank of Ghana, 
SEC, National Insurance Authority and the National Pension Regulatory Authority 
(FINSSP, 2012). Finally, the chapter reviews the roles and structure of Bank of Ghana 
in the Ghanaian banking system. This section discusses the Bank of Ghana’s inde-
pendence and the monetary policy and supervisory tools. 
 This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the historical overview of 
corporate governance while Section 2.3 offers a working definition of corporate govern-
ance.  Section 2.4 reviews the corporate governance structures and their influence on 
firm performance while Section 2.5 presents an account of literature review on bank 
regulation and central banking.  Section 2.6 discusses corporate governance of the 
Ghanaian financial sector while Section 2.7 reviews supervisory and regulatory authori-
ties in the Ghanaian financial systems. Section 2.8 discusses also the role and structure 
of Bank of Ghana while Section 2.10 summarizes the chapter 
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2.2 Historical Overview of Corporate Governance 
     The word governance originates from the Latin word, “gubernare”, meaning to rule or 
to steer and the Greek word, “kubepunois” which means to steer. Nobert Wiener used 
the Greek root as the basis of cybernetic - the science of control in man and machine. 
The idea of the steer man- the person at the helm- is + particularly helpful insight into 
the reality of governance (Tricker, 1984). Corporate governance has been an issue 
since 1600 when Queen Elizabeth I granted the first royal charter to the East Indian 
Company to trade into the Far East (Baskin & Miranti, 1997). The basic issue then was 
who had power and the degree of accountability for its use. The court of directors was 
selected by the court of proprietors who were the investors in this company. The court 
of directors then appointed the chief executive officer who accounted to them (Cadbury, 
2002). The governance structures of this company were not different from what we have 
in the capitalist world today (Warren, 2000). Adam Smith (1776) noted in his ‘Wealth of 
Nations’ that, as managers do not own the company, it should not be expected that they 
will watch over the company the way the owners will do. This conflict of interest was not 
a major issue at the time Adam Smith made this observation because of the size of 
shareholdings in a company at that time and the low numbers of passive investors 
(Cadbury, 2002). 
 The debate on corporate governance continued when Berle & Means (1932) posited in 
their book, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private Property’ that due to very small and 
disperse shareholding which makes it easier for shareholders to sell their shares on the 
stock exchange market if dissatisfied, there was an increased distance between share-
holders and managers to the extent that shareholders were not able to exert the neces-
sary influence on managers to act in their interest. Cadbury (2002) noted that, before 
Berle and Means made these observations, a similar observation had been made by the 
Liberal Industrial Inquiry of 1926 and 1928 in Great Britain. The issues raised by Berle 
and Means, and the Liberal Inquiry report were not followed through on both sides of 
the Atlantic, because the 1930s saw the greatest economic depression (Cadbury, 
2002). The rather peaceful corporate world after the 1930s’ economic depression was 
broken when Penn Central, the U.S. largest railway corporation collapsed in 1970. The 
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collapse was partly caused by the failure of the board of directors to do their work of 
controlling and monitoring the management because they did not know the actual state 
of the company (Cadbury, 2002). 
         Veasey, (1993) observed that the term “corporate governance” appeared in Amer-
ican law journals and gained prominent usage in the 1970s as a result of corporate dis-
turbances like the Watergate scandal and the discovery that major American companies 
had engaged in secret political contributions and corrupt payments to their boards of di-
rectors. In the UK, corporate governance became a major issue in the 1980s and 1990s 
because of issues involving the Robert Maxwell Group of companies and the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce (BCCI). This led to the British government appointing Sir Adrian 
Cadbury to investigate the causes of corporate governance scandals and frauds. Sub-
sequently, the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee Report (1992) which fo-
cused on the financial aspects of corporate governance have had a tremendous impact 
on the development of corporate governance worldwide. 
 Since the beginning of the 1990s, and with the financial scandals and or the bankrupt-
cies which ravaged firms in the US and Europe, like those of Enron (2001), Vivendis 
Universal (2002), Ahold (2003) and Parmalat (Italy) (2003) governance of firms became 
a hot topic for the media and the financial literature. Several reports have been pub-
lished on the subject: principle of corporate governance in the U.S in 1992, the Sar-
banes- Oxley Act in 2002, Greensbury, Higgs, and Hampel in the UK in 1995, 1998 and 
2003, Vein in 1995, and Bouton in 2002 in France. These reports were translated into 
new laws and regulations showing the limitations of the existing corporate governance 
mechanisms, thus provoking scholarly controversies on the definition of governance as 
well as on the models which are to secure shareholders’ interest (Trabelsi, 2010). 
        The recent global financial crisis has encouraged moves toward better corporate 
governance, therefore has driven governments to make changes to their corporate gov-
ernance structures and requirements in the financial markets (OECD, 2010, Kirkpatrick, 
2009). The UNCTAD report (2010) & OECD, (2010) highlighted corporate governance 
deficiencies in the areas, for example, risk management practices, remuneration and 
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compensation systems,  board practices, disclosures and transparency. These reports 
have facilitated new global corporate governance codes and guidelines (OECD, 2010, 
BCBS, 2010, 2015 and the UK FRC, 2012; 2016).  However, in developing countries, 
such as Ghana most of these components of corporate governance  have been missing 
due to weak regulation, perceived  corrupt judiciary, political interference and the lack of 
capital market discipline. Ghana, being an emerging market with recent findings of huge 
oil and gas reserves, cannot be an exception. Strong corporate governance structure is 
imperative for any country to ensure the economic health of its financial institutions. 
 
2.3 Corporate Governance Definitions 
 Corporate governance is not easy to define as a result of the perpetually expanding 
boundaries of the subject (Roche, 2005). Corporate governance can be defined as the 
relationship among shareholders, board of directors and the top management in deter-
mining the direction and the performance of a corporation (Wheelan and Hunger, 2006). 
Definitions vary according to context and cultural situations (Armstrong & Sweeney, 
2002) and the perspective of different researchers. Some schools of thought argue that 
the primary responsibility of firms is maximization of the wealth of the shareholders 
(Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Other schools of thought also argue that a firm has an ob-
ligation, not only to its shareholders but all stakeholders whose contribution is neces-
sary for the success of the firm (Donaldson, 1983; Freeman, 1984). Corporate govern-
ance is about oversight, process, independence and accountability. It has been defined 
either narrowly or broadly by different scholars and practitioners depending on their 
background and focus (Salacuse, 2002).  
       The narrow definition lays emphasis on the rules in capital markets governing equi-
ty investments and publicly listed firms. This includes listing requirements, insider deal-
ing arrangements, disclosure and accounting rules, and the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights. This definition is more specific to the provision of finance and fo-
cuses on how outsider investors protect themselves against expropriation by insiders. 
This also includes protection of minority rights and the strength of creditor rights, as re-
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flected in collateral and bankruptcy laws (Claessens,2003; Mayer, 1997). Narrow defini-
tions are based on satisfying the interest of the shareholders. This definition is close to 
the one advanced by Shleifer & Vishny (1997) in their seminal review on corporate gov-
ernance. They refer to   corporate governance as dealing with the ways in which suppli-
ers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their invest-
ments. This definition can be expanded to address the various types of suppliers of fi-
nance. Thus, one can define corporate governance as being concerned with the resolu-
tion of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of 
conflicts of interest among various corporate claimholders (Becht, Bolton and Roell, 
2005). However, broader definitions extend the narrow definitions and based on satisfy-
ing the stakeholders (Gillan, 2006; Sternberg, 2004) 
 The broader definition however broadens the scope to cover not only internal structures 
and their formal rules but also the external environment and the informal practices that 
evolve in the absence of weakness of the formal rules (Dcyk, 2001). This definition is in 
tandem with the one used by Sir Adrian Cadbury, the head of the committee established 
to investigate the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance frauds in the United 
Kingdom. Cadbury (1992) defines corporate governance as the system by which com-
panies are directed and controlled. An even broader definition characterizes a corporate 
governance system as “the complex set of constraints that shape the ex- post bargain-
ing over the quasi- rents generated by firms” (Zingales, 1998). This definition focuses on 
the division of claims. It can be expanded to include the complex set of constraints that 
determine the quasi- rent (profits) generated by the firm in the course of relationships 
and to shape the ex- post bargaining over them.. The Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD, 2004) defines corporate governance as a system on 
the basis on which companies are directed and managed. 
         It is upon this system that specifications are given for the distribution of competen-
cies and responsibilities among the parties included (board directors, executive man-
agement and shareholders). Consistent with the OECD definition, BCBS (2006; 2010; 
2015) defines corporate governance from a banking perspective as the manner in which 
banking business and the affairs of an individual bank are governed by their board of 
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directors and senior management.  Bank regulators play a crucial role in the corporate 
governance of banks. In this connection, the FDIC has a different view of corporate 
governance than Shleifer & Vishny (1997), OECD (2004) and BCBS (2006; 2010). The 
FDIC said “corporate governance generally can be defined as the process of managing 
an organization’s affairs or ensuring accountability. It includes a range of activities, such 
as setting business strategies and objectives, determining risk appetite, establishing cul-
ture and values, developing internal policies, and monitoring performance (FDIC, 2005). 
Corporate fairness, transparency, and accountability are viewed as goals of corporate 
governance. To some, corporate governance simply means more than active and in-
volved participation by the board of directors; others emphasize corporate “democracy” 
or broader shareholder participation (FDIC Outlook, Fall, 2005). 
      Arun & Turner (2004) support the broader definition of corporate governance by ar-
guing that the special nature of banking requires not only a broader view of corporate 
governance, but also state intervention in order to restrain the behaviour of bank man-
agement. They further argue that the unique nature of banking firms whether in the de-
veloped or developing countries require that a broader view of corporate governance, 
which encapsulates both shareholders and depositors, be adopted for banks. They posit 
that, in particular, the nature of the banking firms is such that regulation is necessary to 
protect depositors, investors as well as the overall banking system. This study will there-
fore adopt the above view and define corporate governance in the context of banking as 
the manner in which systems, procedures, processes and practices of a bank are man-
aged so as to allow for positive relationships and the exercise of power in the manage-
ment of assets and resources (Ranti, 2011). This is with the aim of advancing the inter-
est of shareholders, and other stakeholders with improved accountability, monitoring 
and transparent administration. This study also recognizes that board of directors, own-
ership structure and bank size are essential to the definition of corporate governance. 
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2.4 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
The aim of corporate governance as a mechanism is to deal with problems arising from 
control and ownership separation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Governance mechanisms 
are sometimes grouped into ‘internal and external’ mechanisms. The agency or finance 
approach focuses on internal governance mechanisms where the behavior of managers 
who have incentives to deviate from shareholder value-maximization is efficiently re-
strained by the board of directors representing the shareholders. This approach also 
recognizes the role of the external governance mechanisms, whereby the external mar-
kets for capital, for managers, and for corporate control help in providing market disci-
pline and enforcing internal arrangements. Two types of governance mechanisms – ex-
ternal and internal for mitigating agency problems are proposed by agency theory (Jen-
sen, 1993). Internal control mechanisms include board of directors, ownership structure, 
executive compensation and financial policies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Dennis and 
McConnel, 2003). Keasey and Wright (1997) suggested that the key internal control 
mechanisms include ownership structure (institutional and managerial ownership), 
board structure (board size, composition and committee structures), CEO duality, inter-
nal auditing and information disclosure. Whereas external control governance mecha-
nisms include the market for corporate control, legal system, and the factor and product 
market (Bushman and Smith, 2001). External governance mechanisms are also known 
as the collection of rules, external to the banking firms which complement good internal 
corporate governance because they expose management to disciplining forces external 
to the bank and regulatory authorities   . 
         It is suggested that these external control mechanisms are able to provide protec-
tion and checks of the operations of the firm, enabling discipline of the management and 
shareholders. Farinha (2003) extended the previous arguments and added some items 
such as the role of reputation, security analysts, dividend policy and debt policy. Mean-
while, Hassan (2009) researched the corporate governance in Australia and categorized 
the monitoring of corporate governance mechanisms inti three groups-: (i) mechanisms 
within the company that included board size, board composition, board committees, 
CEO duality, CEO tenure, CEO remuneration, director ownership and managerial own-
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ership, (ii) mechanisms outside the company that included ownership concentration, 
debts and corporate takeovers; and (iii) government regulation, external audits and ac-
counting standards.  
In general, the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm financial perfor-
mance produced mixed and inconclusive results all over the world. These evidences 
however are still not convincing in proving a connection between good corporate gov-
ernance practices and firm performance (Heracleous, 2001). In the next section, a de-
tailed and comprehensive review of studies in corporate governance mechanisms rele-
vant to this study is presented, identifying a specific set of corporate mechanisms 
(board characteristics, foreign ownership structure and bank size) and their impact of 
bank financial performance. The next sub-sections review and discuss these corporate 
governance mechanisms and financial performance connected to the current study. 
2.4.1 Board of Directors 
The fundamental role of the board of directors is to monitor the managerial side of a firm 
and to minimize the problems inherent in the principal-agent relationship. In this sense, 
the principals are the owners, the agents are the managers and the boards of directors 
act as the monitoring mechanism. If the interests of the agent and the principal are mis-
aligned, an agency problem exists. There is always the potential for agency problems, 
mainly that agents will pursue their own objectives at the expense of the principals, for 
which reason principals appoint members of the board of directors as well as agents to 
ensure that the firm is working in the interests of its owners. This divergence of interests 
and the need to oversee agents causes the firm to incur agency costs, including moni-
toring and bonding costs as well as and residual losses (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Ultimately, the principals bear these costs, thus the reduction of agency costs is part of 
the duty of maximizing shareholders’ value. The board of directors is the apex of hierar-
chical corporate control systems, and its primary role is to monitor the management by 
agents on behalf of principals (shareholders) who elect its members. The more power 
and control the board exercises over managers, the less opportunity managers (agents) 
have for activities not geared to the maximization of shareholder value (Liu and Fong, 
2010). Thus, the board of directors is essentially a monitoring mechanism to protect 
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principals’ interests (Jensen and Meckling 1976). An independent board is generally 
viewed favourably as part of an efficient governance mechanism, because independ-
ence from management clearly enhances the ability of the board to exercise its function 
of overseeing the former on behalf of principals (Liu and Fong, 2010). Consequently, 
the board of directors has the power to engage, dismiss and compensate top-level 
managers, to ratify and monitor important decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gillan, 
2006; Yermack, 1996; Booth et al., 2002; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009) and to ensure 
that executive directors are pursuing the interests of principals. According to Fama 
(1980), the board of directors is viewed as an important tool or device to scrutinize 
company manager decisions. 
 From an agency theory viewpoint, the role of the board of directors is to provide the 
most effective device to attain corporate governance that ensures their interests; in oth-
er words, it is instituted primarily in order to mitigate agency problems (Fama, 1980). 
Solomon (2010) recommended some principles to be complied in the construction of 
boards to ensure the best structure: meeting frequently, effective communication be-
tween board members and shareholders, willingness to consider suggestions from each 
other, high level of integrity, concern about financial risks and awareness and rationale 
to solve financial problems, and to take any course of action to improve the efficiency of 
the company. Walker (2005) stated that a significant concern to which attention should 
be given in the construction of a board structure is the appropriate appointing and com-
pensation of directors.   The effectiveness of a board is measured by the extent to which 
it adds value to the company. The board should set the company‘s strategic aims, en-
sure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place for the company to 
meet its objectives and review management performance. The board should set the 
company‘s values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and 
others are understood. (UK Combined Code, 2016). The following sections discuss 
three different mechanisms (e.g. board size, board committees and Board composition 
or non-executive directors) and their impacts on bank performance 
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2.4.2   Foreign Ownership Structure 
In many developing countries, there are limited sources of domestic finance for invest-
ment (Leuz et al 2010), which has prompted economic liberalization in many emerging 
markets, enabling investment in domestic equity securities by foreign investors (Bekaert 
et al 2007). This has resulted in large increase in investment in emerging markets since 
the mid- 1990s. In common with other countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana has 
made great strides in creating the necessary legislative reforms and establishing a legal 
environment conducive to foreign investment. As confirmed by previous literature, for-
eign investors are inherently at a disadvantage compared to domestic or local investors 
due to their lack of knowledge and expertise in the local financial and legislative envi-
ronment (Stulz, 2005).Through financial liberalization in the emerging markets had 
stimulated domestic savings and growth as well as increased flow of foreign direct in-
vestment (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998).  In Ghana, liberalization of the financial 
sector under FINSAP  (1989-2000) and FINSSP (2002-2006) had resulted in increase in 
the number of banks and non-bank financial institutions  in the financial sector with in-
creased  foreign sector participation (Bawumia, 2010). 
         According to Bank of Ghana (Financial stability report, 2014) and Bawumia (2010) 
that in 1989, there were only three foreign owned banks and the end of 2014 the num-
bers had increased to 15 universal banks. One of the common barriers to foreign in-
vestment in the developing markets is poor corporate governance practices. Weak cor-
porate governance was identified as a barrier to investment in Swedish companies by 
foreign portfolio investors by Giannetti and Simmonov (2006), but weak corporate gov-
ernance partially associated with developing and emerging markets. Weak institutional, 
poor protection of investors and high concentrated ownership in emerging markets such 
as Ghana has giver arise to conflict between controlling or majority shareholders more 
often than managers and shareholders (La Porta et al 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Also, the negative relationship between foreign ownership and profitability had been at-
tributed to the lack of motivation and negotiation power of foreign shareholders com-
pared to local or domestic firms. 
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Young et al (2008) assert that the existence of foreign investors play an important role 
in applying good corporate governance practices in companies. They believe that the 
ability of the foreign investors to monitor the companies is higher than the local ones. 
Foreign investors have the ability and incentive to intervene in corporate governance to 
affect monitoring or complement existing poor monitoring by domestic investors (Gillan 
& Starks, 2003). Foreign firms including banks offer expertise in risk management prac-
tices and more superior culture of corporate governance, thus resulting better perfor-
mance.   
  A number of unique features and characteristics make Ghana attractive for foreign in-
vestors in the financial sector, mainly because it is relatively safe environment, with po-
litical stability, huge oil and gas findings, strong democratic dispensation and stable 
macro-economic climate. In addition, since 1988, key legal developments have taken 
place in financial industry. These include the promulgation of the following acts: Banking 
Act 2004 Act 673; Foreign Exchange Act 2006 Act 723; Credit Reporting Act 2007 Act 
726; Borrowers and Lenders Act 2008 Act 773; Ghana Investment Promotion Act 2001 
Act 590 and Anti Money Laundering Act 2008 Act749.  Additionally, in 2003, the Bank of 
Ghana introduced the concept of universal banking to replace the increasingly frag-
mented banking system. Universal banking concept, which involves the removal of re-
strictions on banking activity, was introduced to allow banks to choose the type of bank-
ing services they would like to offer in line with their capital, risk appetite, and business 
orientation. The introduction of universal banking was a basically a recognition that the 
financial system had to become integrated and thus the old divisions between commer-
cial banks, development banks and merchant banks had become anachronistic 
(Bawumia, 2010). Hence, considering the important impact of the foreign investors on 
bank performance in the developing countries as explained above, this study will inves-
tigate the impact of foreign ownership on bank performance for the period 2006-2014. 
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2.4.3 Bank Size 
Different researchers report an ambiguous relationship between the bank size and firm 
performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Nenova, 2003; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005).Short and Keasey (1999) and Joh (2003) argue that larger 
banks have better opportunity than the smaller ones in creating and generating funds 
internally and accessing external resources. In addition, larger banks might benefit from 
economies of scale by creating entry barriers with a positive effect on firm performance. 
Furthermore, Jensen (1986) points out that firm size may be used as a proxy for the 
agency problem. He reports that managers have motivation to increase the firm size 
beyond the target which will indicate more power, when the amount of assets under 
their control is larger. Fama and Jensen (1983), Booth and Deli (1996) and Boone et al. 
(2007) argue that as the bank size increases the firm becomes more diversified. This 
means that larger can explain the natural complexity of the company. Also, it means 
that larger firms need more advice on the board. In addition, larger firms are correlated 
with complex operations in order to pursue the company strategies more efficiently. Ser-
rasqueiro and Nunes (2008) recommend larger firm sizes to benefit performance. 
 This is because, large firms have better opportunity to raise funds and more diversified 
strategies. In addition it has wide variety of expertise management. Black et al. (2006b) 
show that the firm size positively affects firm performance. On the other hand, other re-
searchers (Nenova, 2003; Garen, 1994; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) report that large 
firms are subjected to more inspections and scrutiny. Thus, it might be costly for the 
controlling families to extract private profits (Nenova, 2003). Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) report a negative relationship between the firm size and firm performance. They 
argue that larger firms might not be as efficient as the smaller firms due to reduced con-
trol by management over strategic and operational activities as firm size increases. 
Garen (1994) argues that the cost of complying with corporate governance codes re-
quirements will be comparatively low for the larger companies. However, this cost will 
increase if the companies are subject to public media scrutiny. This is because; they will 
be subject for high levels of media investigations than the smaller companies. (Garen, 
1994).  
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 Finally, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that as the firm size increases the agency 
costs are likely to increase. The increase of costs is due to the need for more control 
that resulted from managerial discretion and opportunism. Moreover, the growth of the 
firm will result in increasing the internal control tools for forecasting and designing. This 
will raise the need for aligning the interest of the managers and the shareholders (Jen-
sen and Meckling, 1976). In line with previous studies (e.g., Muth and Donaldson, 1998; 
Elsayed, 2007; Topak, 2011; Al-Matari et al., 2012; Lehn et al., 2009) who used total 
assets as a proxy for bank size, this study will measure the bank size by using the natu-
ral logarithm of total assets. 
 
2.5 Financial Performance 
 The two most common types of financial performance measurements used in corporate 
governance studies are the accounting and stock market based measures (Kiel & Ni-
cholson, 2003). Most commonly used in the accounting based measures are return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003: Baysinger & Butler, 
1985). Epps & Cereola (2008) defined ROE as the net income divided by shareholders’ 
equity, while Haniffa & Hudaib (2006) defined ROA as the earnings after tax divided by 
total assets. Accounting based performance uses accounting numbers taken from a 
company’s annual reports, which include income and expenditure statements, balance 
sheets and statements of changes in the financial position. This approach remains as 
an important dimension in determining how well a company is performing in the market 
place. It helps managers to effectively plan, control and achieve the goals of the com-
pany (Reid & Myddeton, 1993).   Accounting ratios have been widely used in bank gov-
ernance studies (Mitton, 2002; Hassan & Bashir, 2003; Joh, 2003) ,and commonly used 
ratios are return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE).  
 The ROA is an indicator of short term performance which is calculated as net income 
divided by total assets (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994).This is a percentage that shows 
how profitable a company’s assets are generating revenue (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 
1994; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). It is a measure which assesses the efficiency of assets 
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employed (Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan, 2004) and indicates to investors the earnings 
the firm has generated from its investments in capital assets (Epps& Cereola, 2008).    
Cheung et al, (2007) also defined ROE as operating profit after tax divided by book val-
ue equity at the end of each financial year. ROE measures the rate of return on share-
holder equity of the common stock owners (Ma & Tian, 2009). It measures a firm’s effi-
ciency for generating profits from every capital and also shows how a firm uses its in-
vestment to generate earnings (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Dehaene-et-al, 2001). The 
primary aim of a firm is to generate for the benefit of the shareholders. Therefore, return 
on equity is a measure that shows investors the profit that is being generated from the 
capital invested by the shareholders (Epps & Cereola, 2008). 
2.6 Bank Regulation and Central Banking 
There is no conformity in the literature either regarding the definition of the term “super-
vision”, or on the difference between “regulation” and “supervision”. Regulation, at its 
simplest definition, “refers to the promulgation of authoritative set of rules, accompanied 
by some mechanism, typically a public agency, for monitoring and promoting compli-
ance with these rules (Baldwin, Scot and Hood, 1998).  Banking regulation in its strictest 
sense refers to the framework of laws and rules under which banks operate. Narrowly 
defined, supervision refers to the banking agencies’ monitoring of financial conditions at 
banks under their jurisdiction and to the ongoing enforcement of banking regulation and 
policies (Spong, 2000). The policy justification for banking regulation principally encom-
passes three main principles: (i) to ensure the safety and soundness of banks in order 
to prevent systemic risk, and to maintain payment systems. Merton (1979) and Edwards 
& Scott (1977) noted that the soundness of individual banks provides assurance to de-
positors and borrowers that promote the public welfare; (ii) to promote efficient and ef-
fective banking systems that finances economic growth, (iii) to protect small depositors 
who do not have incentive to or lack experience in monitoring banks. As a result, depos-
itors need a regulator to represent their interest as financial institutions play a major role 
in capital formation and distributions. 
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2.6.1 The Rationale for Financial Regulation 
The rationale for a theory of financial regulation is the need to recognize first that regu-
lation is required to promote a stable economic structure in order to prevent the price 
and output volatility that can lead to financial crises. According to IMF, 2009, wp /09/07) 
opine that the rationale for financial regulation rests on two objectives: the desire to mit-
igate systemic risk and the desire to protect consumers. The economy theory of regula-
tion was first published by Stigler in 1971 and the theory’s central element was the inte-
gration of the analysis of political behavior with economic analysis. The evolution of the 
theory has centered on two basic schools of thought, namely, positive theories of regu-
lation and normative theories of regulation (Joskow & Noll, 1981). 
 As elucidated in the Body of Knowledge on Infrastructure Regulation (cited in 
www./regulationbodyofknowledge.org/on 10/3/2011), positive theories of regulation 
which include theories of market power, interest group theories and theories of govern-
ment opportunism attempt to explain the need for regulation. Theories of market power 
and interest group theories endeavor to explain stakeholders’ interests in regulation 
while theories of government opportunism explain why restrictions on government dis-
cretion need to be regulated in order to facilitate the efficient provision of financial ser-
vices. On the other hand, normative theories of regulation postulate that regulators 
should encourage competition where possible. It is argued that through information 
gathering, regulators should assist in reducing the costs of information asymmetries and 
provide operators with performance improving incentives (Botha & Makina 2011). 
 The economic rationale for financial regulation is that financial market activity gener-
ates externalities that are not easily addressed by private agents. The problem is that 
externalities generate social costs in the event of failure, especially when this cost is 
greater than the private cost and social cost does not form part of the decision making 
function of the financial institutions, especially banks. The two principal strands of the 
rationale for regulating financial markets are: (i) to mitigate the problem of systemic risk 
and (ii) to regulate conduct of business in the financial market. Falkena et al (2001), fur-
ther assert that the main objective of financial regulation is to protect the consumer and 
achieve a high degree of economic efficiency in the market. The protection of the con-
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sumer arises from either the institution failing the client who holds funds within it or 
where the institution’s conduct of business is unsatisfactory.  
 Llewellyn (1999) opines that there are three main objective of financial regulation: (i) 
ensuring sustain systemic stability, (ii) maintenance of safety and soundness of financial 
institutions, and (iii) protection of consumers. Goodhart et al (1999) opine that there are 
three main reasons for financial sector regulation: (i) there is a need to protect custom-
ers against monopolistic exploitation, (ii) there is a need to provide smaller, retail cus-
tomers with protection, and (iii) there is also a need to ensure systematic stability. Sys-
temic regulation is necessary when social costs of a bank failure exceed the private 
costs, and such potential social costs are not incorporated in the decision making of the 
bank. The regulators’ concern is systemic risk that is the risk that the failure of one or 
more troubled financial institutions could trigger a contagious collapse of otherwise 
healthy banks (Dale & Wolfe, 2003). Llewellyn (1999) argued that regulators should 
recognize four areas before setting the economic rationale for regulation in financial in-
stitutions. Firstly, there are distinctions between regulation, monitoring, and supervision. 
Secondly, regulators supply regulatory, monitoring and supervisory services to various 
stakeholders that might have different demands. Thirdly, regulation imposes a range of 
costs, and regulators are risk averse. Fourthly, regulators may change the behavior of 
regulated financial firms by imposing external rules or through creating incentives for 
firms to behave in a particular way. 
2.6.2 Types of Financial Regulation 
  Goodhart et al, (1999) suggest two types of financial regulation: (i) prudential and sys-
temic regulation, and (ii) conduct of business regulation. Prudential regulation is a slight-
ly different from systemic regulation. Systemic regulation is created when the social 
costs of the failure of financial firms exceed the private costs. This is the “safety and 
soundness” of financial institutions objective, for purely systemic reasons. Prudential 
regulation is about the safety and soundness of a financial institution for consumer ben-
efits, because a bank failure may result in consumer losses. Conduct of business regu-
lation takes in a range of interventions to regulate the activities of financial market par-
ticipants, aiming to correct informational asymmetries in retail and whole financial mar-
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kets. Another approach presented by Llewellyn (1999) identifies two general types of 
banking regulation: the prudential regulation and business conduct regulation. 
  Prudential regulation is aimed to ensure the safety and soundness of a banking sys-
tem, focusing on both financial stability and the protection of depositors. In other words, 
its main focus is on the safety and soundness of the banking system and on non-bank 
financial institutions that take deposits. Prudential control is exercised first at the market 
entry by ‘chartering’ that is the obligation to file an application for a charter. To obtain a 
license the owners have to supply sufficient equity capital. A minimum capital is re-
quired as a cushion against losses. The chartering of new financial institution is also 
subject to screening of the proposed managers to prevent undesirable people from con-
trolling them. According to Mishkin (1997) an adverse selection problem arises as finan-
cial activities may attract entrepreneurs wishing to engage in speculative activities. In 
principle, there are regulatory levers that prudential regulations use to moderate banks’ 
risk taking, including quantitative restrictions on aggregate lending or limitations on lend-
ing criteria such as loan to value or loan to income ratios. Other measures include capi-
tal adequacy guidelines and liquidity limits. A central instrument of prudential regulation 
consists in capital adequacy rules, minimum capital requirements, ownership and con-
trols, restrictions on activities and licensing regulation. 
 Equity capital provides the necessary cushion against losses, since shareholders may 
want to benefit from the leverage effect and to increase their return on equity by provid-
ing as little capital as necessary.  Leaving aside any potential systemic dimension, 
Llewellyn (1999) summaries the need for prudential regulation of financial institutions 
when: the institution performs a fiduciary role; consumers are unable to judge the safety 
and soundness of institutions at the time purchases or contracts are made ; post con-
tract behavior of the institution determines the value of contracts; when the institution 
may become more risky because of a change in its behavior after a long term contract 
has been taken out by customers; and there is a potential claim on an insurance fund or 
compensation scheme because the costs of hazardous behavior of an individual finan-
cial institution can be passed on to others.  
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  In some developing countries, prudential regulation is needed as a mechanism to miti-
gate the effects on financial sector underdevelopment or constraints due to a low de-
gree of monetization, smallness of market, political interference, poor accounting sys-
tems and lack of highly qualified staff. While in developed economies, prudential regula-
tions have become reactive and less adaptable to changes in the banking sector. Irre-
spective of the quality of the prudential regulatory environment (Brownbridge & Kirkpat-
rick, 1999), the adoption of universal licensing regime changes the existing regulatory 
design (Tharkor, 1996) thereby creating further endogenous risk factors that have con-
tributed to the present need for micro-prudential and macro-prudential regulations in re-
cent times. 
 The conduct of business regulation aims to establish the rules of good practice and 
business management of banks in relation to their customers. This form of regulation 
examines how firms operate in financial markets. Research by Nier (2009, wp/09/07) 
suggests that conduct of business regulation is necessary to regulate trading activity 
and products offered in the financial markets. From the point of view of investor protec-
tion more broadly, it is required to regulate activities in both retail and wholesale mar-
kets, e.g. to encourage disclosure of information in securities’ prospectuses and dis-
courage insider trading and to establish standards for disclosure of information pertain-
ing to financial products and standards for sales practices in general, or constrain the 
permissible investments undertaken by investment funds. It is generally applied to ena-
ble detection of fraudulent activity that may come to generate losses for consumers in 
the retail markets or investors in wholesale markets. Cranston (2002) extends the scope 
of prudential regulation by distinguishing between preventive and protective regulation. 
Protective regulation involves those techniques which are designed to forestall crises by 
reducing the risks facing banks. These include vetting the controllers and monitoring the 
management of banks, capital, solvency and liquidity standards, and large exposure 
limits. Preventive regulation in the form of the lender of last resort and deposit insurance 
schemes are used to prevent systemic risk (Heremans, 1999).  Cranston (2002) further 
argues that preventive and protective techniques clearly overlap where moral issues 
show up in the form of banks taking higher risks resulting to stronger demand for protec-
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tive techniques. Protective interventions are in the form of lender of last resort and de-
posit insurance provision. Preventive regulation is the form of structural (i.e. restriction 
on entry and on business activities) and prudential (i.e. capital adequacy standards, in-
spection and examination; asset restriction and diversification rules) measures. (Here-
mans, 1999). Financial regulation can also be approached from either a proactive or re-
active perspective.  Proactive regulation takes its roots either from accommodative and 
regulatory forbearance policy or from compliance or rule based intrusive regulation and 
supervision. Under a regulatory forbearance regime, the regulatory attitude is taken for 
granted by banks and financial institutions.   
           This contrasts with the compliance and rule based intrusive regulation (Dermine, 
2013) and supervision which is an extreme version of regulation and experience shows 
that they do not seem to produce desired results. This is because financial markets are 
always changing, there is global competition, prescriptive standards have not been able 
to prevent misconduct and more importantly there is lack of commitment by senior 
management to prescriptive regimes. A principle-based, risk –focused regulatory regime 
aims to deliver and provide a broad framework within which financial institutions can 
operate and plan operations, rather than focusing the presented processes to be com-
pleted by them. The approach relies largely on the regulator being clear about regulato-
ry outcomes it wants and the marshaling the supervisory and enforcement efforts to en-
sure that these outcomes are achieved. If effectively implemented, it is expected to en-
hance access to finance, reduce transaction costs, provide efficient financial services 
and lead to the adoption of good corporate governance practice. 
2.6.3 Central Banking Tools of Regulation and Controls 
 In this section, we examine different tools of regulation applied in financial markets, and 
these instruments of regulation include restrictions, such as entry and exit policy, capital 
requirements, regulatory monitoring and safety net activities (Bangor University, Char-
tered Banker on Financial crises and Regulation, 2013; Dewatripont & Tirole, 1999). 
First, licensing regulation is one of the tools used by regulators to restrict entry into 
banking market. Regulators in most countries do not allow just anyone to enter the 
banking system, but rather screen entrants to better assure they are “fit and proper.” 
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Yet, opponents to the implementation of such conditions argue that they mainly result in 
greater barriers to entry which hinders competition and innovation in the banking sector. 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2003) and more recently Ben Naceur et al., (2011) found that 
lower barriers to entry into banking markets are associated with reduced cost of inter-
mediation. Another study by Barth et al., (2004), showed that restricting entry into the 
banking market reduces performance as measured by overhead costs. The authors al-
so found that limiting foreign banks’ entries is   negatively related to banking sector de-
velopment and increases the likelihood of the occurrence of a banking crisis. Converse-
ly, Pasiouras et al., (2007) found that requirements on entry to banking have no impact 
on bank efficiency. 
           Second, capital regulation is a center piece of government intervention in bank-
ing because it affects the degree of risk taking by bank owners and acts as a buffer to 
absorb unexpected losses. Minimum capital is required by bank regulators in many 
countries to protect their financial institutions against the cost of financial distress, it 
aims to enhance the stability of the financial system by providing a cushion against un-
expected losses when banks enter into risky positions so that bank failures can be 
avoided. Bank capital refers to the part of bank financing that comes from shareholder 
funds, subordinated debt, certain types of reserves, and hybrid debt over equity instru-
ments (Banking Supervision and Regulation report 2009, HL. 101).  The first interna-
tionally agreed standards for bank capital regulation was established in 1988 by the Ba-
sel Committee of the Bank International Settlement. Under the Basel 1 Accord, bank 
assets were assigned a risk-weighting and banks were required to hold capital equal to 
at least 8% of their risk weighted assets. Capital regulation is a useful scheme in terms 
of reducing the risk shifting incentives of banks. Since the degree or risk distortion is 
larger with greater leverage (lower bank capital), regulatory measures designed to move 
a bank, which is critically undercapitalized, to a higher level of capitalization will reduce 
incentives for excessive risk-taking. 
Third, as lender of last resort, central banks sustain financial system stability by being 
ready to lend to banks and other financial institutions in the event of a financial panic in 
the system.  For the banks, the most important component of the safety net is the lender 
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of last resort. The risk of contagion effect is a concern of the regulator because market 
mechanisms cannot insure against liquidity shocks due to market failures. Bagehot 
(1873), as noted by Freixas and Rochet (1999), was the first to state that the central 
bank can prevent the risk of contagion by implementing the policy of a lender of last re-
sort.  Under the LOLR function, the role of the central bank is to make sure that solvent 
banks can meet their depositors’ withdrawal demands. In doing so, the central banks 
lend the needed funds to solvent but illiquid banks against good collateral at a penal 
rate of interest. Such a mechanism was developed in the UK and Europe in the 19th 
century as a response to banking failures (Bankers Magazine, 1866, cited Wood, 1999).  
  Fourth, since the onset of the global financial crisis in August 2007, central banks from 
developed economies such as the USA, EU and UK have provided systemic liquidity in 
interbank and other wholesale markets. The role of the central banks as providers of 
market liquidity during times when financial markets have become disorderly and illiq-
uid, has been referred to as that of the market maker of last resort (MMLR) (IMF, 2009, 
wp/09/70). Central banks have amended their monetary operations to relieve liquidity 
stress. They have, for example, reduced the penalties associated with banks missing 
their reserves targets and reduced the discount rate at which banks could access stand-
ing facilities. When banks became reluctant to lend to each other, central banks increas-
ingly interposed themselves between banks that were short of liquidity and those that 
were long. Buiter (2008) compares the effectiveness of these policies during the crisis 
across a number of central banks, including the European Currency Board, the Bank of 
England, and the US Federal Reserve Bank. 
 However, the phenomenon of central banks providing systemic liquidity to the banking 
system and wider financial markets in crisis times is not new. The Bank of Japan took 
similar action during the early 1990s, when the collapse of asset prices put bank bal-
ance sheets under stress. Central banks throughout Latin America have provided sys-
temic liquidity in response to a number of banking crises in the region since the mid-
1990s (Jacome, 2008). Provision of systemic liquidity in interbank markets against cred-
it-risky collateral can, in the longer run, put central banks’ balance sheets at risk. It can 
complicate the implementation of monetary policy, as the central banks need to sterilize 
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ever larger amounts of liquidity and communicate the distinction between its monetary 
policy stance and the objectives of liquidity provision (Nier, 2009). In emerging econo-
mies, systemic liquidity provision can lead to a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate 
and in the longer run, increase inflation (Jacome, 2008). 
  Fifth, for depositors, the most important component of the government safety net is 
deposit insurance. This is a government backed guarantee in which depositors are paid 
off, in full or in part, on their deposits no matter what happens to the bank.  Deposit in-
surance can be explicit in the sense of a contractual obligation of the government of de-
posit insurance agency, or implicit in the sense that political incentives make tax payer 
bailouts of insolvent banks inevitable. According to Bangor University Business School 
(financial crises and banking regulation (2011/02) explicit deposit insurance  existed in 
only 20 countries in 1980 but in 87 countries by the end 2003. The IMF working paper 
(2014, Wp.14/118) put the explicit deposit insurance schemes in 189 countries and 5 
countries with implicit schemes around the world at the end 2013.  
  However, deposit insurance can also create problems for regulators. These include: (i) 
moral hazard, which arises because insurance can change the behavior of banks and 
depositors.  Beck et al., (2011) argue that deposit insurance schemes are likely to re-
duce the incentive for depositors and creditors to perform effective monitoring and to 
institutionalize the liability of the government. This would cause banks to take excessive 
risk that could hinder banking sector performance and stability. Barth et al., (2004) show 
that a generous deposit insurance scheme increases the likelihood of occurrence of a 
major banking crisis. Similarly, Barth et al., (2010) found that deposit insurance 
schemes have a negative effect on banks’ efficiency. However, Klomp et al., (2011) 
found that deposit insurance schemes do not have any significant impact on banks’ risk. 
2.7 Corporate Governance of the Ghanaian Financial Sector  
 The issues of corporate governance continue to attract considerable national and inter-
national attention and have again appeared at the top of the agenda with the current 
global financial meltdown. Corporate governance is about effective, transparent and ac-
countable governance of affairs of an organization by its management and board. It is 
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about a decision-making process that holds individuals accountable, encourages stake-
holder participation and facilitates the flow of information. The ongoing global financial 
crisis has further reinforced the message that governance of firms, especially of finan-
cial institutions, should always aim at protecting the interests of all stakeholders, which 
include shareholders, depositors, creditors, regulators and the public.  Financial institu-
tions in Ghana are charged with upholding the public trust and protecting deposits. The 
organizational structure of the Ghanaian financial system can be said to consist of a set 
of rules, regulations and the aggregation of financial arrangements, institutions and 
agents that interact with each other and the rest of the world to foster economic growth 
and development of the nation (Onoh, 2002). 
  According to FINSSP 11 (2012) the financial system in Ghana is made up of financial 
institutions, such as universal banks, insurance companies, insurance brokerage firms, 
specialized banks, capital market, investment fund managers, finance companies, leas-
ing companies, discount houses, micro finance companies, bureau de change, mort-
gage institutions, rural and community banks and development finance institutions, each 
covering a particular area of activity or activities (Mordi, 2004). It performs the core func-
tion of financial intermediation, adequate payment services as well as the fulcrum for 
monetary policy implementation.  Any disruption in the financial system will undoubtedly 
have catastrophic effect on the economy (Miiton, 2000). For this reason, stakeholders in 
the financial arena have strong interest in the good governance in the financial institu-
tions. In this vein, parliaments, governments and the private sector are prepared to 
promote good governance in the financial system (Arun &Turner, 2004) 
 The unique feature of the Ghanaian banking system within the entire financial sector 
demands extensive attention on the quality of governance systems in banks. Banks 
usually account for the lion share of a financial system in most of the economies and 
this dominance is overwhelming in case of the developing countries such as Ghana 
which is actually in greater need of a sound financial system.  According to IMF country 
report (2014) and Ghana Statistical Service, 2014), the banking assets constituted 
about 75% (GHC 51.4 billion) of the total financial assets as at December, 2014. Any 
turbulence or failures of the banking sector would push Ghana’s economy into serious 
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problems. The corporate governance of banks in Ghana is important for several rea-
sons. First, banking institutions in Ghana have special significance in the Ghanaian 
economy and their bad management would have far reaching consequences for the 
economy as a whole. Banks play a primary role in intermediation of savings investment 
as well as servicing the economic agents with an efficient payment system mechanism. 
Failure of banks due to poor governance structures would mean that the impact on the 
economy would be very damaging and dest Second, banks in Ghana are typically one 
of the most important sources of finance for the majority of firms. Third, banks in Ghana 
are the main depository for the economy’s savings and provide the means for payment. 
Given the importance of banks, their governance now assumes a central role in view of 
the peculiar contractual form of banking, corporate governance mechanisms for banks 
should encapsulate depositors and shareholders  Fourth, good governance comple-
ments traditional supervision of banking institutions, protects the interest of depositors 
and other interests in banks in Ghana, builds and maintains public confidence in the 
banking sector, ultimately contributes to its integrity and credibility (World Bank, 2016).  
  Finally, banking institutions in Ghana are uniquely vulnerable to liquidity shocks which 
can result in institutional, and potentially, financial instability. Sound corporate govern-
ance supports prudential supervision and regulation, enhancing the role and the effec-
tiveness of the financial institution supervisor.  Banking sector in Ghana is constituted of 
28 banks and almost all of them are universal banks (Bank of Ghana Monetary Policy 
report, 2014). The three largest banks are owned by the state, fifteen are owned by for-
eign investors and the rest are owned by the private domestic investors.  Of them, 7 
banks are listed with the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) as of December 2014. The total 
assets of the banking sector stood at GHC 51.44 billion while the banking sector total 
deposits liabilities was GHC 32.4 billion as at end of December 2014 (Bank of Ghana 
Financial Stability report, 2014). The total banks’ paid capital also stood at GHC 2.65 
billion while the shareholders’ funds stood at GHC 7.57 billion as at the end of Decem-
ber 2014.  
  The legal and regulatory framework for corporate governance practices in the financial 
system in Ghana is contained in the Companies Act 1963 Act 179, Securities Industry 
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Law 1993 (PNDCL, 333) as revised by the Securities Industry (Amendment Act 2000) 
Act 590, Ghana Stock Exchange Listing rules ( 2006;L I. 1509), Banking Act 2004 Act 
673 as amended Banking Act 2007 Act 738.  In the context of this study, the regulatory 
framework of Ghana’s corporate governance in the financial sector has been divided 
into six sections namely the responsibilities and accountability of the board of directors; 
board composition; committees of the boards; relationship to shareholders and stake-
holders and the rights of shareholders; financial affairs and auditing; ownership struc-
ture and control  Section (i) specifies the principal objective of the board of directors of a 
corporate entity. The board of directors is to ensure that bank entity is properly man-
aged in order to safeguard and enhance shareholder value. Directors should ensure 
that good governance is upheld in the bank entity. This section brings out the primary 
responsibility of the board of directors and they are to ensure good corporate govern-
ance is practiced within the banking entity. The principal duties of the board of directors 
are specifically stated to-: (i)  provide strategic guidance for the banking entity in keep-
ing its goals, (ii) oversee and supervise the management of the business, (iii)  develop 
succession plan, appoint, train and replace of senior management and (iv)  supervise 
and maintain internal control system within the business. 
 The Section (i) also brings out how the size of the board should be. It states that, the 
board’s size of banking entity ought to be arrived at with the belief of promoting the 
board’s effectiveness as well as ensuring appropriate representational needs. However, 
no specific number is set with regards to board membership for public listed companies, 
but it goes on to mention between 8-16 members, but for unlisted banking firms with a 
minimum of 3 without capping of the maximum directors.  On the leadership structure, 
the section states that there should be separation of the roles of board chairperson and 
CEO (Mallin, 2007). In addition, specifies, the composition of the board should include a 
balance of executive directors and non -executive directors with the complement of in-
dependent directors such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate 
the board’s decision taking (Serebour-Agyeman, Aboagye and Ahali, 2013).  
 The Section (ii) directs that board to constitute board committees as it may deem ap-
propriate in helping the banks in carrying out its duties. It further stipulates that the con-
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stitution of audit and risk committees may include non-executive directors (SEC code, 
2003; 2010; BOG draft governance regulation (2013). The Section (iii) stipulates that 
corporate governance structures employed by the board of directors should not be 
geared towards stakeholders’ benefit at the expense of shareholders. In addition, this 
section emphasizes the rights of shareholders. This include: secure methods of owner-
ship registration; conveyance and transfer of shares; participation in voting; electing of 
board of directors; and sharing in the profits of the corporate business. The Section (iv) 
deals with financial governance, financial reporting and disclosure of price sensitivity 
information responsibilities of the board, duties of external auditors; deviations from 
standards; rotation of audit personnel and removal or resignation of auditor. The Section 
(v) deals with the presentation of annual audited accounts of banking entity before its 
shareholders.  
 The SEC and Bank of Ghana regulatory measures include:  proper fit test for appoint-
ment of directors, disqualification of directors on the ground of conviction, appointment 
of qualified and experience directors, without capping of the number of directors, eligibil-
ity of close relatives of the directors for the position in bank board, limitation of the direc-
tor’s loans to 2% of paid up value of the shares held by the directors, and criminalizing 
insider trading.  These regulatory responses may lead, it is expected, to better disclo-
sure of financial information, uplifting standard of banking activities. Recently, the finan-
cial markets of developing economies like Ghana have experienced rapid changes due 
to the growth of wider range of financial products. As a result of this, banks have been 
involved with high risk activities such as trading in financial markets and different off-
balance sheet activities more than ever before (Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003), which 
necessitates an added emphasis on good governance of banks in Ghana.  
 Given that Ghanaian banking sector is relatively less efficient and less experienced for 
asset and liability management, good governance is even more required to establish a 
sound banking system.   The Ghanaian banking context has unique characteristics 
which include (i) greater foreign institutional ownership, (ii) high block ownership includ-
ing both government and private individuals (iii) weaker shareholder activism, and (iv) 
poor record of implementing and enforcing both the banking and corporate laws. Bank 
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board has less independence due to dominance of government and family-appointed 
directors who set the addendum of the board meeting to implement their own agenda. 
The management and the board are intertwined which reduces the opportunity to pre-
vent insider trading ; the independent or non-executive directors who have social or 
family connections and political connections with controlling shareholder group fails to 
provide independent judgment and minority shareholders’ rights are largely ignored 
(Berglot & Claessen,2004).  
  The existence of conflict between director ownership dominated board members and 
minority shareholders has been a regular feature in the Ghanaian private sector banks 
like other developing countries (World Bank ROSC, 2005; 2010).  Given the existence 
of political appointees, director ownership dominated board and the dominance of ma-
jority shareholders over minority shareholders, the implementation good governance 
practices in Ghanaian banking sector may experience serious setbacks which may not 
yield expected results.  Banking sector in Ghana has been featured by myriad of de-
creasing profitability, increasing non-performing loans, increased loan loss provisions, 
eroded credit discipline, low loan recovery rate, inferior asset quality, excessive interfer-
ence from the government and owners of the private domestic banks, regulatory arbi-
trage, weak regulatory and supervisory role, and high cost to income ratios (IMF Coun-
try Assessment reports, 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013). Internal control systems, risk man-
agement practices along with accounting and audit qualities are believed to have been 
substandard (World Bank ROSC, 2005; 2010). These reports by the IMF and World 
Bank have all raised serious concerns and criticized the quality of governance in the 
banking sector.  
 
2.8 The Supervisory and Regulatory Authorities in the Ghanaian 
Financial System 
 This section describes the Ghanaian external corporate governance environment. Spe-
cifically, it describes the main stakeholders charged with the responsibility of formulating 
and implementing policies, as well as supervising and regulating the external govern-
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ance environment. It also point out some challenges that the system faces. Figure 1 be-
low depicts the whole functional regulatory structure in Ghana. Generally, it shows four 
major parts. Firstly, It shows that the regulation of universal banks, rural and community 
banks, savings and loans companies and non- bank financial institutions. Secondly, it 
depicts the regulation of the market in which instruments are traded and market partici-
pants (securities). Thirdly, it shows the regulation of the market participants in insurance 
business. Finally, it shows the regulation of market participation of pension funds.  
         Figure 1 also shows that the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of Ghana 
remains at the apex board regulatory structure. It oversees the statutory regulation of all 
financial intermediaries in Ghana. The Sector Ministry has the overall responsibility to 
develop, implement and supervise the financial governance structure in Ghana 
(FINSSP, 11, 2012). It carries out its functions through four major statutory bodies, the 
Bank of Ghana, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Insurance Au-
thority and the National Pensions Regulatory Authority. Bank of Ghana is the apex su-
pervisory financial institutions in Ghana which is empowered by the Bank of Ghana Act 
2002 Act 612 to promote monetary stability and a sound and healthy financial system in 
Ghana. This regulatory institution is saddled with following responsibilities: (i) the issu-
ing of legal tender currency in Ghana, (ii) the maintenance of external reserves to safe-
guard the international value of the Ghanaian domestic currency, (iii) the promotion of 
monetary stability and sound banking system; and (iv) to act as a banker and financial 
adviser to the government of Ghana. 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission is responsible for the supervision and issu-
ance of licenses for the operation of the securities market such as stocks, bonds, bro-
kerage, investments and mutual funds. SEC is to ensure that Ghanaian investors are 
protected from fraudulent market operators and corporate insiders offering shares for 
subscription or for sale. The National Insurance Authority has been mandated to per-
form a wide spectrum of functions including licensing of entities, setting standards and 
facilitating the setting of codes for practitioners. The Authority has been also mandated 
to approve rates of insurance premiums and commissions, provide a bureau for the 
resolution of complaints and arbitrate insurance claims when disputes arise (National 
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Insurance Authority, annual report, 2013). The insurance industry is another growing 
sub-sector of the Ghanaian financial sector with only 4% of the total financial assets 
(IMF, 2014)  National Pensions Regulatory Authority has supervisory powers over the 
pensions companies. The NPRA regulates the three tier pension systems in Ghana. 
The three tier system as follows: (i) Tier 1 mandatory defined benefit public social secu-
rity scheme administered by SSNIT, (ii) Tier 2 mandatory defined contribution and pri-
vately managed occupational pension scheme, and (iii) Tier 3 voluntary occupational 
and personal private pension scheme (FINSSP, 11, 2012). The current financial regula-
tory structure is too fragmented and does not make for effective coordination and man-
agement of systemic risk. The existing regulatory structure fails to recognize the reality 
of the convergence of financial services reflected in universal banking, bancaassurance, 
etc with financial institutions offering products that cut across the traditional sub-sectors 
for regulation (FINSSP, 11, 2012). 
2.8.1 Some of the challenges facing the existing Ghanaian Financial 
Regulatory Structure 
  The Ghanaian financial regulatory structure faces a number of challenges (e.g. IMF, 
2011/11/131; IMF 2012, 2014/14/129). First, the traditional borders between the bank-
ing, securities, pensions and insurance sectors of the Ghanaian financial market in the 
post sector reform period had become blurred, as demonstrated by the emergence of 
hybrid financial products, the increased use of risk transfer instruments and distribution 
agreements between the four sectors, and the growing role of financial conglomerates. 
In this context, the issue arises as to whether a structure based on specialist agencies 
supervising different parts of the business of financial conglomerate may lose sight of 
the institution as a whole (Lleweylln, 2006). According to IMF country report 
(2011/11/131), the exact scope of financial conglomerates in Ghana’s financial sector is 
not fully known. However, the IMF reported that at least nine banks which accounted for 
55% of the banking system, have subsidiary securities firms and in some selected cas-
es industrial and insurance companies. Since the banks are not yet supervised on a 
consolidated basis and there is no mapping of shareholders and common directors, it is 
possible that affiliate companies exist, thus allowing for related party lending to occur 
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unnoticed. These growing inter-linkages increase the potential for risks to have a sys-
tem wide impact. 
  Second, in Ghana, the structure of regulatory agencies was devised from a different 
structure of the financial system than exists now. The universal banking concept in 
2003, financial innovations and structural changes in the financial system over the last 
decade have challenged many of the assumptions made in the time current regulatory 
structure was created. This raises the issue of whether functional regulatory structure 
should mirror the evolution of the structure of the system and the business of regulated 
firms (Llewellyn, 2006).  Third, according to the IMF (2011/11/13; 2012/12/149; IMF, 
2014, 14/129), Ghana’s financial system is dominated by foreign owned bank, of the 28 
universal banks operating in Ghana. 15 are subsidiaries of foreign banks and their mar-
ket share is estimated at 55% of bank assets. The growing internationalization and re-
gionalization of the Ghanaian financial markets had provided the markets with cross 
border contagion issues, cross border supervision and consolidated supervision prob-
lems, pricing efficiency and risk dispersion, and encouraged product innovation and 
complexities (Llewellyn, 2006). The Bank of Ghana does not have regulatory capacity 
and resources to undertake consolidated supervision despite the predominance of for-
eign owned banks and the growing importance of financial conglomerates (IMF, 2012; 
2013).   Fourth, regulatory arbitrage has been a major challenge to the current regulato-
ry structure. A potential danger resulting from a multiplicity of agencies is that overall 
effectiveness is impaired as financial firms engage in various forms of regulatory and 
supervisory arbitrage. The problem has been put by Adams and Taylor (2000) in the fol-
lowing way: regulatory arbitrage “can involve the placement of a particular financial ser-
vice product in that part of a given financial conglomerate where supervisory costs are 
the lowest or where supervisory oversight is least intrusive. This may lead firms to “de-
sign new financial institutions or redesign existing ones strictly to minimize or avoid su-
pervisory oversight” (Adams and Taylor, 2002). This can also induce “competition in lax-
ity” as different agencies compete in order to avoid a migration of institutions to compet-
ing agencies. 
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  In Ghana, for instance, a case of regulatory arbitrage accrued in 2004, when Securities 
Discount Company Investment and Loan (SDCIL) a subsidiary of Securities Discount 
Company regulated and supervised by Securities and Exchange Commission, which 
the holding company Securities Discount House Company was regulated and super-
vised by the Bank of Ghana. As a result of the liquidation of SDCIL for non-payment of 
loans, this led to the collapse of the holding company Securities Discount House Ltd. 
This transaction provided a space for regulatory arbitrage because looser regulations in 
the financial sector (Bank of Ghana Report, 2006).Fifth, the proliferation of local instit-
tions and subsidiaries of foreign institutions after the deregulation of the financial sector 
posed considerable regulation and supervisory challenges for the Ghanaian regulators, 
since most of these regulators lacked managerial capacity, and cross border regulatory 
experience. Finally, the current regulatory structure also faces the challenges of keeping 
up with and adapting to the impact of domestic competition and global competition 
pressures (Bamber et al, 2001, Rossouw et al., 2002). These include changes in inter-
national financial regulations and standards (e.g. IFRS and Basel II & III) 
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FIGURE 1 THE CURRENT MULTIPLE REGULATORS (INSTITUTIONAL 
REGULATION) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of Ghana Website (2012) ; National Insurance Commission, annual re-
port,(2013). 
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2.9 The Structure and Role of the Bank of Ghana 
  The Ghanaian government wholly owns the Bank of Ghana. The Bank of Ghana is the 
apex regulatory body for banks and non-banking financial institutions operating in Gha-
na by the virtue of Bank of Ghana Act 2002 Act 612, and Banking Act 2004 Act 673 as 
amended by Banking Act 2007 Act 738.  Under the Bank of Ghana Act 2002 Act 612 
oversight responsibility has been entrusted to one governor and two deputy governors 
and nine independent directors appointed by the Government of Ghana with back-
grounds in economics, accounting, banking, legal and risk. The Governor is the chair-
man of the board of directors as well as the chief executive officer. The two Deputy 
Governors support the Governor in the running the affairs of the central bank. As de-
picted in Figure 2 the first (1st) Deputy Governor has responsibility for  banking opera-
tions, the center for training and professional development,  currency, risk management 
and information technology, while the second (2nd) Deputy Governor oversight for bank 
supervision, other financial institutions regulations,  legal and administration, financial 
stability and research departments.  
   A central bank, reserve bank, or monetary authority is a public institution that usually 
issues currency, regulates money supply, controls interest rates and also supervises the 
banking sector (Solomon, 2013).  Central banks exist in most countries for the purpose 
of acting as bankers to other banks thereby ensuring a smooth operation of the banking 
system. They also act as bankers to the governments. In this function, the central banks 
control money supply, funding of government’s business and implementation of mone-
tary policy of the government (Begg et al., 1991). The Central banks possess a mo-
nopoly on issuance of the national currency which usually serves as the nation’s legal 
tender (Arthur & Sullivan, 2003). Example includes the Bank of England, the Bank of 
Japan, the Federal Reserve of the U.S.A, the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Bank of 
Ghana. Central Banks around the world plays other functions which include: implement-
ing monetary policies, determining interest rates and managing the money supply. Ac-
cording to the IMF (2009, WP 09/07) the role of central banks in  financial stability in-
clude, determining  interest rates; provision of systemic liquidity , lender of last resort, 
oversight of payment and settlement system, regulating and supervising the banking 
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industry, managing country foreign exchange reserves including gold reserves, and also 
issuance and coordinating government debts.  
              The Bank of Ghana is pivotal in the management of the Ghanaian economy. Its 
role is not only to regulate and monitor the financial system, but also to ensure its de-
velopment, prevent financial distress which could undermine confidence in the system 
as well as facilitate sustained growth. The pervasive role of the Bank of Ghana is also 
appreciated in the light of its continuous monitoring of the domestic and international 
economies. Its knowledge of the economic environment is the major source of infor-
mation for economic planning. Bank of Ghana possesses a monopoly in the printing of 
national currency (Cedi), which serves as the nation’s legal tender. The Bank of Ghana 
is also  responsible for the stability of the monetary system through its monetary policy 
function, for the oversight of financial system infrastructure, that is systemically im-
portant to the country, in particular payment systems, and for “maintaining a broad 
overview of the system as a whole”.  
  In addition, the Bank of Ghana also has statutory responsibility for the payment and 
settlement systems in Ghana. This responsibility is enshrined in the Bank of Ghana, Act 
(2002) Act 612 which empowers the Bank of Ghana to “promote, regulate, and super-
vise payment and settlement systems”. Specifically, the Payment System Act 2003 Act 
662 also authorizes the Bank of Ghana to establish, operate, promote, designate and 
supervise payments, funds transfer, clearing and settlement system in the interest  of 
the public (Bank of Ghana, 2013).  Bank of Ghana also performs a variety of other func-
tions, such as managing the supply of currency ,managing the payments system, acting 
as the government’s fiscal agent, advising government on the exchange rate or public 
debt, supervising and regulating the domestic banking system, and stabilizing the bank-
ing system by acting as lender of last resort. The Bank of Ghana also play an interna-
tional role, by cooperating with other central banks through international organizations 
such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and Bank for International Set-
tlement (BIS) and take part in international forums such as IMF annual meetings. 
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FIGURE 2 THE STRUCTURE OF BANK OF GHANA 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bank of Ghana Website (2012) 
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2.9.1 Dimensions of Bank of Ghana’s independence   
          The Bank of Ghana’s independence has various dimensions, namely institutional 
independence, functional independence, personnel independence and operational in-
dependence. First, institutional independence is also referred to as goal autonomy 
which can be defined as the ability of a central bank to remove political influence in de-
fining its policy objectives (Walsh 2005). Under the goal independence, the Bank of 
Ghana has the right to set its own policy goals, whether inflation targeting, control of 
money supply, or maintaining a managed floating exchange rate. Under this type of in-
dependence, the Bank of Ghana announces their policy goals in partnership with the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. This increases the transparency of the pol-
icy setting process and thereby increases the credibility of the goals chosen by provid-
ing assurance that they will not be changed without notice. In addition, the setting of 
common goals by the Bank of Ghana and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
helps to avoid situations where monetary and fiscal policy are in conflict; a policy com-
bination that is clearly sub-optimal.                                                                                                                             
  Second, functional independence is also referred to as instrument independence 
which can be defined as the ability of the central bank to freely implement policy in pur-
suit of monetary goals (Walsh, 2005). Instrument independence refers to the ability of 
central bank to use full range of monetary policy instruments without restrictions from 
the executive and legislature. The Bank of Ghana Act 2002 Act 612 has given Bank of 
Ghana the independence to determine the best way of achieving policy goals, including 
the types of instruments used and the timing of their use. For example, Bank of Ghana’s 
instruments commonly used for open market operation include government treasury 
bills, Bank of Ghana treasury bills, and prime commercial papers (Bawumia, 2010). The 
setting of monetary instruments values (like the level of the repurchase agreement rate; 
policy rates and discount rate) are entirely up to the Bank of Ghana.  However, the Bank 
of Ghana Act 2002 Act 612 further goes to provide for Minister of Finance and Econom-
ic Planning powers that may influence the manner in which the central bank carries its 
mandate. This essentially means that instrument independence is granted to the Bank 
of Ghana by the Act 612 but this independence is limited by the powers granted to the 
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Finance Minister. The Ministerial powers appear to be in conflict with the provisions of 
the Act on independence and in my view there is a need to reform the Ghanaian legisla-
tion on central banking to make the Bank of Ghana truly independent.  
  Third, turning to personnel independence, the Bank of Ghana Act 2002 Act 612 pro-
vides for a minimum term of office of four years for both the Governor and two deputy 
Governors and this protect them against arbitrary dismissals  Personnel independence 
of the central bank refers to the influence the government has in appointment proce-
dures. It is not feasible to exclude government influence completely in appointments to 
a public institution in the developing country such as the central bank, however, the lev-
el of influence may be determined by criteria such as government representation in the 
board of the central bank and government influence in the appointment procedures, 
terms of office and dismissal of the governing board of the bank (Eijffinger& De Haan, 
1996). Under this type of independence the central bank also has the authority to run its 
own operations (appointing staff, setting budgets, and so on.) without excessive in-
volvement of the government.  The Bank of Ghana Act 2002 Act 612 provides for the 
appointment of Governor as the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank of Ghana and two 
Deputy Governors. The Governor and two deputies are to be appointed by the Presi-
dent of Ghana through a transparent and competitive process and with the approval of 
the Council of State to hold office for a term of 4 years and eligible for another term of 
four years.  This guarantees the tenure of office of the governor and two deputies. The 
President of Ghana also in conjunction with the Council of State under the Bank of 
Ghana Act 2002 Act 612 also appoints nine independent directors with varied experi-
ence in finance, economics and law to the board for a term of four years.  
 Finally, operational independence is an essential prerequisite for an effective regulatory 
regime and for maintaining a fair and equitable financial system. Regulator must there-
fore operate independently, without fear, favour or prejudice.  Operational independ-
ence relates to the central bank’s freedom to pronounce ruling on the basis of the laws 
passed by legislature. Under the Bank of Ghana Act 2002 Act 612, the Bank of Ghana’s 
operational independence includes the freedom to approve, disapprove and revoke li-
censes, decide to conduct on and off- site examination, as well as take enforcement ac-
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tion against a person or entity based upon evidence of violation of a law or regulation. 
The two dimensions of central bank operational independence: - independence from 
political interference and freedom regulatory capture- are equally important and call for 
a balanced approach to regulation that will not promote one at the expense of the other. 
However,  recent IMF country reports (2011,11/131; 2012, 2013), noted that regulatory 
gaps such as the disorderly existence of banks, regulatory forbearances and low com-
pliance with the Basle Core principles have undermined the Bank of Ghana’s operation-
al independence. 
2.9.2 Bank of Ghana’s Monetary and Regulatory Tools  
  Bank of Ghana exists in Ghana for the purpose of acting as banker to other banks 
thereby ensuring a smooth operation of the Ghanaian banking system. It also acts as a 
banker to the government. In this function, the Bank of Ghana controls money supply, 
funding of the government’s business and implementation of monetary policy of the 
government. The Bank of Ghana is the authority with the mandate of manipulating 
monetary policy; through monetary policy tools, to achieve desired macroeconomic ob-
jectives which include; the achievement of price stability with respect to both domestic 
and external prices. Prior to the financial sector reform in 1988, the Bank of Ghana op-
erated a system of managing the amount of money in the economy by using direct con-
trols and a fixed exchange rate system (Alexander et al., 1995; Roe and Sowa, 1997)  
 Direct instruments function according to regulations (granted to the central bank) that 
directly affect either the interest rate or the volume of credit, for example, administrative-
ly set interest rate ceilings, individual bank credit ceilings and direct lending. Direct in-
struments became increasingly ineffective as money and financial markets developed: 
besides, they created distortions, including financial repression, and promoted financial 
disintermediation, and fiscal dominance. As part of a broader set of  financial reforms in 
early 1990s, the Bank of Ghana had used indirect monetary instruments like reserve 
requirements, open market operations, repurchase agreements (Repos) and rediscount 
facilities to control  the money supply. These monetary instruments are used to impact 
base money (an operating target) which in turn impacts broad money (the intermediate 
target) and finally prices. 
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 First, the Bank of Ghana controls the money supply directly by adjusting the level of re-
serves which universal banks are required to hold against their liabilities (the “reserve 
requirement). The central bank uses this reserve ratio which it fixes, to increase or de-
crease the volume of money in circulation in the country. If the Bank of Ghana wants to 
increase the amount of money supplied to the public especially in a period of deflation 
and thereby expand credits, it will lower the reserve ratio of the commercial banks. On 
the other hand, if the Bank of Ghana wants to decrease the amount of money supplied 
especially in a period of inflation and thereby contract credit, it will raise the cash ratio of 
the commercial banks. Therefore, the higher the reserve ratio, the lesser the power of 
commercial banks to grant credit, hence; limiting wealth creation and vice versa.  The 
Bank of Ghana’s level of minimum reserve ratio itself had fluctuated over the years, re-
flecting liquidity conditions in the banking system, reaching its highest level of 27% in 
1990 but progressively lowered until it reached its lowest point of 5% in 1993 
(Yahya,2001). The minimum reserve requirement ratio has hovered between 8% and 
10% over the period 1996-2011. In July 2013, in response to rising inflation and sharp 
depreciation of the local currency (Cedi) was raised to 11% but in 2014 was reduced to 
10% (Bank of Ghana Monetary Policy Committee, 2014). 
  Second, open market operation is one of the monetary tools used by the Bank of Gha-
na to regulate money in circulation. The OMO entails the sale or purchase of eligible 
bills or government securities in the open market by the Bank of Ghana for the purpose 
of influencing deposits, banks’ reserve balances, the level of base money and conse-
quently the overall level of monetary and financial conditions (Bawumia,2010).. Like the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Central Bank of Nigeria, OMO enables the cen-
tral bank to influence short term rates and reach other monetary targets of either reduc-
ing money in circulation or otherwise and  or  create seasonal or cyclical shift of funds 
between sectors (Fedpoints, 2001). The Bank of Ghana sells out securities to its prima-
ry dealers through their clearing banks and the accounts of the dealers are debited up-
on the delivery of the security (contraction of monetary policy). This reduces reserves 
from the banks and reduces liquidity in the hands of purchasers. On the contrary, where 
the Bank of Ghana is bent on increasing bank reserves and liquidity in the hands of the 
purchasers, it buys securities from the primary dealers and credits their accounts of 
54 
their clearing banks (expansionary monetary policy). Selling securities reduces the 
amount of money in circulation while buying securities increases it. This activity also 
changes interest rates. 
 Third, in 1998, as part of financial sector reforms, Bank of Ghana introduced repur-
chase agreements (Repos) instrument, which has since become the principal instru-
ment for the provision of central bank funds. As part of these transactions, Bank of 
Ghana purchases government securities from the universal banks on condition that the 
sellers simultaneously repurchase the securities forward. The tenor of the repurchase 
agreements is usually ranges from overnight to 14 days. According to Bawumia (2010,p 
.58), repurchase agreements have proved to be flexible cash management tool by the 
Bank of Ghana to manage the reserves and excess cash position of the universal 
banks. 
   Fourth, Bank of Ghana in their capacity as Lender of Last resort (LOLR) has tradition-
ally extended credit to banks that see an outflow of liquidity and are unable to finance 
these interbank money markets. In almost all countries, bank regulation involves the 
provision of a government safety net for banks and their deposits. For the Ghanaian 
banks the most important component of the safety net is the lender of last resort (LOLR) 
of the central bank. Under the LOLR function, the role of the Bank of Ghana is to make 
sure that solvent banks can meet their depositors’ withdrawal demands. In doing this, 
the Bank of Ghana lends the needed funds to solvent but illiquid banks against good 
collateral at a penal rate of interest. The Bank of Ghana’s lender of last resort compo-
nent promotes market discipline to the extent that the central bank provides unsubsi-
dized support to illiquid but solvent Ghanaian banks (Cocris and Ungureanu, 2007). Ac-
cording to Healy (2001), the involvement of central banks in their lender of last resort 
role and monetary objectives has led them to be intrinsically interested in the stability 
and general health of the financial system. 
 Fifth, the Bank of Ghana’s licensing regulation is one of the tools used to restrict entry 
into the banking market and also to ensure that only sound and healthy banks with “su-
pervisable” structures or strong home supervisors enter into the market (IMF, 2013). 
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Banking licensing is a cornerstone of bank regulation in Ghana because it is supposed 
to prevent weak banks from entering the banking market whether established locally or 
foreign banks seeking to establish a presence as a subsidiary or branch. Bank charter-
ing is also adopted primarily to prevent “over-banking’’ and to keep dishonest or inexpe-
rienced people from operating banks, either of which would lead to bank failure and 
possible depositor losses and hence endanger public confidence in the entire banking 
system. The threshold condition for a new license acquisition and authorization requires 
that the Bank of Ghana is satisfied that the directors, controllers and managers of the 
proposed bank are fit and proper persons. The Bank of Ghana’s assessment criteria for 
licensing are in line with the requirements of the Banking Act 2004 Act 673 and also 
consistent with Principles 3 of the BIS Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
(2006; 2012). 
 Sixth, Opoku-Agyeman (2015) asserts that capital regulation is a center piece of gov-
ernment intervention in banking because it affects the degree of risk-taking by bank 
owners and acts as a buffer to absorb unexpected losses. Ghana has a long history of 
increases in the minimum capital requirements, since the first banking ordinance was 
enacted in 1948 (Bawumia, 2010). In 2008, the minimum stated capital for universal 
banks was increased to GHC 60 million (US $ 16 million). Foreign banks were required 
up to 2009 to meet the requirement while domestic banks were given up to 2012 (Bank 
of Ghana quarterly report, 2008). Bank capitalization serves as a cushion to increase 
shares of risky assets since well-capitalized banks need to borrow less to support a giv-
en level of assets and face lower costs of funding because of the low prone to bank-
ruptcy risks. High level of capitalizations also sends positive signals about the solvency 
of the bank solvency lowering the risks of bankruptcy and credit default. In Ghana, there 
exists no deposit insurance scheme like Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation and 
US Federal Deposit Insurance (Opoku-Agyeman, 2015). As a result, the level of bank 
capitalization should be able to send strong signals to depositors about the banks’ sol-
vency and guarantee the safety of deposits. 
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  Lastly, the Bank of Ghana’s supervisory role is to help in the prevention of Ghanaian 
banks from engaging in excessive risk taking behavior and thus improve bank develop-
ment, performance and stability (Barth et al., 2004). Bank supervision entails not only 
enforcement of rule and regulation, but also judgment concerning the soundness of 
bank assets, its capital adequacy and management. The Bank of Ghana is responsible 
for the supervision and regulation of the banking sector and fulfills this through on-site 
and off-site monitoring, which includes data collection, placement of corrective actions 
and the imposition of sanctions and penalties. The prudential supervision activities of 
the Bank of Ghana include, the on-going monitoring of the health of an institution and 
banking system, especially capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity, earnings, man-
agement,  internal control systems: the sanctioning or imposition of penalties in cases of 
non-compliance; and crisis management , including insolvency procedures.  The Bank-
ing supervision department (BSD) of the Bank of Ghana performs comprehensive in-
spections yearly or half yearly on the banks’ operating in Ghana by assessing their 
strengths and weaknesses on the basis of CAMELS methodology.  CAMELS’ has been 
a tool used by the Bank of Ghana to assess the financial conditions of Ghanaian banks 
(BSD working manual, 2008). 
2.9.3 Critique of the Bank of Ghana’s Monetary Policy and Supervisory tools 
  The instruments available to the Bank of Ghana to meet its numerous objectives can 
be classified as ineffective (interest rates and reserve requirements), dependent on ex-
ternal circumstance when they are effective, or when either of the two conditions do not 
apply, rife with uncertainty about effectiveness. For example, in the face of excessive 
monetary financing of the fiscal deficits, the Bank of Ghana’s monetary policy tools 
proved to be ineffective. In the post sector reform period, the financial sector has re-
mained shallow. In Ghana, the two key indicators often used in gauging the extent of a 
financial system in the economy. According to IMF report (2014); and FINSSP, 2012), 
the economy pointed to a little deepening of the Ghanaian financial system over the 
past couple of years. The M2+ % of GDP (the ratio of broad money to GDP) declined 
from 36.3% in 2006 to 23.8% in 2014, while the ratio of the private credit sector to GDP 
has averaged 16.5% over the same period, compared to the average figure of 90% 
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M2+% to GDP and 80% private sector credit % of GDP of Mauritius (various IMF coun-
try reports; World Bank Development reports 2006-2014).  
  These indicators thus reflect the poor contribution of the financial system to the growth 
of the economy over the period. High budget deficits and persistent inflation have been 
two of the intractable problems that had confronted and inhibited the growth and devel-
opment of the Ghanaian economy. These records of inflation episodes have been cited 
in the works of Cudjoe (2004); Hug (1989) Kwakye (2010); ISSER (2001-2005), as well 
as the Bank of Ghana Monetary Policy Committee reports, World Bank Development 
reports (2010-2012) and IMF country reports (2012-2014). However, the main cause of 
Ghana’s macroeconomic instability could be attributed to the persistent and large gov-
ernment budget deficits that the Government financed through the banking system. 
   Second, the Bank of Ghana’s ability to implement an effective and independent mone-
tary policy is seriously impaired by the Bank of Ghana Act 2002 act 612, which saddles 
the central bank with too many objectives that sometimes conflict with each other and 
currently makes monetary policy a tool for financing the government’s budget deficits. 
For example, the Bank of Ghana Act 2002 Act 612 allows the government to borrow 
from the central bank in any year up to 10% of its expected revenue (Bawumia, 2010). 
Open market operations are potentially the most effective arrow in the Bank of Ghana’s 
quiver. But the Bank of Ghana is seriously hampered in using OMO’s by its subservient 
relationship to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, which gets first claim on 
the auction, proceeds to meet the government’s public sector borrowing requirement 
with the Bank of Ghana the residual claimant. 
  Third, reserve requirements are not costless, however, on the contrary, the Bank of 
Ghana requires that universal banks to hold 10% of their deposits in reserve, as non-
interest bearing balances at the Bank of Ghana, imposes a cost on the private sector 
equal to the amount of forgone interest on these reserves or at least on the fraction of 
these reserves that banks hold only because of legal requirements and not because of 
the needs of their customers. The higher the level of reserve requirements, the greater 
the costs imposed on the private sector; at the same time, however, higher reserve re-
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quirements may smooth the implementation of monetary policy and dampen volatility in 
the reserve market, (Feinman 1993). The government’s imposition of higher reserve re-
quirements on the banking sector may also give the government a cheap source for 
funding for its large budget deficits. 
          Fourth, licensing regulation by the Bank of Ghana has been subverted by political 
interference (Lewis & Stern, 1997).  For instance, the issuance of universal  bank li-
censes to two former governors of Bank of Ghana who just retired from active service 
.in contravention of the banking law.  These findings have highlighted lax regulation and 
supervision of the banking sector, weaknesses in enforcement and regulatory forbear-
ance. Failures on the part of the Bank of Ghana to impose stricter rules on the fit and 
proper test, and limit on individual person shareholdings in the domestic private banks 
have resulted in connected persons and politically exposed persons holding banking 
licenses. These have reduced the franchise value of holding a banking license and had 
also reduced incentives on bank owners to facilitate bankruptcy or other serious actions 
such as serious breaches of banking laws and regulations that could result in the loss of 
their license (Caprio, 1996; Caprio & Summers, 1993). 
  Finally, there has been some criticism leveled against CAMELS methodology. There 
has been a supervisory problem due to a lack of effective information and coordination 
owing to their structural nature and weak legal backing. Second, CAMELS ratings are 
basically historical but not a forward looking approach. The Bank of Ghana will have to 
supplement CAMELS with a more risk-based and forward looking approach that would 
involve considerable qualitative judgment. 
2.10 Conclusion  
  Corporate governance is the system by which firms are directed and controlled. It 
deals with the ways which suppliers of finance can ensure that they will get a return on 
their investment (Cadbury Committee, 1992; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Because the lit-
erature includes several definitions to clarify the meaning of corporate governance from 
different perspectives and understandings, this chapter defined corporate governance 
from two perspectives: shareholders and stakeholders. With a view to the objective of 
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the thesis to investigate the impact of corporate governance on bank performance, the 
broader definition is more relevant since it provides direct link between corporate gov-
ernance and financial performance of banks.  
   Second, this chapter also reviewed the literature on bank regulation and central bank-
ing. The main objective of reviewing the bank regulation and central banking is to pro-
tect the consumer and achieve a high degree of economic efficiency in the financial 
markets. In the discussions, different tools of regulation and controls in the financial 
markets were examined and these included the licensing regulation, capital require-
ments, regulatory and supervisory monitoring and government safety nets (Dewatripont 
&Tirole, 1999). Third, the chapter also explores how corporate governance in the finan-
cial sector is required to maintain public trust and confidence in the banking industry; to 
run an efficient financial system without excessive risk exposures; to establish and an 
efficient and reliable depository and financing system to fuel the wheels of the Ghanaian 
economy.  Finally, the chapter examined the structure of the supervisory and regulatory 
authorities in the Ghanaian financial sector. The chapter then discussed the role and 
structure of Bank of Ghana, its independence and the monetary and regulatory tool 
used in the banking system. 
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3.0 Chapter:  Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review  
 
3.1. Introduction 
This section discusses the relevant extant theories that attempt to link corporate gov-
ernance structures and bank financial performance. This section further discusses four 
theories of corporate governance (agency, stewardship, stakeholder and resource de-
pendence theories). Specifically, it seeks to achieve two main overarching goals. Firstly, 
it attempts to offer a review of existing theoretical literature that tries to link corporate 
governance structures to firm financial performance. The central aim is to describe the 
theoretical blocks on which the study is based. The second objective of this chapter is to 
carry out a comprehensive review of the the empirical literature on corporate govern-
ance structures and financial performance. Specifically, it traces the extant corporate 
governance and financial performance relationship literature to develop hypotheses 
among the variables examined in this study.  
 The chapter is organized into (12) twelve sections. Section 3.1 discusses the back 
ground to the theoretical and empirical literature review while section 3.2 discusses the 
relevant extant theories that attempt to link corporate governance and financial perfor-
mance. Section 3.3 reviews the integration of four governance theories while Section 
3.4 discusses the overview of corporate governance theories. Section 3.5 presents an 
account of a theoretical and empirical literature on board size and financial performance 
while Section 3.6 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on board composition 
and financial performance. Section 3.7 presents an account of a theoretical and empiri-
cal literature on board committees and financial performance while Section 3.8 reviews 
theoretical and empirical literature on bank size and financial performance. Section 3.9 
presents an account of theoretical and empirical literature on foreign ownership struc-
ture and financial performance while Section 3.10 discusses the overview of the existing 
literature. Section 3.11 presents the research gaps in the literature while Section 3.12 
offers the summary. 
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 3.2 Theoretical Perspectives of Corporate Governance 
 This section discusses the relevant extant theories that attempt to link corporate gov-
ernance structures and firm financial performance. Theories underlying corporate gov-
ernance have drawn from a variety of disciplines such as accounting, economics, fi-
nance, law amongst others (Rwegasira, 2000; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007). As a re-
sult, prior studies have adopted several theoretical perspectives. Common among them 
include agency, stewardship, stakeholder and resource dependency theories. These 
four theories are relevant to this study of the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance of universal banks in Ghana. They are based on the govern-
ance structures, and process that affect the performance of banks 
In this study, and in many others that will be reviewed in this chapter, corporate govern-
ance is approached from finance perspective, using a quantitative research methodolo-
gy. In fact, much of prior studies have been carried out based on the four governance 
theories with the agency theory being adopted as the principal underlying theory. How-
ever, given the complex nature of corporate governance, and in line with previous stud-
ies by Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Haniffa and Hudiab, 2006) as well as recent calls for 
the adoption of multi-theoretical approach to corporate governance research (van-Ess 
et al., 2009; Filatochev and Boyd,2009) where applicable, agency theory is comple-
mented with stewardship, stakeholder and resource dependency theories. This gives 
the study a multi theoretical orientation.  In a study to analyze the mainstream academic 
thoughts on the roles of boards, Hung (1998) indicates that there is no single competent 
theory or model to explain the role played by boards. Hung (1998) explains that the 
roles of boards and how they perform is consistent with and at the same time reflects 
some of the main arguments of four different school of thoughts also referred to as gov-
ernance theories. These include agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory 
and resource dependency theory. This is because of the board involvement in such 
complex phenomenon that no single theoretical perspective can adequately capture the 
entire process involved,that is the reason why this study adopts a multi-theoretical ap-
proach.  The following sections discuss the four theories and explanation on corporate 
governance mechanisms in terms of each theory. These governance theories are dis-
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cussed in under-listed sections in turn and particular emphasis is placed on those theo-
ries that are applicable in explaining the governance structures of banks in a comple-
mentary rather than contradictory manner. In the next sub sections, the four governance 
theories (agency, stewardship, stakeholders and resource dependency theories) will be 
discussesd comprehensively 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
 This theory has its origin in the principles of the Modern Corporation. It is based on the 
idea that players in a firm can be categorized into two groups:  the principals who are 
the owners of the firm and the agents who manage the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). The agency theory explains that a principal-agent relationship leads 
to conflict which can then result in extra costs associated with resolving conflict between 
principals and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). It has been argued 
that agency theory has been the most dominant issue in corporate governance and 
principal-agent theory is generally considered the starting point of this debate. Agency 
theory hypothesizes that in the modern corporation, in which share ownership is widely 
held, managerial actions depart from those required to maximize shareholder returns 
(Mallin ,2007). 
 The key tenet of the theory is that the manager acts in his personal interest and is self- 
centered. Jensen and Meckling (1976) espouse that the theory considers that, to solve 
problems that emerge in the principal-agent relationship, it will be in the right place to 
design contracts that spell out the specific rights of both the agents and principals. 
These could be internal rules that determine how relationships, rights and responsibili-
ties, and the means of evaluating and rewarding managers within a firm (Fama & Jen-
sen, 1983). Shleifer & Vishny (1997) postulate that residual rights are however accord-
ed the agent to take  discretionary decisions in allocating funds because of the instabil-
ity of the business environment  which means that on-the-spot decisions may be need-
ed because of contingent occurrences. The provision of residual rights is as a result of 
the fact that writing a perfect contract is an impossible quest. This, however, has proven 
to be a main source of the problems that emanate between shareholders and agents 
due to the regular abuse of these rights by the latter (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
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   Agency theory also considers that in a large corporation where ownership is widely 
dispersed, those shareholders who only hold small shares do not have the luxury of 
spending resources for monitoring the behaviour of managers (agents). Eisenhardt 
(1989,) among other authorities have presented different conditions under which agency 
problems can arise. Eisenhardt posits two main explanations under which agency prob-
lems can occur: "(a) the desires or a goal of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is 
difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing". The 
postulations of the agency theory therefore directly imply that the board has an ominous 
task of monitoring the agents who are entrusted with the resources of the owners of a 
firm in order to ensure the improvement of the firm’s performance. Agency theory sup-
ports the delegation and concentration of control in the board of directors and the use of 
compensation incentives Fama (1980) indicates that to ensure that principal-agent con-
flicts are contained in the board of directors and executive compensation schemes are 
necessary in order to align the interests of both the agent and the principal.  To con-
clude, agency theory recognizes the possibility for the board to exhibit inherent biases. 
The theory therefore posits that to check these biases, a board should be composed of 
a majority outside members or preferably independent directors who can most likely be 
fair in their dealings with principals and agents. The theory also suggests that the posi-
tion of the chairman of the board should be separated from that of the CEO (Bosch, 
1992; Cadbury, 1992; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; OECD, 2004: BCBS, 2006; Le et al, 
2006). From the agency theory perspective, non-executive directors and independent 
directors contribute to effective corporate governance by exercising control over senior 
managers’ decision-making, because they are seen as the check and balance mecha-
nism to enhance board’s effectiveness. Furthermore, NEDs are expected to bring inde-
pendence into the board and add to the diversity of skills and expertise of the directors 
(Abdullah, 2004) 
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3.2.2 Stewardship Theory 
 The stewardship theory of corporate governance holds that, because people can be 
trusted to act in the public good in general and in the interests of their shareholders in 
particular, it makes sense to create management and authority structures that, because 
they provide unified command and facilitate autonomous decision making which ena-
bles companies to act quickly and decisively to market opportunities. This approach 
leads, for instance, to the combination of the roles of CEO and board chairperson and 
for audit committees to be either non-existent or lightweight.  Stewardship theory as-
sumes that managers are honest, and motivated more by intrinsic rewards than extrin-
sic rewards, and sel motivated to maximize collective interests (Nicholson and Kiel, 
2003; Davis-et al., 2003).       
 Stewardship theory offers an alternative to agency theory by suggesting that when a 
convergence of values exists between principals and agents or when organizations 
promote unselfish values, responsible behavior is resolved by internal means (Dicke, 
2000). A steward protects and maximizes shareholders’ wealth through firm perfor-
mance, because, by so doing the stewards utility function are maximized (Davis et al., 
1997).  Lack of trust referred to by agency theory regarding authority and ethical behav-
ior is what is replaced by this theory which is one of the key distinguishing features of it 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991). With stewardship theory, directors and managers are seen 
as stewards of a firm whose main concern is to maximize the wealth of its shareholders 
(Davis et al., 1997). Further, the theory postulates that managerial decisions are not 
solely dependent on financial motives, but that there are other factors such as achieve-
ment and recognition, the intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, and the man-
ager’s respect for authority and the work ethic (McClelland 1961; Argyris, 1964; Her-
zberg, 1966; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). As a result, proponents of stewardship theory 
contend that superior corporate performance will be linked to the majority of executive 
directors as they naturally work to maximize profits for shareholders. 
 Donaldson (1990) opine that inside directors have a better understanding of the busi-
ness and are in a much better position to run the firm than people from outside who 
barely have adequate information and understanding of the business.  Similarly, stew-
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ardship theory opposes the idea that the CEO position should be separated from that of 
the chairman of the board and argues consequentially in favour of CEO duality – the ar-
gument that the same person holding the position of chairman of the board should also 
be the chief executive officer (Davis, et al., 1997). Donaldson and Davis (1991) there-
fore had cause to argue that the with the CEO duality, the performance of the firm 
stands to improve greatly because there is clear and unified leadership. To conclude, 
the stewardship theory strongly argues that managers and boards of directors are good 
stewards of a firm and they should be given utmost trust. The theory argues in favour of 
CEO duality and that the board of directors of a firm should largely be composed of in-
siders, or executive directors, so as to harness the superior knowledge and experience 
of such directors who have a deeper understanding of a firm’s operation. And therefore 
shareholders should give the managers in particular, the room to operate. 
3.2.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
 Resource dependence theory posits that corporations depend on the environment and 
other organizations for required resources (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978). According to 
this theory, corporate governance is a set of mechanisms that ensure efficient man-
agement of the network of interdependencies and access to scares resources and their 
management. The resource dependence theory underpins the penchant for outside di-
rectors. The resource dependence school of thought spearheaded by writers such as 
Burt (1983) view outside directors as a critical link to the external environment of the 
firm. Such board members, according to the theory, may provide access to valued re-
sources and information especially in times of adversity (Daily& Dalton, 1994a; 1994b; 
Sutton & Callahan, 1987). The resource dependency theory, however considers the 
board of directors as resources that are used by a firm in order to produce output 
(Johnson et al., 1996; Hillman et al., 2000). To this extent,  various resource depend-
ence theorists have posited that the introduction of a board of directors as an internal 
corporate governance structure is not only meant to keep oversee managers but also to 
ensure that firm and critical resources that are needed to maximize financial perfor-
mance are promptly made available (Pfeffer, 1973). 
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  The resource dependence theory suggests that a firm is an open system which de-
pends on eternal organizations and environmental contingencies in many cases to pro-
mote efficiency in the performance of the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). One important 
tenet of resource dependence theory is that organizations attempt to exert control over 
their environment by co-opting the resources needed to survive (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Boards of directors also function as boundary spanners, thus enhancing the pro-
spects of a firm's business. For example, the outside links and networks that board 
members exercise may positively benefit the development of a business and its long-
term prospects. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) observe, "When an organization appoints 
an individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to support the organization, 
will concern him (or herself) with its problems, will favorably present it to others, and will 
try to aid it". 
The appointment of outside directors, independent directors and board interlocks can be 
used to manage environment contingency. In an earlier study, Pfeffer (1972) showed 
that board size and the background of outside directors are important in managing an 
organization’s needs for capital and the regulatory environment.  Muth and Donaldson 
(1998) argue for the importance of network connections, which, according to resource 
dependence theory, enhance firm performance. Thus, the resources dependence theo-
ry views the board as a resource that cannot only supplant its need for other resources, 
but also influence the environment in its favour, thus improving firm performance. 
3.2.4 Stakeholder Theory 
 The stakeholder theory adopts a pluralistic approach to organizations. According to 
Freeman (1984), a stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of a corporation’s purpose. Stakeholder theory assumes that corpo-
ration is a nexus of both implicit and explicit contract among a broad range of stake-
holders. Stakeholders include employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, banks, 
environmentalists, the state and other groups who can help or hurt the corporation. In 
the stakeholder theory, the objectives of a corporation are achieved by balancing the 
interests of all groups or individuals. By including the participation of stakeholders on 
boards, corporations are likely to respond to the interests of society as a whole. In the 
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stakeholder approach, it is expected that compromises and negotiation will occur in a 
board’s deliberations. According to Wang and Dewhirst (1992), the stakeholder’s ap-
proach is best explained by how members of a board think about the interests of corpo-
rate constituencies and thus how organizations are actually managed (Wang and De-
whirst 1992). 
  Related to the above discussion, John and Senbet (1998) provide a comprehensive 
review of the stakeholder theory of corporation governance which points out the pres-
ence of many constituents with competing business interests. This approach attempts to 
align the interest of managers and all stakeholders.  Stakeholder theory, as discussed 
by John and Senbet (1998), emphasizes the role of non-market mechanisms, citing as 
an example, the need to determine an optimal size of a board of directors especially in 
view of the tendency for board size to exhibit a negative correlation with firm perfor-
mance. In their critique of stakeholder theory, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) argue that 
the objective of shareholder value maximization matters most because it is the only ob-
jective that leads the decisions that enhance outcomes for all stakeholders. They argue 
that identifying a myriad of stakeholders and their core values is an unrealistic task for 
managers (Sundaram and Inkpen (2004b). Freemen-et-al, (2004) focus on two core 
questions: ‘what is the purpose of the firm?’ and ‘what responsibility does management 
have to stakeholders? They posit that both these questions are interrelated and manag-
ers must develop relationships, inspire stakeholders, and create communities where 
everyone strives to give their best to deliver the value the firm promises.        Thus, the 
stakeholder theory is considered to better equip managers to articulate and foster the 
shared purpose of their firm. Other key issues, such as flow of information from senior 
management to middle level managers and others, interpersonal relations, the working 
environment, etc are all enticing issues that should be considered (Jensen 2001). 
 In conclusion, the theories reviewed in the above theoretical perspectives focus on how 
corporate governance affect firm performance. Agency theory focuses on conflicting in-
terests between principals and agents, and maximizing shareholder returns. Therefore, 
agency theory considers outside directors, board leadership structure, and board com-
mittees as optimal monitory devices that will maximize the value of firms, while steward 
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theory views managers as stewards of the corporation and considers that a combined 
leadership structure (CEO duality) and executive directors are likely to maximize share-
holders wealth. On the other hand, stakeholder theory suggests that the composition of 
the board should consider representatives of all interested parties in order to ensure 
consensus among stakeholders. The board is a mechanism for addressing conflicts and 
creating the necessary cohesion. The representation of all stakeholder groups on board 
is, therefore necessary for effective corporate governance (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) 
while resource dependence theory places emphasis on outside directors as critical link 
to the external environments of the firm, and their opportunities to gather information 
and network in various ways. In the agency theory, corporate governance mechanisms 
play  an important role in ensuring the alignment of the interests of principals (owners) 
and agents (managers), thus enriching the firm’s capability to maximize shareholder 
wealth and thereby improve firm performance, while stewardship, stakeholder and re-
source dependence theories provide different explanation for the mechanisms by which 
the board of director’s function and how it affects firm performance , and in some as-
pects there is overlap between these three theories and agency theory. 
 
3.3 Integration of the four theories 
Each of the theories reviewed give primacy to a particular view on how boards   should 
deal with board decisions.   
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Table 3. 1. Integration of the four governance theories 
Theory  Role of board  Implications for board  
Agency theory Managerial role  Outside directors are mechanisms for 
shareholders to retain ownership and 
control rights and monitor performance 
Stewardship the-
ory  
Managerial empower-
ment  
Board must be controlled by manage-
ment and managers corporate assets 
efficiently 
Resource de-
pendency 
Co-optation   Board with strong external link is a co-
optation mechanism foe access to ex-
ternal resources  
Stakeholder the-
ory  
Uphold interests of all 
stakeholders (share-
holders, employee, 
customers, banks, so-
cieties government and 
suppliers 
Maximizing the shareholders returns is 
not sale objectives interest of all stake-
holders should be upheld. 
Researcher’s own compilation from Bathula, H. (2008) 
 
The analysis in this section indicates that prior literature on corporate governance use a 
number of theories. This is because scholars from different disciplines take different 
perspectives while dealing with the issues of corporate governance. This creates a lack 
of unifying theory to the study of corporate governance. Trickler (2009) posited that this 
issue and state that; “corporate governance,as yet, does not have single theory widely 
accepted theoretical base or a commonly accepted paradigm, that the subject lacks a 
conceptual framework that adequately reflects the reality of corporate governance. As 
all the theories discussed suffer from several limitations, none of the governance theo-
ries in isolation can provide a complete understanding of corporate governance (Daily et 
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al., (2003); Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Jackling and Johl, 2009). Hence, researchers re-
cently have been asking for the use of multiple theoretical approach to the study of cor-
porate governance ( Huse,2007; van Ess et al., 2009). 
  Among various theories discussed, the agency theory perspective was the most popu-
lar and has received maximum attention from researchers and academics (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983) as well as practitioners. Based on the objective 
of each of these theories, one realizes that they are all relevant as they are geared to-
wards shareholders’ wealth maximization.  Agency theory has provided the basis for 
governance codes, standards and principles developed by international bodies and 
countries (OCED, 1999, 2004, 2014; BCBS, 2006, 2010, 2015; UK Combined codes, 
2006; 2012; 2016; Kings Reports (SA) 2002, 2010; CBN Codes (Nigeria) 2006; 2014). 
Boards are appointed by shareholders to monitor and control managerial decision mak-
ing to protect the shareholders’ interest. In particular, the monitoring role is expected to 
be effectively performed through non-executive directors or independent directors and 
that the position of board chairman and CEO should be held by different persons (Cad-
bury, 2002, UK Combined code, 2006; 2012; 2016). 
 However, stewardship theory suggests otherwise, that executive directors and CEO 
duality are expected to perform better than the agency theory. Other scholars (Boyd, 
1995; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003) have taken a different approach and have not limited 
themselves to a particular distinctive perspective. Boyd (1995) argues that the seeming-
ly opposing theoretical perspectives of both agency and stewardship theories can be 
corrected, but under different environmental conditions, by using a resource dependen-
cy theory. Hillman & Dalziel (2003) integrated the agency and resource dependency 
perspectives and argued that each has board capital and it affects both board monitor-
ing (agency perspective) and the provision of resources (resource dependency perspec-
tive) and that board incentives moderate these relationships.  
         Hendry and Kiel (2004) argue that the choice of a particular theoretical perspec-
tive depends on ‘situational and contextual factors’ such as board power, environmental 
uncertainty and information asymmetry. However, given the complex of corporate gov-
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ernance, and in line with prior studies (Nicholson & Kiel, 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006) 
as well as recent calls for the adoption of multiple theoretical approach to corporate 
governance  research (Van Ess et al., 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009), where appli-
cable agency theory in complemented with stewardship, resource dependency and 
stakeholder theories.  
3.4 Overview of Corporate Governance Theories 
 Various corporate governance theories have been analyzed with respect to their ad-
vantages and drawbacks, but the phenomenon of boards of directors cannot be ex-
plained thoroughly by adopting a single theoretical approach. Table 3.1 provides a 
comprehensive overview of the corporate governance theories and their key propo-
nents. Theoretical pluralism is recommended for this study as a critical process of cor-
porate governance research. Eisenhardt (1989) argued that apart from agency theory 
additional perspectives will facilitate the capture of the complexity of the phenomenon. 
Stewardship theory argues that managers have the same interests as shareholders; 
whilst resource dependency theory emphasizes on the linkage role of directors with the 
external environment. Regarding the validity of agency theory and stewardship theory, 
Donaldson and Davis (1999) stated that “each may be valid for some phenomenon but 
not for others”. Hillman and Danziel (2003) recommended to link agency theory and re-
source dependency theory. 
  Furthermore, Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) concluded that “a multi-theoretical ap-
proach to corporate governance is essential for recognizing that the many mechanisms 
and structures that might reasonably enhance organizational functioning. A multi-
theoretical approach will help to overcome the limitations of different theories and allow 
the study to focus more on the “inner workings of boards” Hermalin &Wiesbach, 2003; 
Pettrigrew, 1992). Considering the limitations with each of these theoretical stances, 
adopting a multi-theoretical approach is useful as indicated in previous studies (Chen & 
Roberts, 2010, Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2012). Furthermore, considering the complexity of 
issues surrounding the banking sector, it is appropriate to use a multiple theoretical ap-
proach in examining the corporate governance, as well as bank size and their impact on 
the performance of banks.  Review of different perspectives clarifies that there is a need 
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to take an integrated approach rather than a single perspective to understand the effect 
of corporate governance on bank performance.  
 Therefore, this study adopts a combined or multi-theoretical approach as it provides a 
stronger basis for explaining the effect of corporate governance on financial perfor-
mance of universal banks within the Ghanaian context. The next section utilizes the 
above four theoretical perspectives to identify specifics board characteristics, foreign 
ownership structure and their influence on bank performance and the development of 
hypotheses for the study.  The following sections present more comprehensive review 
of theoretical and empirical literature in order to explain how corporate governance 
mechanisms might affect the firm financial performance. 
. 
3.5 Board size - financial performance relationship. 
  Corporate board size is considered to be one of the most important board structure 
variables. As a corollary, the extant literature has sought to provide a theoretical and 
empirical nexus between corporate board size and firm financial performance with 
mixed results (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996). One theoretical (agency theory) 
proposition is that larger boards are bad, while smaller boards are good and effective at 
improving financial performance (e.g. Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Sonnenfeld, 2002). Firstly, 
this is because while they plan, organize, direct and control the business of the organi-
zation, the size of the board has also got financial cost implications. That is “ceteris pa-
ribus” larger boards consume more pecuniary and non-pecuniary company resources in 
the form of remuneration and perquisites than smaller boards. Secondly, Jensen (1993) 
argues that when a board gets too big, it does not only become difficult to coordinate, 
but also comparatively easier to control by a dominant CEO due to associated director 
shirking and free-riding. Some authors argue that when boards grow, they become less 
likely to function effectively (Jensen, 1993), may create a diminish sense of individual 
responsibility and might be more involved in bureaucratic problems: increasing board 
size might inhibit board process due to the potential group dynamics problems associ-
ated with large groups.  More specifically, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggested that cor-
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porate board size must preferably fall between eight (8) and nine (9) directors. They ar-
gue that as corporate board size goes beyond a maximum number of ten (10) directors; 
additional costs of having larger boards typically associated with slow decision making 
are higher than any marginal gains from intense monitoring of management’s activities. 
Finally, Yawson (2006) argued that larger boards suffer from higher agency problems 
and are far less effective than smaller boards. Thus, limiting corporate board size may 
improve efficiency.  
  Another strand of theoretical literature from a resource dependence perspective, sug-
gests that boards are chosen to maximize the provision of important resources to the 
firm (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; Klein, 1998; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  Klein (1998), 
for instance, suggests that the advisory needs of a CEO increases with the extent to 
which the firm depends on the environment for resources. So, increasingly board size 
links the organizations to its external environment and secures critical resources. In re-
sponse  to resource dependence and regulatory pressures, organizations create large 
boards to encompass directors from different backgrounds (Pearce II and Zahra, 1992; 
Pfeffer, 1972; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992 and Jensen, 1993) observed that when corpo-
rate board expand beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to effectively con-
trol management and are easier for the CEO to dominate. 
  A contrary theoretical view (agency and resource dependency) is that larger boards 
may possibly be better for corporate financial performance (e.g. John and Senbet, 1998; 
Yawson, 2006). The theoretical literature also suggests that larger boards are associat-
ed with diversity of skills, business contacts and experience that smaller boards may not 
have, which offer greater opportunity to secure critical resources (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). It is apparent that a board’s capacity for monitoring increases as more directors 
are added. This has been the position of Romano et al., (2012) and Andres and Val-
lelado (2008) who argued that a large board size should be preferred to a small size be-
cause of the possibility of specialization, for more effective monitoring and advisory 
functions.  Similarly, larger boards offer greater access to their firm’s external environ-
ment which reduces uncertainties and also facilities securing critical resources such as 
finance, raw material and contracts (Pearce II and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994). 
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Some other authors argue that larger boards are positively associated with higher cor-
porate performance, because larger boards might be more effective in monitoring finan-
cial reporting as they have the ability to appoint directors with relevant and complemen-
tary expertise and skills and, thus, draw from a broader range of knowledge and experi-
ences (Xie et al., 2003; Van de Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Stewardship theory also 
contends that superior performance will be linked to the majority of executive directors 
and CEO duality as they naturally work to maximize profits for shareholders. 
   As can be seen from Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, prior studies have found some mixed 
results on the relationship between board size and performance (Yermach, 1996; Ra-
mano et al., 2012; Adams & Mehran. 2012; Wintoki et al., 2012; Coles et al., 2008; 
Bennedsen et al., 2008).The first strand of empirical studies reports that board size im-
pacts negatively on firm performance. Yermack, (1996) was one of the first to investi-
gate the relationship between board size and financial performance in a sample of 452 
US large companies between1984-1991. Generally, he reports an inverse relationship 
between corporate board size and performance (Tobin’s Q). Ramano et al., (2012) ar-
gue that when boards grow, they become less likely to function effectively (Jensen, 
1993), may create a diminished sense of individual responsibility and might be more in-
volved in bureaucratic problems. Wang et al., (2012) investigated the relationship be-
tween board size and firm performance across 68 US Bank holding companies over the 
2005-2007, and found a negative relationship between board size and bank profitability.           
This can be explained by the fact that increasing the board size leads to increased 
agency problems which makes the board less effective.  Larger boards are more difficult 
to coordinate and may experience problems with communication, organization, partici-
pation, providing worst financial reporting oversight and lowering corporate performance 
(Canyon & Peck, 1998; Mak & Kusnadi, 2005; Eisenberg et al., 1998). 
 Using a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 and several 
indicators of bank risk, Pathan (2009) finds that board size is negatively related to risk 
taking. For the non-crisis period, Minton et al., (2010) reported a negative relationship 
between board size and bank performance. They argue that small board size was fa-
voured to promote critical, genuine and intellectual deliberation and involvement among 
75 
members which presumably might lead to effective corporate decision making and im-
proved performance (Yermach, 1996; Jensen, 1993; Vafeas, 2000)   Grove et al., 
(2011) found some evidence for an inverted U-shaped relationship between board size 
and ROA.  Furthermore, using 230 listed firms in Singapore and Malaysia from 1999-
2000, Mak & Kusnadi (2005) reported an inverse relationship between board size and 
firm value in both countries. These findings provide empirical support to the conclusions 
of Reddy et al., (2008) for the New Zealand listed firms. They reported a negative rela-
tionship between board size and firms’ profitability. 
  Similarly, using a data sample of 85 default and 243 no default US commercial banks 
over the period 2007-2010, Berger et al., (2012) found a negative but statistically insig-
nificant relationship between board size and probability of default.  They support the 
view that firms with larger boards tend to be ineffective as they may not be able to make 
good and informed decisions due to the fact that too many directors may be unproduc-
tive as effective communication may pose a serious challenge among members. The 
larger the board size the more expansive are the experiences that can be tapped which 
helps in the corporate decision making especially with the presence of outside directors 
seating on the board.   Also, Dahya et al., (2008), found a negative relationship between 
performance- related top management turnover and board size in a sample of 400 UK 
listed companies between1988 to 1996.  Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) report a negative 
relationship between board size and financial performance as measured by Tobin’s Q, 
in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed companies. Staikouras et al., (2008) examined 58 
large European banks over the period 2002-2004. They found that return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are statistically significant and negatively related to 
board size. In a large board size there is a problem of communication between board 
members, quick decision making could not be possible, which causes a great detriment 
to firm performance. 
            Using a larger sample size of 2746 UK listed firms from 1981-2002, Guest 
(2008) found board size to have a strong negative impact on firm performance meas-
ured by ROA and Tobin’ Q. Using a sample of 44 Republic of Ireland listed firms over 
the period 2001- 2002, O’Connell and Crammer (2010) reported a significant negative 
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relationship between board size and firm performance measured by ROA. They argue 
that small board size was favoured to promote critical, genuine and intellectual delibera-
tion and involvement among members which presumably might led to effective corpo-
rate decision making, monitoring and improved performance (Lawal, 2012). 
 The second strand of empirical studies found a positive relationship between board 
size and financial performance Sheikh et al., (2012) Adams and Mehran,2012; Kajola, 
2008; Sanda et al., 2010; Coles et al., 2008). Sheikh et al., (2012) found that when 
board size increases the market responds favourably. In their study, they report that 
large boards provide better monitoring for companies with poor operating performance 
due to their diversity of backgrounds and communications skills. . Using data from 147 
Singaporean firms from 1995-1999, Mak and Lin (2005) found that board size has a 
positive impact on firm performance. Their results support that large boards have better 
access than smaller ones to the external environment by offering better chances to 
have wide resource for finance and raw materials. This is line with resource depend-
ence theory that large boards offer greater access to their firm external environment, 
which facilitate and secure critical resources (Pearce and Zahra, 1991).   
Bathula (2008) studied the association between board characteristics and firm perfor-
mance of a sample of 156 New Zealand listed firms over the period 2004- 2007, and 
found that board size was positively related to firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Beiner et al.,(2006) and Henry (2008) independently reported a similar statistically sig-
nificant and positive relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q for a sample of 
Swiss and Australian listed firms, respectively. These studies provide empirical support 
to the conclusions of previous studies in UK and Australia respectively. Similarly, using 
a sample data of 8165 US firms over the period 1992-2001, Coles et al., (2008) found a 
positive relationship between board size and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q 
and ROA. These authors suggested that larger boards are able to promote effective 
monitoring due to their ability to distribute the work load over a greater number of ob-
servers. It is argued that larger boards can improve financial performance because they 
have diversity experiences and skills which help them make better decisions (Setia-
Atmaja, Tanewski & Skully, 2009). Stepanova & Ivantsova (2012) support this argument 
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by pointing out that due to the fact that the banking sector differs from other sectors, 
and thus additional skills, experience and knowledge provided by larger boards leads to 
better bank performance. 
   Also, Sanda et al., (2010) found a positive correlation between board size and firm 
profitability, as proxied by a return on equity (ROE), in a sample of 93 Nigerian listed 
firms from 1996- 1999. Busta (2008) examined two samples; they consisted of 69 pub-
licly traded banks from the 5 principal E.U. countries banking sectors (Germany, 
France, UK. Italy, and Spain) over the period between 1996-2005, and the second 
sample consisting of 125 banks operating in 15 E.U countries including Switzerland for 
the same period and found that board size is positively related to the market-to-book 
ratio and return on capital employed (ROCE). Using a sample of US bank holding com-
panies data over period of 34 years, Adams and Mehran (2012) found that board size is 
positively related to performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q. They argue that increases in 
the board size were due to additions of directors who also sit on subsidiary board ap-
pear to be important. Also, Aebi et al., (2012) find that board size is positively related to 
indicators of 372 US banks’ performance as measured by buy and hold and ROE over 
2007-2008. 
  Using a sample of 72 Zimbabwe listed firms from 2002 to 2004, Mangena and Taurin-
gana (2008) also reported a positive nexus between board size and financial perfor-
mance in an environment of severe political and economic uncertainty. Kajola (2008) 
found a positive relationship between board size and financial performance, as meas-
ured by return on capital employed (ROCE) and profit margins in a sample of 23 Nigeri-
an listed companies from 2000- 2006. Other authors argue that larger boards are posi-
tively associated with higher corporate performance (Pearce & Zahra, 1992) and that a 
larger board might be able to appoint directors with relevant and complementary exper-
tise and skills and, thus draw from a broader range of knowledge and competencies 
(Van de Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Dalton & Dalton (2005); Klein, 2002) views were 
anchored on the premise that large board size promotes diversity which gives the firm a 
competitive edge in different fronts ranging from more expertise, experiences, compe-
tencies, skills resource-cooptation, corporate strategy innovation, creativity and provi-
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sion of broad services. In addition, Jackling and Johl (2009) argue that a large board 
improves the quality of strategic decisions in an manner that will eventually affect per-
formance, as it will lead to greater depth of intellectual knowledge. 
  The third strand of empirical studies reports that board size has no significant impact 
on firm performance (Bennedsen et al., 2008; Wintoki et al., 2012; Andrest et al., 2005). 
Wintoki et al., (2012) examined the relationship between board size and firm perfor-
mance across 6000 US listed firms from 1991 to 2003 after criticizing prior studies for 
not controlling for the potential problems of endogeneity. They addressed the endoge-
neity problems by using the dynamic GMM and found no causal relationship between 
board size and firm performance measured by ROA. The results made through for all 
OECD countries by Andres et al., (2005) indicate that there is no relationship between 
firm value and the size of board of directors. Using a sample of 6850 Danish firms for 
the period 1999-2003, Bennedsen et al., (2008) found that there is no relationship be-
tween board size and profitability as measured by ROA. These findings support the 
view that larger boards offer greater exposure to the external environment than smaller 
boards which improve access to resources and therefore impact positively on perfor-
mance (Goodstein et al., 2006). Similarly, Ehikioya (2009) and Belkhir (2009) found 
there is no empirical support of agency theory or stewardship theory suggestion about 
the impact of board composition on the firms’ performance. 
 With specific reference to banking, prior studies have found mixed results on the rela-
tionship between board size and bank performance (Adams & Mehran, 2012; Aebi et 
al., 2012; Al-Sahafi et al., 2015; Grove et al., 2011). Adams & Mehran, (2012) reported 
a statistically significant and positive relationship between board size and Tobin’s Q. 
and ROA. They argue that larger boards might be more effective in monitoring financial 
reporting, because the bank might be able to appoint directors with relevant and com-
plementary expertise and skills, thus draw from a broader range of knowledge and ex-
periences (Van de Berge and Levrau, 2004). Other studies report that improving board 
size negatively affects banks’ performance (Trabelsi, 2010; Al-Sahafi et al., 2015; ) 
They argue that larger boards are more difficult to coordinate and may experience prob-
lems with communication, organization, participation, providing worst financial reporting 
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oversight and thus lower bank performance. Using a sample of unbalanced panel data 
of 69 commercial banks from six (6) OECD countries with 620 bank year observations 
from the period 1996 to 2006, De Andre and Vallelado (2008) found an inverted “U” 
shaped relationship between board size and financial performance as measured by To-
bin’s Q, return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE).  
Empirical Literature on Ghana 
 Focusing on Ghana where this thesis is based, the empirical evidence is also mixed, 
For example, Kyereboa-Coleman and Biepke (2006a, 2006b) found that board size has 
a positive association with firm performance among Ghanaian listed companies, evi-
dence supported by Abor and Biekpe (2007) and Isshaq et al., (2009). They argued that 
larger boards are better than the smaller ones in improving firm performance. They also 
argued that in small boards the powerful position of the CEO enable him to override the 
decisions made by the board members in accordance with their own interests leading to 
increase agency problems and correspondingly undermining the performance of the 
firm. Ghanaian large board size also plays an important role in improving and enhancing 
outcomes of decisions because of idea sharing and contributions, which might increase 
the likehood of the better firm performance.  
 In contrast, Kyereboa-Coleman and Amidu (2008) found a negative relationship be-
tween board size and firm performance of SMEs in Ghana. This lends empirical support 
for previous Ghanaian studies by Tornyeva and Wereko, (2012). They argued that re-
ducing board size helps in avoiding any rider problems or poor coordination and com-
munication which results from larger boards. As the board size increases problems of 
coordination and communication result, leading to decreased ability of the board to con-
trol management thereby increasing agency problem. They also noted that most of the 
bank boards are dominated by individual family members, controlling or majority share-
holders which impair independent judgment decision making process. Of particular in-
terest to this thesis is Kyereboa-Coleman and Biekpe (2006b) recommendation of the 
optimal board size of 10 for the Ghanaian banks, a recommendation supported by 
Adusei (2011) but in disagreement with Sanda et al., (2010). Consistent with Adusei 
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(2011), the Ghanaian SEC code (2003; 2010) and Bank of Ghana’s draft regulation on 
bank governance (2013) regard board size as an effective governance mechanism and 
recommend the board size of listed companies including banks to be between a mini-
mum of eight and a maximum of sixteen members in order to promote effective and re-
sponsible management of a particular firm. Given the recommendation of the SEC code 
(2003;2010), and the Bank of Ghana draft corporate governance regulation recommen-
dation of a minimum of 3 directors without capping the maximum; it is expected in this 
thesis that larger boards will have a positive impact on bank performance. 
  As can be seen from the mixed results that, there is no consensus as to whether larger 
or smaller boards are better to monitor the firm. Thus, the board size issue is primarily 
concerned with board ability to monitor and control managers. Therefore, if monitoring is 
implemented it is more likely managers’ behaviors will be controlled and agency costs 
are reduced which might result in better firm performance. Based on the above discus-
sions, this current study hopes to fill a gap in the governance literature by measuring 
how bank board size and financial performance are related. From the above argument, 
the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Ho1:  Larger board size should lead to higher bank performance 
Prior studies have provided the theoretical view that larger boards may possibly be bet-
ter for corporate financial performance (John & Senbet, 1998; Yawson, 2006). In partic-
ular, larger boards are associated with diversity in skills, business contacts and experi-
ence that smaller boards may not have, which offers greater opportunity to secure criti-
cal resources (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). It is therefore expected in this thesis for the 
board size to have a positive impact on bank financial performance. 
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Table 3.   Empirical  research showing a positive relationship between board size and firm performance in US, UK 
and Other countries 
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance Summary results 
Coles et al  
(2008) 
1992-2001 8165 US firm 
year observa-
tion from IRRC 
Tobin's Q ROA Larger board size is positively associat-
ed with firm performance (Q) in complex 
firms. This is opposite in simple firms 
where smaller board size is positively 
related with firm performance (Q) The 
result suggests that either very small or 
very large boards are optimal. i.e. 
Tobin's Q increases (decreases) in 
board size for complex (simple) firms, 
and the relationship is driven by the 
presence of NED. 
Adams & 
Mehran (2012) 
1986-1999 35 US listed 
banks 
Tobin's Q ROA Board size has a positive and statistically 
significant correlation ROA with Tobin's 
Q but has no impact on ROA 
Adams (2012)  
 
89 US banks 2008-2009 Probability of re-
ceiving TARP 
money 
Positive relationship between board size 
and performance Tobin’s Q 
Adams and 
Mehran (2012) 
35 US BHCs 1964 – 1985 Tobin’s Q Positive relationship between board size 
and performance 
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Aebi et al. 
(2012)  
 
372 US banks July 1, 2007, to 
December 31, 
2008 
Buy-and-hold re-
turns and ROE 
Positive and significant  relationship be-
tween board size and financial perfor-
mance (ROE) 
Kiel & Nicolson 
(2003)  
1996 348 Australia 
listed compa-
nies 
Tobin's Q ROA Board size is positively correlated with 
firm performance 
El Mehdi (2007)  2000-2005 24 listed MENA 
Firms 
Tobin’s  Q Board size is statistically significant and 
positively related with firm performance. 
 
Kajola (2008)  
 
2000-2006 
20 Nigeria 
listed compa-
nies  
ROE Profit margin 
(PM) 
There is a positive and significant rela-
tionship between board size and firm 
performance (ROE) but no significant 
relationship between board size and PM 
Jackling & Johl 
(2009) 
2006 180 Indian 
listed Compa-
nies 
Tobin's Q ROA There is a significant and positive rela-
tionship between larger board size and 
firm performance. 
Sanda et al 
(2010) 
1996-1999 93 Nigerian 
listed firms 
Tobin's Q P/E Ratio, 
ROA, ROE 
Board size is significant and positively asso-
ciated with firm performance (Tobin's Q) but 
has no impact on ROA. They recommended 
optimal number of 10 for Nigerian compa-
nies 
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Table 3. 2  Empirical literature showing a negative relationship between board size and firm performance in US, 
UK and Other countries 
Wang et al.. 
(2012)  
 
68 US BHCs 2007 Efficiency index 
based on CAMEL 
indicators 
Negative relationship between board size and 
efficiency 
Berger et al., 
(2012a)  
 
85 default and 243 
no default US com-
mercial banks 
2007.I-2010.III Probability of de-
fault 
Insignificant negative relationship between  
board size and Probability of default 
Staikouras et al 
2008  
58 European banks 2002-2004 ROA & ROE Negative relationship between board size and 
performance 
Fernandes and 
Fich (2009) 
398 US banks January 2007- 
December 2008 
Stock performance 
Likelihood of bank 
failure Amount of 
TARP money 
 Negative relationship between board size 
and TARP in post-financial crisis 
Hau and Thum 
(2009)  
 
592 supervisory 
board members in 
29 largest German 
banks 
2007.I-2008.III Bank losses Higher losses in banks having boards with 
less financial expertise ( Negative relation-
ship between board size and Bank losses 
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Minton et al. 
(2010)  
 
US publicly-traded 
financial institutions 
with total assets 
greater than $1 bil-
lion 
2007-2008 2003-
2006 
Stock returns, To-
bin’s Q, probability 
of receiving TARP 
money Several risk 
indicators 
Negative for performance but not significant-
ly related to probability of receiving TARP 
money. Positive relationship with risk, nota-
bly in pre-crisis period. 
Aebi et al. (2012)  
 
372 US banks July  2007, to Dec. 31, 
2008 
Buy-and-hold re-
turns and ROE 
Negative, but not always significant 
Cheng (2008)  1996-2004 1252 US S&P 
firms from 
IRRC  
Tobin's Q ROA , 
Monthly share re-
turns 
Larger board size is negatively signifi-
cant associated with variability of firm 
performance.  
Lasfer (2004)  1990-1991/ 1996-
1997 
1424 UK Firms Tobin's Q Board size has a significant negative im-
pact on firm performance 
Guest (2008)  1981-2002 2746 UK larger 
sample size  
Tobin's Q , ROA, 
Share returns 
Board size has a strong negative impact 
on Tobin's Q, profitability and share re-
turns. 
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Bozec (2005)  1976-2000 25 Canadian 
SOE 
ROS,ROA, Sales 
Efficiency, NIE, 
Asset Turnover 
A negative relation is found between 
board size and firm performance (ROS, 
sales efficiency & assets turnover) but 
no impact on ROA,&NIE 
Mak & Kusnadi  
(2005) 
1999-2000 230 Singa pore 
& Malaysian 
firms for each 
country 
Tobin's Q The results show a negative relationship 
between board size and firm perfor-
mance 
O'Conne|l &  
Cramer (2010) 
2001 44 Ireland listed 
firms 
RET, Financial Q, 
ROA 
Board size exhibits a significant negative 
association with firm performance. The 
relationship is significantly less negative 
in smaller firms 
Guo & Kga 
(2012)   
2010 174 Sri Lanka 
listed 
ROA, Tobin's Q Board size shows a marginal negative 
relationship firms with firm performance 
Ujunwa (2012) 1991 – 2008 122 Nigerian  
quoted firms 
ROAE Board Size is negatively related with firm 
performance 
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Table 3.3  Empirical research showing no relationship between board size and firm performance in US, UK and 
Other countries 
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance Summary results 
Bennet &  
Robson (2004)  
1994-1997 1445UK  SMEs Change in profitabil-
ity per employee 
There is little evidence of strong association 
between board size and firm performance 
Dulewicz & 
Herbert (2004) 
1997-2000 75-80 UK listed 
firms 
CFROTA, Sales 
turnover 
No significant correlation between whether 
larger or smaller board size and firm perfor-
mance 
Bennedsen et 
al (2008) 
1999 6850 Danish 
firms 
ROA Board size has a negative  significant impact 
on firm performance 
Wintoki et al  
(2012) 
 
1991-2003 6000 US listed 
firms  
ROA After re-examined the relationship between 
board structure and firm performance, they 
find no causal relation between the two 
Source:ResearchersCompilation(Variousliteratures)
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3.6. Board Composition - Financial Performance Relationship 
 Board composition is a debated corporate governance issue since it could influence 
board deliberations and the capability to control top management decisions and results. 
Although there is not an optimal formula (Vance, 1978), board independence has be-
come a relevant issue in the corporate governance agenda. Board composition is con-
sidered as the proportion of outside directors on the board and is related to the level of 
independence of the board. Having greater proportion of outside directors on a board 
could be considered to be a management innovation as one of other mechanisms to 
mitigate agency costs between management and shareholders (Chizema and Kim, 
2010). Hence, according to the agency theory, the non-executive directors are assumed 
to be important monitors that supervise and control the executives. The agency per-
spective on the monitoring role of the board structure is that non- executive directors are 
better positioned than executive directors to carry out the monitoring function since they 
are presumably independent and more concerned for their reputation in the labour mar-
ket (Fama, & Jensen, 1983). 
  Fama, (1980) and Fama & Jensen (1983) suggested that non-executive directors in 
the board add to firm value by providing expert knowledge and monitoring services. 
Based on the resource dependency theory, it can be argued that the non-executive di-
rectors might contribute to the profitability of a firm in terms of their expertise by giving 
advice to the management on strategic plans and investments, and in terms of their 
reputational integrity by enabling the firm to have network relationships with the com-
munity and other stakeholders. From these perspectives, we expect a positive causal 
relationship between board independence. On the contrary, there is a stewardship theo-
ry perspective which suggests that insider directors are better equipped to undertake a 
monitoring function than the non-executive directors since they possess superior infor-
mation that enables them to evaluate top managers (Baysinger and Hoskinsson, 1990). 
Advocates of the stewardship theory suggest that the combined leadership provides a 
unified leadership structure and the inside directors facilitate superior firm performance. 
 Supporting this argument is that the non -executive directors are usually part timers 
and this limits the extent of their monitoring, and that they lack all the complete infor-
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mation necessary for making decision (Bozec, 2005). From this perspective, the non- 
executive director representation would have a negative impact on firm performance.  
As can be seen from Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, prior studies  found some mixed results 
on the relationship between board composition (NEDs) and firm performance ( Romano 
et al., 2012; Adams & Mehran 2009; Bino & Tormar, 2007; Staikouras et al., 2008; Gor-
dini, 2012; Bozec,2005; Managena et al., 2012; Haniffa & Hudiab,2006; Babatunde & 
Olaniran, 2009). 
         A first strand of the empirical literature reports that boards dominated by outside 
directors or non -executive directors impact positively on firm performance ( Al-Sahafi et 
al., 2015; Al- Hawary (2011); Yesser et al., (2011) Cho and Kim, 2007; Bino and Tomar, 
(2007) Laun and Tang, 2007; Trabelssi (2010).  Yasser et al., (2011) provides evidence 
on the effect of corporate governance on firm performance using 792 Pakistan  compa-
nies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2003- 2008, and found that 
board independence impact positively on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Us-
ing a sample of Tunisian commercial banks for the period 1997- 2007,  Trabelssi (2010) 
reported a significant positive relationship between the percentage of non-executive di-
rectors and firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA).  
Cornett et al., (2010) investigated the relationship between several corporate govern-
ance mechanisms and bank performance in the 2007-2008 financial crises in a sample 
of approximately 300 publicly traded US banks. They find that more outside or inde-
pendent directors are positively related to banks’ performance during the 2007 crisis.  
Similarly, in sample of 347 Korean listed firms during 1999, Cho and Kim, (2007) found 
that the rate of outside directors participation is significant and positively related with 
firm performance measured by ROA.  
  These findings suggest that boards dominated by outside directors offer higher per-
formance. Such board members may provide access to valued resources and infor-
mation especially in times of adversity (Daily and Dalton, 1994). They also argue that 
outside directors have the incentive to act as monitors of management because they 
want to protect their reputations as effective, independent decision makers. These re-
ports support that greater proportion of outside directors is associated with enhanced 
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performance in terms of efficiency. O’Connell and Cramer (2010) examine the relation-
ship between board composition and firm performance for 77 listed companies in Ire-
land, and found that board with a high proportion of independent directors have a posi-
tive effect on firm performance. 
  Using a panel data of 14 listed banks on the Amman stock exchange for the period 
1997- 2006,  Bino and Tomar (2007) found that board composition has a significant 
positive impact on bank financial performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q, return on as-
sets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Similarly, Alonso and Gonzalez (2006) exam-
ined a sample of 66 commercial banks operating in six (6) OECD countries from 1996 - 
2003. They found a significant positive relationship between the proportion of non- ex-
ecutive directors and financial performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q and return on as-
sets (ROA). Staikouras-et-al., (2008) examined 58 large European banks over the peri-
od 2002- 2004. They found that board composition is positively related to both return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), but is statistically insignificant in all cases. 
These authors argued that non-executive directors are in a better position to carry out 
the monitoring function than executive directors. Jensen (1983), states that the inde-
pendence of non-executive directors helps in constructive criticism, because they will 
give their opinions without sycophancy or coercion. In addition, non-executive directors 
will help in reducing information asymmetry between the shareholders and the execu-
tive directors. This will reduce the agency problem and hence increase the shareholders 
wealth. 
  Gordini (2012) reported a positive relationship between non-executive directors and 
firm performance as a result of their contributions such as skills, experiences and their 
linkage to the external resources. He concludes that the greater the percentage of out-
side directors on the board will result in better firm performance and add value to the 
company. These findings are consistent with the view of agency theory and resource 
dependence theory, namely that non-executive directors are effective monitors and a 
disciplining device for managerial behaviour. Using a data of 296 large financial firms for 
the period 2004-2008, Erkens et al., (2012) found a positive relationship between non-
executive directors and equity raised. If the representation on the board of non-
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executive directors increased the effectiveness of monitoring, then the performance of 
the company should improve. Having a higher proportion of outside directors on the 
board increases the independence of the board. 
 In contrast, other researchers reported that board composition (as a percentage of non- 
executive directors) is negatively correlated with firm financial performance (Yermack, 
1996; Bozec, 2005; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Mangena et al., 2012, Sanda et al., 
2005). Yermack (1996) finds a negative relationship between performance and propor-
tion of outside directors. Using a sample data of 25 Canadian firms from 1976-2000, 
Bozec (2005) found that the relationship between board composition and firm perfor-
mance is negative. Similarly, Mangena et al., (2012) reported a statistically significant 
and negative relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and firm 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q, in a sample of 157 Zimbabwean listed firms from 
2000 to 2005. This indicates that the benefit of board independence, objectivity and ex-
perience expected from the representation of outside directors to influence board deci-
sions appear to hold back managerial initiative through too much monitoring. Cheng 
(2008) in their study of 2980 US firms (including 122 financial firms) over the period 
1996-2004, found that there is a negative relationship between firms’ performance and 
board composition. 
  Similarly, Sanda et al., (2005) reported that Nigerian firms with a low percentage of 
outside directors performed better than those with more non-executive directors. This 
suggests that whilst NEDs can bring independence and objectivity to bear upon board 
decisions, they can also stifle managerial initiative through excessive monitoring. De 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) stated that there a number of reasons why empirical evi-
dence may not support the positive relationship between non-executive directors and 
bank performance. Non- executive directors are only employed on a part time basis and 
are likely to have other commitments, which may result in devoting insufficient time to 
the company. They may lack the expertise required to understand certain technical is-
sues in the business and they not possess sufficient information when called upon to 
make key decisions. More recently, Bhagat & Bolton (2008) confirmed the existence of 
a negative relationship between board independence and operating performance. 
91 
Erkens et al., (2012) reached similar conclusions by using a sample of 296 financial 
firms from 30 countries. They found that firms with more independent boards experi-
enced worse stock returns during the 2007-2009 financial crises.  
   A third stream of empirical studies do not support the outside directors or non- execu-
tive directors impact on financial performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, (2006); Choi and Kim, 
2007, Babatunde and Olaniran, 2009; Minton et al., (2010)).  Consistent with Muller-
Kahle and Lewelly, 2012) did not find any link between outside directors and perfor-
mance. Minton et al., (2010) reported no link between board composition and perfor-
mance for a sample of US publicly traded financial institutions with total assets greater 
than 1billion for the period 2007-2008. Further, Haniffa & Hudiab (2006) report a statisti-
cally insignificant relationship between the percentage of NEDs and financial perfor-
mance for a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms.   Using panel data from 60 listed 
companies on the  Nigerian Stock Exchange for the period between 2002- 2006, Baba-
tunde and Olaniran (2009) found  no significant evidence to support the idea that out-
side directors help to promote firm performance.  Similarly, using a data of 298 US 
banks for the period 2007-2008, Fernandes and Fich (2010) found that independent di-
rectors have no significant relationship with stock performance. Hence, the argument for 
board composition is that the skills and the knowledge base they bring to the firm are of 
no importance to firm performance (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan, 2004). Similarly, Ehikioya 
(2009) and Belkhir (2009) found that there is no empirical support of agency theory or 
stewardship theory suggestion about the impact of board composition on the firm’s per-
formance. 
  With reference to banking industry, the results regarding the effectiveness of outside 
directors and bank performance are mixed. The majority of the existing studies about 
banks show a significantly positive relationship between board composition and banks’ 
profitability, highlighting how banks with a higher presence of non-executive or inde-
pendent directors on their boards perform better than the others (Al-Hawary, 2011; Al-
Sahafi et al., 2015; Staikouras et al., 2007). Their empirical studies support the industry 
views that the appointment of non-executive directors to bank boards’ as a positive cor-
porate governance practice (BCBS, 2006; 2010; 2015). This is because the presence of 
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non-executive directors can potentially improve the independence of bank boards and 
its decisions. By contrast, a group of researchers’ reports that board composition is 
negatively correlated with bank performance ( Adusei, 2011; Al-Manaseer et al., 2012; 
De Andres and Vallelado, 2008). They support the view that non-executive directors of-
ten command less knowledge about the banking business and find it too difficult to un-
derstand the complexities of the bank. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that out-
side directors are usually part timers who normally also sit on boards of other banks (Ji-
raporn et al., 2009). Other empirical studies show no significant relationship between 
board composition and bank performance (Romano et al., 2012; Adams & Mehran, 
2008; Zulkafli & Samad, 2007). 
Empirical literature on Ghana 
  In Ghana, the evidence is not different from the existing literature. For example, 
Kyereboa-Coleman and Biekpe (2006a; 2006b) found a negative association between 
board composition and Ghanaian listed firm’s performance.  This is supported by 
Owusu (2012) who found that NEDs to be statistically significant and negatively related 
to ROA among Ghanaian listed firms. They argued that firms with higher proportions of 
NEDs are likely to experience lower performance because NEDs are part time workers, 
unfamiliar with operations and company business, which are unable to comprehend the 
complications and difficulties that face the company. They also argued that NEDs may 
not have total commitment to the cause of the firm because of outside commitments. As 
a result, NEDs may not be on top of issues affecting the business and this would limit 
their contribution to the performance of the firm. 
By contrast, Adusei (2011) reported a significant positive relationship between board 
composition and the financial performance of banks in Ghana. Abor and Biekpe (2007) 
also reported a significant positive relationship between NEDs and firm performance 
among SMEs in Ghana. Tornyeva & Wereko (2012); Kyereboa-Coleman and Amidu 
(2008) reported a positive relationship between non-executive directors and firm per-
formance among Ghanaian insurance firms and listed companies respectively. They 
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concluded that the greater percentage of NEDs contribute positively to firm performance 
as a result of skills, experiences, and their linkage to the external resources. 
They conclude that the greater the percentage of NEDs in the board will result in better 
firm performance and add value to the firm.  This is because of close monitoring and 
their valuable advices and contribution to the company. However, the Ghanaian SEC 
governance code (2003; 2010) and Bank of Ghana’s draft corporate governance regula-
tions (2013) recommend a balance of executive directors and non-executive directors 
on the board to monitor the activities of management. This means that the inclusion of 
non-executive directors on the board should therefore ensure effective monitoring of the 
executive directors whose interests are not aligned with shareholder value maximiza-
tion. 
  As can be seen above the mixed results, there is no consensus as to whether non-
executive directors or executive directors are better to monitor the firm. Thus, board 
composition issue is primarily concerned with a non-executive directors’ ability to moni-
tor and control managers. Therefore, if monitoring is implemented it is more likely man-
agers’ behaviors will be controlled and agency problems are reduced which might result 
in higher firm performance. While there is a great deal of empirical literature on corpo-
rate governance, very little of it concerns the board composition (non-executive direc-
tors) of banks; all of it assumes that banks conform to the concept of the firm used in 
agency theory. This study attempts to investigate the relationship between board com-
position and financial performance in the Ghanaian universal banks. 
  Based on the monitoring hypothesis of agency theory that outside directors’ represen-
tation gives a strong position for the boards to monitor executive directors and the re-
source dependency theory, the hypothesis this research would test is: 
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Ho2: Board composition is positively associated with bank performance. 
    Most of the prior studies have provided theoretical support for the agency theory 
proposition that non-executive directors perform their monitoring function effectively and 
bring independent judgment to board decisions. This is particular important because the 
existence of the NEDs as the most effective internal control mechanism for monitoring 
of executive director's behaviour (Fama and Jensen, 1983) may be achieved, and there-
fore could ultimately lead to better performance. 
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Table 3. 4 Empirical research showing a positive relationship between NEDs-performance relationship in USA, 
UK & Other countries 
Author (Year) Study period Sample size Performance Measure-
ment 
Methods Summary results 
El Mehdi (2007)  2000-2005 24 listed MENA 
companies 
Economic performance 
(Marginal Q) 
OLS Proportion of outside di-
rectors is positively 
associated with firm per-
formance 
Cho & Kim(2007) 1999 347 Korean listed 
firms 
ROA Multivariate 
Regression 
Analysis 
The rate of outside direc-
tors’ participation is sig-
nificant and positively 
associated with firm per-
formance. 
Jacking & Johl 
(2009) 
2006 180 Indian listed 
firms 
Tobin's Q Fixed Effects Proportion of outside di-
rectors has positive and 
significant impact on firm 
performance 
Gordini (2012)    2007-2009           950 Italian small 
firms 
ROA& ROE    
 
GMM NED has a positive effect 
on performance 
Yasser et al, 
(2011)  
2003- 2008 792 Pakistan listed 
companies 
Tobin's Q 
ROA 
Multivariate 
Regression 
Analysis 
Proportion of outside di-
rectors is significant and 
positively associated with 
firm performance 
(Tobin's Q) but has no 
relationship with ROA 
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Trabelssi (2010) 1997-2007 14 Tunisian bank Tobin’s Q, ROA,   The higher the proportion of 
outside directors, the higher 
the firm performance as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, & 
ROA  
Cornett et al (2009) 2007-2008  300 US publicly traded 
banks 
 
Tobin's Q Panel Data Anal-
ysis 
Proportion of outside directors 
is statistically significant and 
positively relationship with 
firm performance 
Bino & Tomar 
(2007) 
1997-2006 14 Jordanian listed 
Banks 
Tobin's Q 
ROA 
Multivariate Re-
gression Analysis 
Proportion of outside direc-
tors has positive impact on 
firm performance (Tobin's 
Q & ROA) 
Staikouras et al., 
(2008)  
2000-2006 58 large European Bank ROE and ROE Panel data anayl-
sis 
Proportion of outside direc-
tors has positive significant  
impact on bank perfor-
mance 
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Table 3. 5 Empirical research showing a negative relationship between NEDs and performance in USA, UK & 
Other countries 
Author (Year) Study period Sample size PerformanceVariable Methods Summary results 
de  Andres and 
Vallelado 
(2008)  
1995-2005 69 European large 
banks from 6 
countries 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
shareholder market 
return 
Number of non-
executive directors 
out of the total 
number of directors 
Inverted U-shaped re-
lation between board 
independence and per-
formance 
Pathan (2009)  212 large US 
bank holding 
companies 
(BHCs) 
1997–2004 Total risk, idisosyn-
cratic risk, systemat-
ic risk, assets return 
risk, Z-score 
Percentage of in-
dependent directors  
 
Negative relationship 
between NEDs and 
Asset Return 
Coles et al.,  
(2008) 
1992-2001 8165 US firm year 
observation IRRC 
Tobin's Q ROA GMM Larger proportion of 
NEDs on the board is 
negatively associated 
with firm performance 
(Q) in complex (sim-
ple) firms. 
Faleye and 
Krishnan 
(2010)  
 
317 bank-years 
for 51 US banks 
1994-2006 Borrower’s long-term 
S&P credit rating, 
the inclusion of fi-
nancial covenants in 
loan contracts, and 
the bank’s decision 
to diversify its lend-
ing risk through syn-
dication 
Percentage of in-
dependent directors 
Negative Relationship 
Independent directors 
and Tobin’s  
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Yasser et al., 
(2011) 
1996-2005 792 Pakistan 
listed companies 
Tobin’s Q; ROA ; 
ROE 
 
Panel data analysis Companies with pro-
portion of outside di-
rectors perform posi-
tively with Tobin’s Q; 
ROE; ROA. 
Cornett et al., 
(2010) 
2007-2008 300 US  publicly 
traded banks 
Q-ratio OLS; Logistic regres-
sion 
Representation of in-
dependent NEDs on the 
board has significant and 
negative relationship with 
firm performance. This is 
however not the case if 
NEDs are not independ-
ent. 
 
Dulewicz  
&Herbert (2004) 
 
1997-2000 
300 UK questions 
were answered by 
board chairman 
CFROTA 
Sales turnover 
2SLS The larger the proportion 
of NEDs the lower was 
the subsequent growth of 
sales. However, there is 
no significant correlation 
between proportion of 
NEDs and firm perfor-
mance (CFROTA).Again, 
no performance differ-
ences were found on ei-
ther the Combined Code 
(1/3) or the Smith (50%). 
Guest (2008)  1981-2002 2746 UK larger 
sample size 
Tobin's Q ROA 
Share returns 
GMM. OLS and Fixed 
effects 
Proportion of outside di-
rectors has significant 
negative impact on firm 
performance variables. 
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Yeh et al., 
(2011)  
20 largest financial 
firms from each G8 
country 
2005-2008 Stock return, ROE, 
ROA 
Proportion of inde-
pendent directors in 
committees 
Performance is better for 
financial institutions with 
more independent direc-
tors on auditing and risk 
committees particularly 
in cil law countries and in 
firms with excessive risk-
taking 
Hardwick et al., 
(2011)  
 
UK life insurance 
firms 
1994-2004 Profit efficiency Proportion of non-
executive directors on 
the board 
Significant positive or 
negative depending on 
whether there is separa-
tion of the CEO and 
board chairman positions 
and whether there is an 
audit committee 
Erkens et al., 
(2012)  
296 large (total as-
sets greater than 
US $10 billion) fi-
nancial firms (in-
cluding non-banks) 
across 30 countries 
Jan. 2007- Sep. 
2008 Jan. 2004- 
Dec. 2006 2007.I- 
2008.III 
Buy-and-hold returns 
Expected default fre-
quency and stock re-
turn volatility Equity 
raised  
 
Percentage of non-
executive directors 
Negative  relationship 
between NEDs 2007-
2008 
 
 
Adams and 
Mehran (2012)  
 
35 US BHCs 1964-85 Tobin’s Q Fraction of outside 
directors 
Insignificant negative re-
lationship between NEDs 
and Tobin’s Q. 
Aebi et al., 
(2012)  
 
372 US banks July 1, 2007, to De-
cember 31, 2008 
Buy-and-hold returns 
and ROE 
Percentage of outside 
directors 
Negative but mostly in-
significant with ROE 
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Table 3. 6 Empirical studies showing no relationship between the proportion of NEDs and firm performance in 
USA, UK & Other countries 
 
Daily & Dalton  
(1992) 
1989 100 US listed firms ROA OLS Proportion of outside 
directors has no im-
pact on firm perfor-
mance 
Adams & 
Mehran 
(2012)  
1986-1999 35 US  listed 
banks 
Tobin's Q  ROA OLS Proportion of NEDs on 
the board has no im-
pact on firm perfor-
mance measured by 
Tobin's Q.  
Wintoki et al., 
2012) 
1991-2003 US 6000 listed 
firms 
ROA GMM Find no causal relation 
between board inde-
pendence and firm 
performance 
Berger et al., 
(2012a)  
85 default and 243 
no default US 
commercial banks 
2007.- 2010. 
 
Probability of de-
fault 
Number of outside 
directorsin the board 
Not significant 
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Muller-Kahle 
and Lewelly 
(2011)  
 
Matched-pair 
sample of US 
firms in the finan-
cial industry 
1997–2005 Dichotomous varia-
ble which takes a 
value of 1 if the firm 
is Subprime Special-
ist and 0 otherwise 
Ratio of outside to 
total number of di-
rectors 
Not significant rela-
tionship between 
NEDs 
Minton et al., 
(2010)  
 
US publicly-traded 
financial institu-
tions with total as-
sets greater than 
$1 billion 
2007-2008 2003-
2006/08 
Stock returns, To-
bin’s Q, probability 
of receiving TARP 
money Several risk 
indicators 
Percentage of direc-
tors that are not em-
ployed or affiliated 
with the firm 
Not significant for per-
formance, but inde-
pendence is associat-
ed with higher proba-
bility of receiving 
TARP money Negative 
but not always signifi-
cant 
Laing & Weir 
(1999) 
1992 & 1995 115 UK listed 
companies 
ROA OLS Statistically insignifi-
cant relationship be-
tween NEDs represen-
tation and firm perfor-
mance 
Weir & Laing 
(2000)  
1992 & 1995 200 UK listed 
companies 
ROA 
RAW 
OLS, Logistic re-
gression 
There is statistically 
insignificant relation-
ship between propor-
tion of outside direc-
tors on the board and 
firm performance 
(ROA) 
Sources: Researcher’s Own Compilation:(Various Literatures) 
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3.7 Board committees- financial performance relationship 
  Board committees are an important component of the board structure of banks in 
Ghana, which affect bank performance. Board committees as part of the manner in 
which boards are organized, play vital roles by rendering objective and non-biased su-
pervisory and consultancy services to the company with the aim of preserving the inter-
est of shareholders (Harrison,1987). Prior literature suggests that board committees 
help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate boards (Jiraporn et al., 2009). 
The existence of board committees is considered by regulators in their regulatory deci-
sions. Board committees act in order to obtain the most effective operation of the board 
(Van Den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Board committees are important corporate gov-
ernance tools to monitor corporate activities and can play a valuable role in the protec-
tion of shareholder value (Kesner, 1988). Ramano et al., (2012) argued that board 
committees are important governance tools which monitor corporate activities and pro-
tect shareholder value. Bussoli (2012) cited that board committees are the yardstick for 
the better functioning of banks, as the number of board committees is statistically signif-
icant to bank performance. It is becoming a widely accepted practice that properly gov-
erned banks should have audit, risk, remuneration, nomination, ethics and compliance 
committees of the board in place to assist in delivering a system for objective monitoring 
of the bank’s activities  (BCBS, 2010; 2015; Nigeria CBN code, 2006, 2014; Bank of Ita-
ly, 2008; South Africa’s Kings Report 11, 2010). 
 The Cadbury Report (2002) pronounces that the establishment of board committees is 
one way to avoid board meetings being otherwise burdened. Of particular interest to this 
thesis are the audit, risk, remuneration and nomination committees whose functions are 
well considered as important by the BCBS (2006; 2010 and 2015) corporate govern-
ance principles. In this respect, given the focus of this thesis on audit, risk, remuneration 
and nomination committees, the functions of these board committees. Arguably, the ex-
istence of board committees may improve corporate accountability, legitimacy and cred-
ibility by performing specific functions (Weir et al 2002). The agency theory principle of 
separating the monitoring and executive function is established to monitor the execution 
functions of audit, remuneration and nomination (Roche, 2005). Corporate failures in the 
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past focused criticism on the inadequacy of governance failures to take corrective ac-
tions by boards’ committees of failed firms. The importance of board committees was 
espoused by the business world.  As a result the Basel Committee for Banking Supervi-
sion (2006; 2010; 2015) recommend that banks’ boards should appoint   board sub-
committees to address the following five functions; audit; risk management; compensa-
tion nomination, ethics and compliance.. Therefore, BCBS (2006; 2010; 2015) argued 
that these committees should be composed exclusively of independent or non-executive 
directors to strengthen the internal control systems of banks. Shareholders are able to 
have greater confidence in boards when there are named board committees to address 
the key responsibilities and disclose their existence to investors (Davis, 2002).   
  Agency theory also suggests that the central monitoring function of the board is to en-
sure that corporate activities are properly audited (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983).  Fama and Jensen (1983a) suggested that boards perform advisory 
roles, overseeing long-term investments and strategy formulations. To address the spe-
cific needs of firms, boards establish committees to perform various functions which 
may be either of an advisory nature or of a monitoring nature (Klein, 1998). In firms 
where management is in greater need of advice, such as a firm with greater growth op-
portunities or a firm facing greater uncertainty, managers are more willing to share in-
formation with board members (Adam and Ferreira, 2007). Utilizing the platforms of 
specialization would be more effective in this process (BCBS, 2006). Consequently, 
Reeb (2007) posited that firms with complex operations or firms whose managers have 
a greater need for advice would perform better with larger board, and the cost of larger 
boards are mitigated in the presence of a greater number of board committees. 
  According to Harrison (1987), there are two generic types of board committees; moni-
toring or oversight and operating.  Monitoring committees are intended to protect share-
holder interests by providing objective, independent reviews of corporate executives 
and affairs. According to BCBS (2006; 2010; 2015) monitoring committees are made up 
of audit, risk, remuneration and nomination.   Operating board committees advise man-
agement and the board on major business decisions and such committees are strategic 
committee; finance and investment committee. Despite the increasing popularity of 
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board committee structures, there are conflicting theoretical propositions as to the nex-
us between board monitoring committees and financial performance. One line of theo-
retical literature suggests that the establishment of monitoring committees can impact 
positively on firm performance (Harrison, 1987; Sun and Cahan, 2009). 
 The principal function of an audit committee concerning banks is to review manage-
ment information and to meet regularly with internal and external auditors to review  fi-
nancial statements and the external reporting process, to review the audit processes 
(both internal and external) and the internal controls (Bosch, 1995; Klein, 1998). This 
information allows an audit committee to assess the extent to which a board is fulfilling 
its duties and responsibilities.  Risk committee of the board provides oversight of senior 
management activities in managing credit, market, liquidity, operational, compliance, 
reputational and other risks. Culp and Miller (1995) posited that a corporate risk man-
agement committee increased firm performance by reducing cost associated with exter-
nal financing and transactions, while lowering corporate taxation and minimizing agency 
costs. By reducing agency costs associated with market imperfections, risk manage-
ment can reduce cash flow volatility, thus increasing cash flows to the owners of the 
firms (Santomero, 1995). In contrast, Tufano (1996) found few theoretical studies that 
support risk management practices as a means of maximizing a firm exposure to risks 
(e.g. hedging).    
  Compensation committees typically determine and review remuneration packages for 
senior management (Klein, 1998), taking into consideration the company’s needs to-
gether with the interest of shareholders and other stakeholders (Bosch, 1995). Remu-
neration packages awarded to directors and senior managers have long drawn share-
holders and media attention (Pease and McMillan, 1993).Nomination committees assist   
board members in nominating  new members to a   board, which reduces the involve-
ment of the entire board members including the CEO from the nomination process  
(Petra, 2007). The benefit of a nomination committee is that they will appoint individuals 
who will act as advocates for shareholders (Byrd &Hickman, 1992). Roche (2005) stat-
ed that in order to balance the power of the CEO, Asian firms have created nomination 
committees to strength the monitoring function of boards. 
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   As seen from Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9, the empirical literature concerning the relation-
ship between board committees and firm performance is mixed (Bussoli, 2013; Kim & 
Black, 2012; Bozec, 2005; Lam & Lee, 2012; Klein, 1998; Kajola, 2008). The first strand 
of the empirical literature suggests a positive relationship between board committees 
and financial performance (Wild, 1994; Liang & Weir, 1999; Vefaes, 1999b; Black & 
Kim, 2012; Bussoli, 2013; Puni, 2015; Young & Bucholtz, 2010).  Using a sample of 260 
US listed firms from 1966 to 1980, Wild (1994) investigated the market reactions before 
and after the establishment of audit committees. He reported a statistically significant 
improvement in share returns following the establishment of audit committees, indicat-
ing that the presence of audit committees can improve managerial accountability to 
shareholders. Similarly, using a sample of 606 large US listed companies; Vefaes, 
(1999a) documented a positive relationship between board committees and the quality 
of a new board of directors on a board. Klein, (1998) examined the relationship between 
board committee composition and firm performance. She found a significant positive re-
lationship between the percentage of executive directors on board committees dealing 
with long-term strategic investment decisions and various accounting and marketing 
measures of firm performance. Board committees enhance corporate accountability, le-
gitimacy and credibility by performing specialist functions (Weir et al., 2002). Aebi et al., 
(2012) argued that the presence of a risk committee indicates a stronger risk manage-
ment. They support the view that strong internal risk controls are useful in restraining 
risk-taking behavior at banking institutions. 
   Using a sample of 115 UK listed firms over the period 1992-1995, Laing & Weir (1999) 
observed that the presence of audit and remuneration committees do positively affect 
firm performance measured by ROA.  Bussolli, (2013) cited that  board committees are 
the yard sticks for the better functioning of banks, as the number of board committees is 
positive and statistically significant to banks’ performance. Using a sample data of 31 
listed companies on the Ghana Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2010, Puni (2015) report-
ed that remuneration committee regressed positively on corporate financial perfor-
mance. These results support the empirical evidence that critical processes and deci-
sions are derived from board sub-committees such as audit, remuneration and nomina-
tion committees, rather than boards at large. These committees enable the boards to 
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cope with the limited time factor and the complexity of information that they need to deal 
with (Dalton et al., 1998). They argue that board committees help in bringing individual 
director’s specialist knowledge and expertise to bear on the board decision making pro-
cess (Harrison, 1987). This also allows the main board to devote attention to specific 
areas of strategic interests and responsibility. 
 Using a sample of 606 large US listed companies, Vefaes, (1999b) documented a posi-
tive relationship between the establishment of nomination committees and the quality of 
new director appointments. Young and Bucholtz, (2010) found that the presence of a 
compensation committee is positively associated with the financial performance of New 
Zealand companies. They support the monitoring hypothesis of the agency theory that 
board committees are usually made up of independent directors or non-executive direc-
tors who are better placed to protect shareholders’ interest by effectively scrutinizing 
managerial actions (e.g. Klein, 1998; Vefeas, 1999). Consistent with recent evidence by 
Black & Kim (2012) in Korean 658 large public firms found nomination and audit com-
mittees to have a statistically significant and positive impact on large public firms’ per-
formance.  
   Similarly, Lam and Lee (2012) examined the relationship between board committees 
and firm performance in a sample of 346 Hong Kong public listed firms from 2001-2003 
and found a statistically significant and positive relationship between the presence of 
nomination committees and firm performance. Laing & Weir (1999) also reported that 
the companies, which introduced board committees to the board structure, performed 
better than those without them, and showed a significant improvement in firm perfor-
mance by firms which introduced audit and remuneration committees. They argue that 
because of the relative small size of the board committees, they are able to meet regu-
larly and frequently. This provides sufficient time for meaningful dialogue and in reach-
ing consensus decisions quicker (Karamanous and Vefeas, 2005). 
 The second stream of empirical studies suggests that the presence of board commit-
tees impact negatively on firm financial performance (Main and Johnson, 1993; Vafaes, 
1999; Bozec, 2005; Lam & Lee, 2012). In a sample of 220 large UK listed companies, 
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Main and Johnson (1993) examined the role of remuneration committees in UK board 
rooms and report that the presence of a remuneration committee with higher executive 
pay, impact negatively on shareholder value and firm performance. Using 307 US listed 
companies from 1990-1994, Vafaes (1999b) reported a negative relationship between 
the establishment of board committees namely; audit, remuneration and nomination and 
firm performance. These studies highlighted that committees may cause encroachment 
on the functions of the executive and dilution of executive authority, or may pre-empt 
management responsibility (Rainsbury et al., 2008; Barker 2002) and sometimes the 
committees are used as a rubber stamp to confirm management decisions. 
  Adams and Mehran (2005) found a statistically significant and negative relationship 
between performance and the number of board committees. Using a sample of 25 Ca-
nadian firms from 1976-2000, Bozec (2005) found the presence of audit committees to 
have a negative impact on firm performance. Using a sample of 17 Tunisian banks over 
the period 2002-2011, Zemzem and Kacem (2014) reported a negative relationship be-
tween risk management committees and banks’ performance. Shungu et al., (2014) 
found that board committees (risk, audit, remuneration, nomination, asset and liability) 
impact negatively on Zimbabwean commercial banks’ performance.  In a sample of 346 
Hong Kong listed firms for the period 2001-2003, Lam and Lee (2012) found a statisti-
cally significant and negative relationship between the presence of compensation com-
mittees and firm performance.  Using a sample data of 31 listed companies on the Gha-
na Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2010, Puni (2015) found a negative relationship be-
tween nomination committee and corporate financial performance. They argue that, first 
the establishment of board committees imposes extra costs in terms of managerial time, 
travel expenses and additional remuneration for the members of the committees (Ve-
feas, 1999a). Secondly, board committees can result in excessive managerial supervi-
sion, which inhibit executive initiative and vision (Goodstein et al, 1994; Vefeas, 1998). 
Thirdly, it may also result in duplicating corporate board duties and responsibilities. This 
will have additional costs implications for firms.  
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 The third stream of studies suggests no empirical relationship between board commit-
tees and financial performance (Klein, 1998; Vafaes and Theodorous, 1998; Laing and 
Weir, 2002; Petra, 2007; Kajola, 2008). Using a sample of 486 US firms over the period 
1992- 1993, Klein (1998) examined the association of the presence of board committee 
(audit, compensation and nomination) and financial performance but found no statisti-
cally significant relationship. Vafaes & Theodorous (1998) investigated the impact of 
board committees (audit, remuneration and nomination) on the financial performance of 
250 UK listed companies in 1994. They found no evidence in favour of the idea that the 
existence of board committees significantly affected firm financial performance. Also, 
Kajola (2008) reported no significant relationship between the presence of audit commit-
tees and performance in a sample of 20 Nigerian listed firms from 2000 to 2006. These 
studies support the argument that board committees are not significance and relevant 
as far as firm performance is concerned. 
   With specific reference to banking industry, empirical results between board commit-
tees and bank performance have been found to be mixed.  The majority of the existing 
studies about banks show a significantly positive relationship between board commit-
tees and banks’ profitability. Highlighting how banks with board committees control 
banks’ management opportunistic behaviour, monitor closely bank activities, and reduce 
bank risk –taking appetite (Sevam et al., 2006; Anderson et al., 2004; Barth et al., 
2004). However, other studies reported that board committees negatively affect banks’ 
profitability. They support the view that the establishment of board committees imposes 
extra costs in terms of managerial time, travel expenses and additional remuneration for 
members of the committees (Vefeas, 1999).  
Empirical evidence from Ghana 
 Focusing on Ghana where this thesis is based, prior studies examining the impact of 
board committees on firm performance have also found mixed results. Kyereboa-
Coleman and Amidu (2008) reported that the presence of audit committees impacts 
positively on the performance of SMEs in Ghana. Owusu (2012) also found that the au-
dit and remuneration committees to be statistically insignificant but positively related to 
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ROA among Ghanaian listed firms. They concluded that the existence of board commit-
tees may improve corporate accountability, legitimacy and credibility by performing spe-
cific functions. In this respect, and given the focus of this thesis on audit, risk, remunera-
tion and nomination committees, the functions of these board committees may minimize  
the agency problems with the ultimate improvement in firm performance. 
  By contrast, Puni (2015) found that nomination committee regressed negatively on 
corporate financial performance, while an audit committee has no significant impact on 
corporate financial performance. He argued that the creation of board committees add 
extra costs resulted from management time, travel expenses and additional fees paid to 
the members of the committees. He further concluded that these board committees can 
have negative effect on firm performance, a finding supported by Kyereboa-Coleman 
and Amidu (2008) who reported that the adoption of remuneration committee may in-
crease agency costs.  Given that the SEC code (2003; 2010) and Bank of Ghana draft 
regulation on corporate governance (2013) recommend that monitoring by board com-
mittees is expected to have a positive influence on firm performance. It is therefore ar-
gued in this thesis that the presence of board committees in the Ghanaian universal 
banks could help reduce agency costs and expected to have positive impact on bank 
performance. 
   As can be seen from the above mixed results that, there is no consensus as to 
whether banks with board committees are able to monitor and control managers or not. 
Thus, board committees issues are primarily concerned with the board’s ability to con-
trol and monitor managers. Therefore, if monitoring is implemented it is more likely that 
manager behavior will be controlled and agency costs are reduced which might result in 
better firm performance. Based on the above discussions, this study is to examine the 
relationship between board committees (risk, audit, nomination and remuneration) and 
bank performance in Ghana that whereas, there is paucity of prior literature related to 
this relationship. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed to be empirically test-
ed. 
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Ho3:  The presence of board committees (risk, audit, and remuneration and nomi-
nation committee) should lead to better bank performance. 
  Arguably, the impact of the presence of board committees on bank performance in this 
area is at its emergent stage (Dalton et al., 1998; Laing & Weir, 1999). However, and 
given the important functions of board committees in an attempt to reduce agency prob-
lems, provide an interesting area for further research. This is particularly important in a 
developing country context as it may help to provide further insights on the board com-
mittees-performance relationship. It is therefore argued in this thesis that the presence 
of audit, risk, nomination and remuneration committees in Ghanaian universal banks 
could help to reduce agency costs and is expected to have a positive impact on finan-
cialperformance.
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Table 3. 7 Empirical research showing a positive board committees-performance relationship in US, UK and other 
countries 
Author     
Year 
Study Peri-
od 
Sample Period Performance 
variable 
Method Summary results 
Puni (2015) 2006 – 2010 31 Listed 
Ghanaian 
companies 
ROE & ROA Panel Data 
Analysis 
Remuneration committee regressed  
positively on corporate financial per-
formance 
Black and Kim 
(2012) 
2006- 2009 
 
68 large public 
companies 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Multiple  Re-
gression 
There is a positive association between 
nomination committees ; audit commit-
tees .and firm performance 
Black & Kim 
(2012) 
1998 – 2004 658 public 
listed firms & 
611 smaller 
firms 
Tobin’s Q 
 
Panel data 
analysis 
Nomination and audit committees are 
found to have significant positive im-
pact on large public firms' performance 
but not smaller firms. However, com-
pensation committee has no impact on 
both large public firms and smaller 
firms. 
Lam & Lee 
(2012) 
2001 – 2003 346 public 
listed firms 
ROA, ROE, 
ROCE, MTBV 
Multiple regres-
sion 
Nomination committee is found to have 
significant positive impact on firm per-
formance. However, a remuneration 
committee has a significant negative 
impact on firm performance. 
Laing & Weir 
(1999) 
1992 & 1995 115 listed 
Companies 
ROA OLS : Logistic 
regression 
Audit and remuneration committees do 
positively affect firm performance 
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Weir & Laing  
(2000) 
1992 & 1995 200 listed 
Companies for 
each year 
ROA 
RAW (Market –
Based 
Measures) 
OLS The presence of remuneration commit-
tee is significant and positively associ-
ated with firm performance (RAW) 
Aebi et al. 
(2012)  
 
372 US 
banks 
July 1, 2007, 
to December 
31, 2008 
Buy-and-hold 
returns and 
ROE 
OLS Risk Committee show positive impact 
on performance 
Young & Bu-
choltz (2010) 
New Zea-
land Listed 
Companies 
2003 – 2007 Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
Panel Data The presence of compensation com-
mittee is positively related to financial 
performance 
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Table 3. 8 Empirical research showing negative relationship between board committees and firm performance in 
USA, UK & Other countries 
Author Study Pe-
riod 
Sample Size Performance 
variable 
Methods Summary results 
Shungu et 
al (2014) 
2005 – 
2010 
Zimbabwean 
Commercial 
Banks 
ROE OLS Negative relationship between board committees 
and performance 
Zemzem 
and Kacem 
(2014) 
2002 – 
2011 
17 Tunisian 
banks 
ROE & ROA OLS Negative relationship between risk management 
committee and performance 
Adams & 
Mehran 
(2012) 
1986-1999 35 US listed 
banks 
Tobin's Q ROA OLS Board committee has a negative and statistically 
significant correlation with Tobin's Q but has no im-
pact on ROA 
Bozec 
(2005) 
1976-2000 25 SOE ROS, ROA, 
NIE 
 The presence of audit committee has a negative 
relationship with firm performance. However, nomi-
nation committee has a positive impact on sales 
efficiency, NIE & assets turnover. 
Puni (2015) 2006 – 
2010 
31 Listed 
Ghanaian 
companies 
ROE & ROA Panel Da-
ta Analy-
sis 
Nomination committee regressed negatively on 
corporate financial performance 
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Table 3. 9  Empirical research showing no relationship between board committees and firm performance UK, USA 
and Other countries  
Vafeas 
&Theodorou 
(1998) 
1994 250 Public 
traded firms 
Market-to-book 
ratio Operating 
performance / 
total assets 
OLS The presence of board committees has no im-
pact on firm performance. 
 
Kajola (2009) 2000-
2006 
20 listed 
Companies 
ROE 
Profit Margin 
(PV) 
Panel data 
analysis 
The presence of audit committee has no signif-
icant impact on firm performance measured by 
ROE & PM 
 
Weir et al 
(2002) 
1994 – 
1996 
311 listed 
firms 
Q  Ratio OLS. Logistic 
regression 
The presence of audit committee has no im-
pact on firm performance. 
Dulewicz & 
Herbert 
(2004) 
1997 300 ques-
tion an-
swered by 
board 
chairman 
CFROTA Sales 
turnover 
Multivariate 
Regression 
Analysis 
No statistically differences in firm performance 
(CFROTA or Sales turnover) between boards 
with audit and remuneration committees and 
those that did not have one. 
Researcher’sOwnCompilation(VariousLiteratures)
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3.8 Bank size - financial Performance relationship 
 
  Bank size is another important element of performance as banks may enjoy econo-
mies of scale in both-the adoption of corporate governance   norms and financial opera-
tions. Bank size is considered to be an important determinant of its performance. Indus-
trial economic theory postulates that if an industry is subject to economies of scale, 
large institutions will be more efficient, thus are able to produce services at a lower cost. 
Larger size is expected to have a positive effect on bank profitability.  Recent studies 
have adopted the premise that there is a positive relationship between bank size and 
profitability based on the view that a larger size should allow a bank to obtain econo-
mies of scale (Iannotta-et-al., (2007) and Mercieca et-al., (2007). Boone et al., (2007) 
found that as firms become larger and more diversified, the size of the board increases. 
 Larger firms may benefit from economies of scale and they are likely to have easy ac-
cess to internal or external funds (Baumol, 1959 cited Lehmann & Weigand, 2000; Short 
& Keasey, 1999). In addition, they may be faced with higher agency costs, implying a 
higher demand for better monitoring processes, and this may mean that more compe-
tent managers are hired ( e.g. Himmelberg et al., 1999). Larger firms are also more like-
ly to be monitored closely by institutional or foreign investors, market regulators and the 
press (Helwege et al., 2007).These arguments suggest that there will be a positive rela-
tionship between firm size and performance.  Agency costs include monitoring expendi-
tures by principal such as auditing, budgeting, control and compensation systems, 
bonding expenditures by the agent and residual loss due to divergence of interests be-
tween the principal and agents. As bank size increases, agency costs are expected to 
increase.  Since a large span allows for greater managerial discretion and opportunism, 
thus increasing monitoring cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Bank size accounts for 
the economies or diseconomies of scale (Naceur & Goaied, 2008). However, compli-
cated management structures in the larger banks with an increasing number of mana-
gerial layers may reduce efficiency.   In general, large banks in terms of assets have the 
advantage of providing a larger menu of financial services to their customers which can 
be associated with more competitive fees and/or rates. Hence, bank size is included as 
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an independent variable in this study to examine the effect of corporate governance on 
bank performance. Consistent with the conflicting nature of the theoretical literature, 
empirical evidence regarding the relationship between the size of a bank and financial 
performance has proved inconclusive and mixed. 
 As can be seen from Tables 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12, key studies have found some mixed 
results (Staikouras & Wood, 2004; Adusei, 2011; Naceur & Omran, 2011; Sanda et al., 
(2005) Babatunde & Olaniran,2009; Bino & Tomar, 2007; Micco et al 2007). The first 
strand of the empirical literature reports that bank size impacts positively on financial 
performance (Beiner et al, 2006; Staikouras & Wood, 2004; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 
2007; Al-Khouri, 2011 and Naceur and Omran 2011; Al-Sahafi et al., 2015)). Using a 
sample of 11 listed banks on the Saudi Stock Exchange over the period 2009-2012, Al-
Sahafi et al., (2015) found that there is a strong positive relationship between bank size 
and financial performance measured by ROA and ROE. This finding is consistent with 
previous studies that show the same relationship (Fallatah & Dickins, 2012; Pervan & 
Visic, 2012; Zeitun and Tian, 2007).  Staikouras & Wood (2004) constructed the OLS 
and Fixed Effect Models to examine bank size and profitability of European banks over 
the period 1994-1998. The authors found that profitability of European banks is positive-
ly influenced by bank size. Similarly, Naceur and Omran (2010) found a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between size and profitability of a bank, because 
large banks have   degree of loans and product diversification than medium and small 
banks.  Trujillo- Ponce (2013) pointed out that a large bank can enjoy economies of 
scope for the bank resulting from the joint provision of related services. With the number 
of observations of 43 commercial banks in 6 Gulf Cooperation Council countries over 
the period of 1998 – 2008, Al-Khouri, (2011) also found that there is a positive and sig-
nificant relationship between bank size and return on assets. Suffian (2009) found a 
positive relationship between bank size and profitability of a bank, but it is insignificant 
at any conventional level. Naceur and Omran (2011) , using a sample of 173 banks 
from 10 Middle East North African countries over the period 1988-2005, found a positive 
and significant relationship between bank size and performance. 
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  Using a panel data of 16 Ghanaian insurance companies for the period 2005-2009, 
Tornyeva & Wereko (2012) found a positive but insignificant relationship between firm 
size and profitability measured by ROA and ROE. Similarly, Micco et al., (2007) find al-
so, a positive and but no significant correlation. Pasiouras & Kosmidou (2007) studied 
internal and external factors determining the profitability of domestic and foreign com-
mercial banks operating in 15 European Union countries in the period 1995-2001. The 
found a positive significant relationship between bank size and financial performance. 
 By contrast, another group of researchers reported that bank size impacts negatively 
on performance (Sanda-et-al., 2005; Babatunde and Olaniran, 2009; Ferde, 2012; Al-
Manaseer et al., 2012)). Using a sample of 180 companies listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange for the period of 1996 – 1999, Sanda-et-al., (2005) found a negative relation-
ship between company size and financial performance, as proxied by ROA and ROE.  
Al-Manasser-et-al., (2012) found a significant negative relationship between bank size 
and performance as measured by ROA and ROE.  The negative effect was explained 
by the agency problem associated with large banks. Using a sample of 25 listed banks 
in Bangladesh over the period 2003 -2011, Hoque-et-al., (2012), found a statistically in-
significant negative relationship between bank size and performance measured by ROA 
and ROE. Using a sample data from 15 Ethiopian Commercial Banks for the period 
2007 – 2011, Ferede, (2012) found a negative relationship between bank size and fi-
nancial performance as measured by ROA and ROE. Similarly, using a panel data of 10 
Tunisian banks for the period 2000-2010, Rachdi (2014) found a negative relationship 
between bank size and profitability measured by ROA. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) re-
ported a negative relationship between firm size and firm performance. They argue that 
larger firms might not be as efficient as smaller firms due to reduced control by man-
agement over strategic and operational activities as firm size increases. 
  Kasman (2010) found that size has a negative and statistically significant relationship 
impact on ROA and Net Interest margin on a panel of 431 banks in 39 countries. These 
studies argued that smaller boards enhance communication, cohesiveness and coordi-
nation, which make monitoring more effective. For instance, Jensen (1993) argued that 
large boards are less effective at monitoring management because of free-riding prob-
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lems amongst directors and increased decision-making time. Other researchers, Ban-
chuenvijit, (2012) and Goddard et al., (2005) argue that due to organizational rigidity 
brought about by bigger firm size and a lot of unnecessary bureaucracies, profitable op-
portunities that may want urgent attention will easily pass the firm and thus making them 
less profitable in relative terms and thus negatively impact on firm performance. 
  The last strand of empirical studies found no relationship between bank size and fi-
nancial performance (Bino & Tomar, 2007; Ramadan-et-al., 2011; Micco-et-al., 2007). 
Using a panel data of 14 listed banks on the Amman Stock Exchange over the period 
1997 to 2006, Bino and Tomar (2007) found that bank size has no impact on bank per-
formance measured by ROA. This finding agrees with the one presented in Micco-et-al., 
(2007) that there is no correlation between bank size and performance as proxied by 
(ROA) return on assets. Ramadan, Kilani and Kaddumi (2011) investigated with 100 
observations of 10 banks in Jordanian for the period 2001-2010 and found no statistical-
ly significant relationship between bank size and performance. 
Empirical evidence on Ghana 
 In Ghana, the evidence is not different from the existing literature. For example, 
Gymerah and Amoah (2015) and Adusei (2011) found a positive association between 
the bank size and profitability among Ghanaian universal banks. They contend that 
larger Ghanaian banks have better opportunities than smaller banks in creating and 
generating funds internally and accessing external resources. In addition, large Ghana-
ian banks might benefit from economies of scale by creating entry barriers with a posi-
tive effect on bank performance. The positive coefficient lends empirical support to prior 
studies by Tornyeva and Wereko (2012) who found a positive but statistically insignifi-
cant relationship between firm size and profitability as measured by ROA and ROE 
among Ghanaian insurance companies.  By contrast, Kyereboa-Coleman and Biekpe 
(2006a) found that bank size has a statistically insignificant negative relationship with 
financial performance. The negative coefficient also lends empirical support to prior 
studies (Abor and Biekpe, 2007). They argued that large Ghanaian banks might not be 
as efficient as the smaller banks due to reduced control by management over strategic 
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and operational activities as bank size increases. They further concluded that due to or-
ganizational rigidity brought about by bigger bank size and a lot of unnecessary bureau-
cracies, profitable opportunities that may want urgent attention will easily pass the bank 
and thus making them less profitable in relative terms and thus negatively impact on 
bank performance. It is therefore argued that large Ghanaian banks might benefit from 
economies of scale by creating an entry barrier with positive effect on bank perfor-
mance. 
 Based on the above arguments, this study attempts to bridge the gap in the existing 
literature by investigating the association between corporate governance mechanisms 
and banks’ financial performance in the emerging market of Ghana, it focuses on add-
ing a new important variable of corporate governance mechanisms like bank size that 
improves bank performance. Consistent with the literature (Bennedsen et al., 2008) as a 
bank increases in size, it is expected that it will enjoy economies of scale, and therefore 
its financial performance should improve. Consequently, the following hypothesis is to 
be tested empirically: 
Ho4: The larger bank size should lead to higher bank performance 
Most of the prior studies have provided theoretical support for the industrial economy 
theory that large institutions enjoy economies of scale and therefore, its financial per-
formance should improve.   Larger firms are also more likely to be monitored closely to 
institutional foreign investors, market regulators market regulators and the press (Hel-
wege et al., 2007). These arguments suggest that there will be a positive relationship 
between firm size and performance. It is therefore expected in this thesis for bank size 
to have a positive impact on financial performance.
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Table 3. 10 Empirical studies on the positive relationship between bank size and firm performance in UK, USA 
and Other countries 
Author Year Study Peri-
od 
Sample Size Performance & 
Measurement 
Methods Summary& Conclusion 
Ehikioya 2009 1998 – 2002 107 listed firms in 
Nigeria Stock Ex-
change 
ROA, ROE 
and Tobin’s Q 
Panel Data 
Analysis 
Firm size impact positively on firm 
performance 
Adusei 2011 2005 – 2009 17Ghanaian Univer-
sal Banks 
ROE OLS Bank size impact positively impact 
financial performance 
Alkhouri 2011 1998 – 2008 43 Commercial 
banks from 6 Gulf 
Countries 
ROA and ROE Panel Data Bank size has a positive relationship 
with profitability 
Kosmidou & 
Pasiouras 
2007 1995 – 2001 Commercial banks 
from 15 EU coun-
tries 
ROA and ROE Multivariate 
Regression 
Analysis 
They found a positive significant rela-
tionship between bank size and per-
formance 
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Ayaidi & 
Boujelbene 
2012 1995 – 2005 12 Tunisian banks ROA and ROE OLS Found to be a significant positive re-
lationship between bank size and 
performance 
Ben Naceur 
and Oman 
2011 1988 – 2005 173 banks from 10 
MENA Countries 
ROA and ROE OLS Find a positive and significant rela-
tionship between bank size and per-
formance 
Staikouras 
and Wood 
2004 1994 – 1998 European banks Using OLS 
and Fixed Ef-
fect (ROA & 
ROE) 
Panel Data 
Analysis 
Authors found a positive relationship 
between bank size and profitability 
Stancic et 
al.  
2014 2005 – 2009 74 South East Eu-
ropean Banks 
ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q 
OLS Bank size has a positive relationship 
with performance 
Nodeh et al  2016 2005 – 2014 37 Malaysian Com-
mercial Banks 
ROA & ROE OLS/ Fixed 
Effect 
Bank size positively impact on per-
formance 
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Alhassan et 
al 
2015 2007 – 2012 10 Saudi Listed 
Banks 
ROE and ROA OLS Positive relationship between bank 
size and performance 
Kyereboa-
Coleman & 
Biekpe 
2006 1997 – 2004 18 Ghanaian Com-
mercial Banks 
ROE & ROA OLS Positive relationship between bank 
size and performance 
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Table 3. 11 Empirical studies on the negative relationship between bank size and firm performance in UK,USA 
and Other countries.  
Author Year Study Pe-
riod 
Sample Size Performance 
& Measure-
ment 
Method Summary & Conclusion 
Sanda et al 2005 1996 – 
1999 
180 listed coun-
tries on Nigerian 
Stock Exchange 
ROA, ROE  OLS Firm size impact negatively 
on performance 
Hoque et al 2012 2003 – 
2011 
25 listed bank on 
Bangladesh stock 
exchange 
ROA, ROE Panel data analysis Bank size impact negatively 
on financial performance  
Al Mana-
seer et al 
2012 2004 – 
2008 
15 listed Jordani-
an Banks 
ROA, ROE, 
Tobin’s Q 
Multivariate Regres-
sion Analysis 
Bank size is found to be neg-
atively related to profitability 
Rachdi 2014 2000 – 
2010 
10 listed Tunisian 
banks 
ROA  OLS  Bank size impact negatively 
on bank performance  
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Ben 
Naceur & 
Omran 
2011 1988- 2005 173 banks from 
10 MENA coun-
tries 
NIM Ordinary Least 
Squares 
Found a significant negative 
relationship between size and 
performance 
Ahmad 
Almazri 
2011 2005 – 
2009  
7 Jordanian 
Commercial 
banks 
ROA OLS Strong negative relationship 
between bank size and bank 
performance  
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Table 3. 12 Empirical studies showing no significant relationship between bank size and firm performance in UK, 
USA and other countries.  
Author Year Study Pe-
riod 
Sample Size Performance 
& Measure-
ment 
Methods Summary & Conclusion 
Bino & 
Tomar 
2007 1997- 
2006 
10 listed banks 
on Amman Stock 
Exchange 
 
ROA 
OLS Found no relationship between 
bank size and performance 
Ramadan 
et al., 
2011 2001- 
2010 
10 Jordanian 
banks 
ROA, ROE Panel data 
analysis 
Found no relationship between 
bank size an performance 
Micco et 
al., 
2007 1999 – 
2004 
Banks from 119 
countries 
ROA, ROE Ordinary 
Least Squares 
No established relationship be-
tween bank size and perfor-
mance 
El-Mehdi 2007 2000 – 
2005  
24 Tunisian 
banks 
ROA & ROE OLS No relationship between bank 
size and financial performance 
Source;VariousLiteratures;Researcher’sowncompilation
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3.9 Foreign ownership – performance relationship 
 The effect of foreign ownership on firm financial performance has been an issue of in-
terest to academics and policy makers. According to Gorg and Greenaway (2004), the 
main challenging question in the international business strategy is the outcome gained 
from foreign ownership of firms. It is mainly accepted that foreign ownership plays a 
crucial role in firm financial performance, particularly in developing and transitional 
economies. Researchers (Aydin, Sayim and Yalama, 2007) concluded that, on average, 
foreign owned companies have performed better than domestically owned firms.  It is 
therefore, not a surprise that the last three decades have witnessed increased levels of 
foreign direct investments in emerging economies. These authors have put forward two 
plausible reasons to explain the phenomenon of high performance associated with the 
foreign ownership of firms. 
 Foreign owners have the ability to monitor managers, and give them performance-
based incentives, leading the managers to manage more effectively and avoid behav-
iors and activities that undermine the wealth creation motivations of the firm owners. 
The second reason is the transfer of new technology and tried and tested management 
practices to the firm, which help to enhance efficiency by reducing operating expenses 
and generating savings for the firm.  On the performance of foreign banks there are two 
contrasting views, the home field advantage and global advantage hypotheses. The 
home field advantage hypothesis argues that domestic banks are generally more effi-
cient than foreign owned banks due to organizational diseconomies to operate and 
monitor from a distance and limited access to soft qualitative information. The global 
advantage hypothesis argues that foreign banks can be more efficient because of supe-
rior managerial skills and high quality human capital inherited from foreign owners (Ber-
ger-et-al., 2000).  
 Foreign- owned banks are typically part of large banking organizations and generally 
face the same scale of economies and diseconomies as large, domestically owned insti-
tutions. They may have advantages in serving multinational customers by setting up 
branches in countries where their home country customers have foreign affiliates (Gold-
berg and Sunders, 1981). There are other plausible reasons for the enhanced perfor-
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mance of foreign owned banks as compared to their domestic counterparts. Foreign 
owned banks may also have better access to capital markets, superior ability to diversi-
fy risks and the ability to offer some services to multinational customers not easily pro-
vided by a domestically owned bank. In developing countries, foreign owned banks may 
also have access to superior technologies, particularly information technologies for col-
lecting and assessing “hard” quantitative information (Buch, 2003; Buch & Delong, 
2004). The impact of foreign ownership upon bank profitability is associated to various 
reasons (Al-Manaseer et al., 2012). First, the capital contributed by foreign investors 
minimizes the fiscal costs of restructuring of banks (Tang, Zoli & Klytchnikova, 2000). 
  Second, foreign banks may offer expertise in risk management and a more superior 
culture of corporate governance, resulting in more efficient banks (Bonin et al., 
2004).Third, the presence of foreign banks heightens the competition and urges local 
banks to cut costs and enhance their efficiency (Claessens & Fan, 2002). Most of these 
studies have argued that foreign owned banks are more profitable than their domestic 
counterparts in developing countries and less profitable than domestic banks in devel-
oped economies. 
  As can be seen from Tables 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15, prior studies found some mixed re-
sults on the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance (Claessens & 
Van Horen (2012); Kim & Rasiah, (2010); Chari et al., (2012); Lensink & Naaborg, 2007; 
Barako & Greg, 2007; Shan & Mclver, 2011; Tsegba & Ezi-Herbert, 2011). The first 
strand of the empirical literature reports that foreign owned banks impact positively on 
financial performance. Using a data of foreign and domestic banks from 51 emerging 
and developing economies over the period 1999-2006, Claessens and Van Horen 
(2012), find that foreign banks tend to perform better when larger and having a bigger 
market share. They also argue that foreign banks perform better when they come from 
a high income country, when regulations in the country are relatively weak, and when 
from home countries with the same language and similar regulation as the host country. 
Kasman and Yildrim (2006) reported that foreign ownership is positively associated with 
bank performance in the eight Central and European countries.  Similarly, using a sam-
ple data of foreign and domestic banks in Turkey, Bayyurt (2013) also reported that for-
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eign ownership provides better performance than domestic banks. Similarly, using a 
sample data of 15 Jordanian commercial banks for the period 2007-2009, Al-Manaseer 
et al., (2012) found a positive relationship between foreign ownership and financial per-
formance measured by ROA, ROE, and Profit Margin. The study supports that in  
emerging markets, foreign banks tend to be more profitable than domestic banks due to 
cost management advantage as a result of a superior operational set up obtained from 
their home countries (Bonin-et al.,2005). Chari et al., (2012) examined data of US firms 
over the period 1980-2006 and found that foreign banks impact positively on firm per-
formance measured ROA. Using a sample data of 270 Japanese manufacturing com-
panies over the period 1999-2006, Sueyoshi et al., (2010) found that there is a positive 
relationship between foreign ownership and operational performance. Similarly, 
Ghahroudi (2011) examined 3500 Japanese foreign firms over the period 2006-2007 
and found a positive relationship between foreign ownership and performance meas-
ured by ROA, ROE and Net Profits. 
 Choi and Hassan (2003) examined the effect of ownership structure and bank perfor-
mance during 1998- 2002 by using an ordinary least squares model and found a signifi-
cant and positive relationship between foreign owned bank and financial performance. 
Dauma et al., (2006) used financial data of 1005 Indian firms for the period 1999-2000; 
found that foreign ownership impacts positively on financial performance measured by 
return on assets (ROA).  Using a data sample of 249 banks from 20 Middle East and 
North African countries for the period of 1998- 2003, Kobeissi (2004) found that foreign 
owned banks performed better where financial performance was measured by return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) than both privately owned and state owned 
banks. These studies provide empirical evidence that foreign banks in developing coun-
tries may bring expertise in risk management and better culture of corporate govern-
ance rendering foreign banks more efficient (Bonin et al., 2005). Using a global sample, 
Micco et al., (2007) found that in developing countries, foreign owned banks appear to 
have higher profitability as measured by return on assets (ROA). This finding confirms 
that foreign investors have the ability and incentive to intervene in corporate governance 
to affect monitoring or complement existing poor monitoring by domestic investors 
(Gillian & Starks, 2003). 
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            On a sample of South East European banks, Staikouras et al., (2008) found that 
foreign owned banks or banks with higher foreign bank ownership have higher perfor-
mance and efficiency/ than the domestic banks.  Similarly,  using data from 23 Malaysi-
an banks for the period1995- 2005, Kim and Rasiah (2010) found that foreign owned 
banks have better corporate governance and risk management practices that lead to 
positive financial performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE). Arouri et al., (2011) investigated 27 banks in the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil countries for the year 2008 and reported that the foreign ownership level has a signif-
icant positive impact on bank performance as measured by ROA. Their findings support 
the view that foreign banks are more cost efficient than local banks and also provide 
better and quality services. 
 By contrast, a group of researchers reported that foreign owned banks impact negative-
ly on financial performance (Lensink and Naaborg, 2007; Barako and Greg, 2007). Us-
ing a sample data of 511 banks from 73 countries for the period 1998- 2001, Lensink 
and Naaborg (2007) found a negative relationship between foreign owned banks and 
financial performance, as  measured by return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE). The negative relationship between foreign ownership and performance lends 
support to the home field hypothesis which argues that domestic banks are generally 
more profitable than foreign banks due to organizational diseconomies to operate and 
the ability to monitor from a distance and limited access to soft qualitative information.   
Barako and Greg (2007) examined all the financial institutions in Kenya for the period of 
2000-2004, and found that foreign ownership impacts negatively on financial perfor-
mance. Using a sample data of 70 Indian banks for the period 1986- 1991, Bhathahatya 
et al., (2007) foreign owned banks impact negatively on performance. Empirical studies 
by De Young and Nolle (1996), and Elyasiani & Mehdian (1997) found that foreign 
owned banks are less profit efficient as a consequent of their reliance on purchased 
funds. Chang et al., (1998) examined US multinational commercial banks and found 
that foreign owned banks are less efficient than US owned banks. The empirical studies 
showed that the lower performance of foreign banks compared with locals banks in de-
veloped countries were due to different markets, competitive regulation and disclosure 
conditions. 
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             The third strand of empirical studies shows that there is no relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performance (Shan and McClver, 2011; Millet-Reyes & 
Zhao, 2010; Tsegba and Ezi –Herbert, 2011; Gurbuz & Aybars, 2010). Using a sample 
data of 540 Chinese from non-financial firms listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange over 
2001-2005, Shan & Mclver (2011) found no relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm performance. Millet-Reyes and Zhao (2010) examined 174 French companies with 
650 firm year observations over the period 2000-2004, and found that foreign ownership 
has no significant impact on firm performance measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. Simi-
larly, using a sample data of 73 firms listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange during the 
period from 2005 to 2007, Tsegba & Ezi-Herbert (2011) found that foreign ownership 
has no relationship with firm performance measured by EPS and ROA.  Gurbuz and 
Aybars (2010) investigated 205 Turkish listed companies over the period 2005-2007, 
and found that foreign ownership has no significant effect on firm performance. 
Empirical Literature on Ghana 
 Focusing on Ghana where this thesis is based, prior studies examining the impact of 
foreign ownership on firm performance have also found mixed results between the two. 
For example, Ntow and Laryea-Afoley (2012) reported that foreign ownership impacted 
negatively on financial performance among 25 Ghanaian banks over the period 2005-
2010. They concluded that foreign investors are inherently at a disadvantage compared 
to domestic investors due to their lack of knowledge and expertise in the local financial 
and legislative environment.  By contrast, Adams and Agbemade (2012) reported a pos-
itive relationship between foreign ownership and financial performance among 24 banks 
over the period from 2003 to 2007.Other study by Opoku-Agyeman (2015) found that 
foreign ownership had a positive and significantly impact on financial performance 
among 27 Ghanaian universal banks. They argue that foreign banks may offer expertise 
in risk management and a more superior culture of corporate governance, resulting in 
more efficient banks. They also reckon that existence of foreign investors plays an im-
portant role in applying the corporate governance in the companies. They also believed 
that the ability of the foreign investors to monitor the companies is higher than the do-
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mestic ones. Therefore, foreign investors are in better position to improve on the firm 
performance and add value to the firm. 
  As can be seen above from the mixed results, there is no consensus as to foreign 
ownership perform better or not in the developing country. Thus, foreign owners are 
more likely to have the ability to monitor managers, and give them performance-based 
incentives, leading the managers to manage more seriously, and avoid behaviours and 
activities that undermine wealth creation motivations of firm owners. Therefore, if moni-
toring is strictly implemented it is more likely managers’ behaviour will be controlled and 
agency problems are reduced which might result in better firm performance. Based on 
the above discussions, this study aims to contribute to the on-going debate to serve not 
only the policy makers in deciding which path  should be taken in developing countries, 
but also the literature to fill the gap on the link between foreign ownership and financial 
performance in developing countries and specifically Ghana. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is proposed to be empirically tested. 
H05: Foreign ownership has a positive impact on bank performance 
   Most of the prior studies have provided that foreign investors in the developing coun-
tries improve corporate performance through effective corporate governance practices 
Staikouras et al, (2008): Iannotta et al., 2007). Foreign ownership is found to positively 
affect bank performance, thus suggesting that good corporate governance standards 
are imperative to every bank and important to investors and other stakeholders. There-
fore, it is expected that in this thesis for foreign ownership to a have positive impact on 
bank performance.
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Table 3. 13 Empirical studies showing a positive foreign ownership and firm performance UK,USA and other 
countries  
Author Year Study Period Sample Size Performance 
Measurement 
Methods Summary & Conclusion 
Al Mana-
seer et al., 
2012 2007 – 2009 15 Jordanian 
banks 
ROA, ROE, 
PM 
Multiple Re-
gression 
Authors find a positive significant 
relationship between foreign own-
ership and performance 
Chari et 
al., 
2012 1980 – 2006 US firms ROA Pobit Regres-
sion 
Find a positive relationship be-
tween foreign firms and perfor-
mance 
Choi et al 2007 1999 – 2002 457 Korean 
companies 
Tobin’s Q Basic Regres-
sion 
Find a positive relationship 
Staikoura 
et al., 
2008 1996- 2002 Banks from 
South East Eu-
ropean Countries 
ROA, ROE OLS Regres-
sion 
Positive relationship between for-
eign owned banks and profitability 
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Kim & Ra-
siah 
2010 1995- 2005 23 Malaysian 
commercial 
banks 
ROA, ROE GMM Positive relationship between for-
eign owned banks and profitability 
Ghabroudi 2011 2006 3500 Foreign 
firms in Japan 
ROA, ROE, 
Net profit 
OLS Regres-
sion 
Positive relationship between for-
eign owned banks and perfor-
mance 
Sueyoshi 
et al., 
2010 1996 - 2006 270 Japanese 
companies 
ROA, ROE Panel data 
analysis 
Positive relationship between for-
eign owned banks and perfor-
mance 
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Table 3. 14 Empirical studies showing a negative relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance 
in USA, UK and other countries 
Author Year Study 
Period 
Sample Size Performance Meas-
urement 
Methods Summary & Conclusion 
Barako and 
Greg 
2007 2000 – 
2004 
All Financial In-
stitutions in Ken-
ya 
ROA, ROE Multivariate Re-
gression Analy-
sis 
Foreign ownership impact 
negatively on performance  
Bhattahytya 
et al., 
2007 1986 – 
1991 
70 Indian banks ROA Panel Data Foreign ownership impact 
negatively on performance 
Stancic et al., 2014 2005 – 
2010 
74 commercial 
banks from 4 
transition econ-
omies of South 
East Europe 
ROA, ROE Ordinary least 
Squares 
Foreign ownership impact 
negatively on performance 
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Phung & Le 2013 2008 – 
2011 
Listed banks in 
Vietnamese 
listed on Ho Chi 
Minh Stock Ex-
change 
ROA & ROE  OLS  Foreign ownership negatively 
impact on performance 
Cornett et al 2009  1989 – 
2004 
16 banks from 
Far East  Coun-
tries 
ROA & ROE Multivariate re-
gression 
Foreign ownership negatively 
impact on performance 
San, Then 
and Heng 
2011 2002 – 
2009  
21 Malaysian 
banks 
ROA & ROE DEA Foreign ownership negatively 
impact on performance 
Haneef 2012 2001 – 
2010 
45 Pakistani 
banks 
ROA, ROE and Divi Multivariate re-
gression 
Foreign ownership negatively 
impact on performance 
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Table 3. 15  Empirical studies showing a no relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance in 
UK,USA and other countries 
Author Year Study Pe-
riod 
Sample Size Performance & 
Measurement 
Methods Summary & Conclusion 
Shan & 
Mcclver 
2011 2001 – 
2005 
540 firms listed in Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange 
Tobin’sQ,ROA OLS, Fixed Effect Find that there is no relation-
ship between foreign owner-
ship and performance 
Millet Reyes 
and Zhao 
2010 2000-
2004 
174 French Companies Tobin’s Q, 
ROA 
Multiple Regression 
Analysis 
Authors found that there is 
no relationship between for-
eign owned firms and per-
formance 
Tsegba & 
Ezi- Herbert 
2011 2005 – 
2007 
73 listed firms on Nige-
rian Stock Exchange 
EPS, ROA Panel Data analysis No relationship found be-
tween foreign firms and per-
formance 
Gurbuz & 
Aybars 
2010 2005 - 
2007 
205 Turkish listed firms ROA Employ Quartile Re-
gression 
Authors found no relationship 
between foreign firms and 
performance 
Source:  Various Sources: Researcher’s own compilation
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3.10 An Overview of Existing literature 
 Even though there is a growing body of literature on corporate governance practices 
and company performance, there is a diversity of results due to the different theoretical 
perspectives applied, selection of methodologies, measurement of performance, cofliing 
views on board and ownership involvement in decision making and the contextual nture 
of individual firms (Kakabadse, Kakabadse & Kouzmin, 2001). They also argued that 
political opportunity, ownership structure, stakeholder interest, social infrastructure and 
mobilization have an influence on corporations and corporate stakeholders, demanding 
attention for good corporate governance practices. The past literature shows inconclsive 
findings and mixed arguments regarding the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance of universal banks in Ghana.  
 First, the focus of the existing literature is mainly on corporate governance characteriics 
and firm performance, but most of the reviewed studies are centered on non-banking 
firms and developed countries and very limited study has been done on bankin institions 
and developing countries such as Ghana. If banks and non-banks firms from different 
countries are included, differences in regulations, legal and governance systems could 
play a role in explaining differences between studies as there is substantial evidence 
that corporate governance of banks, financial regulation and national governance intrac-
tion (De Haan & Vlahu, 2013).  Furthermore, institutional legal frameworks in emerging 
economies are not well developed compared to developed countries, which limits the 
benefits of their corporate governance efforts. These emerging economies show signifi-
cant differences in terms of regulation, legal, investor protection, economic growth busi-
ness environment and management practices. 
  Second, in addition, corporate governance in Ghana is still in the infantile stage com-
pared to developed economies. Literature on corporate governance in Ghana is also 
limited. There are no previous studies conducted on corporate governance practices 
and universal banks’ performance in Ghana. The relationship between board structure, 
foreign ownership, and bank size is not well defined or analyzed in the existing litera-
ture. 
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3.11 Research Gaps 
  From the above studies reviewed, we observed that there are inconclusive findings 
and mixed arguments and hence, the researchers would want to ascertain (using the 
Ghanaian banking industry) whether there is a relationship between corporate govern-
ance structures and financial performance of the universal banks in Ghana. Thus, this 
study seeks to add to the debate by making it clear from a Ghanaian perspective 
whether corporate governance structures (e.g. board size, composition, committees, 
bank size, and foreign ownership) impact on universal banks’ performance. Secondly, 
little reference can be found or made from an African perspective on terms of the in-
flence of corporate governance structure on the financial performance of universal 
banks. This study will make an original contribution to knowledge by examining the de-
velopment of corporate governance practices in the social, political and economic envi-
ronments of the Ghana as a particular case among the Sub-Sahara African countries. 
The proposed study besides filling these research gaps will also contribute to the policy 
and development of bank governance structures in Ghana. 
 3.12 Summary 
  Corporate governance is the system by which firms are directed and controlled. It 
deals with the ways suppliers of finance can ensure that they will get a return on their 
investment (Cadbury report, 1992; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Because the literature in-
cludes several definitions to clarify the meaning of corporate governance from different 
perspectives and understandings, this chapter defined corporate governance also from 
two perspectives: shareholder and stakeholder. This chapter has focused on the extant 
theoretical and empirical on corporate governance and financial performance relation-
ship literature. Its objective has been twofold. Firstly, it sought to review existing theo-
ries that attempt to link corporate governance structures with firm financial performance. 
Recognising the complex and multi-disciplinary nature of corporate governance, and in 
line with prior studies, multiple theoretical perspectives os adopted in explaining the 
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complex relationship between corporate governance structures and firm financial per-
formance. The second objective of this chapter has been to review the extant empirical 
literature on the link between corporate governance structures and firm financial per-
formance.  The final objective of the chapter has been to review the empirical literature 
on Ghana and the empirical evidence on Ghana offer an interesting research context for 
corporate govenance, as the dearth of empirical literature on Ghanaian market is very 
limited and scarce.  
  Arguably, this offers an opportunity to make substantial contributions to empirical lit-
erature. The literature also recognized that a structure that is appropriate to one organi-
zation may not be suitable for another, and if shareholder interests are to be promoted, 
greater flexibility in acceptable governance structures may be necessary (Weir et al., 
2001). Prior research also reported that good corporate governance could help inves-
tors to have confidence in banks resulting in good banking performance. However, em-
pirical studies of corporate governance and bank performance relationships reported 
mixed results. The literature review will be used to develop the relevant hypothesis in 
this study. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
 The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research methodology of this study. 
Since the aim of this study was to test the effects of corporate governance practices on 
bank performance, the design of the methodology was based on prior research into 
these relationships. This chapter describes the research philosophy and methodology, 
method of data collection and the variables used to test the hypotheses and statistical 
techniques employed to report the results. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 
4.2 discusses the research philosophy while Section 4.3 presents the research method-
ology. Section 4.4 discusses the descriptive statistics while Section 4.5 presents the 
panel data methodology adopted in this study. Section 4.6 presents the diagnostic tests 
for assumptions of multiple linear regression while Section 4.7 discusses the regression 
and panel methods. Section 4.8 discusses the choice between Pooled OLS and the two 
alternative estimations (FE and RE) while Section 4.9 presents the Hausman Test 
Specification. Section 4.10 discusses the Specification of Empirical Models while Sec-
tion 4.11 presents the sample data criteria and selection. Section 4.12 reviews the data 
collection methods while Section 4.13 discusses the design of the variables: operation-
alization and measurement of variables. Section 4.14 presents the summary chapter. 
4.2 Research Philosophy 
  Philosophical paradigm deals with the belief or worldview about the way data on a 
phenomenon should be gathered and analyzed (Levin, 1988). This study is based on 
the positivistic paradigm (also known as, experimentalist or traditionalist) which as-
sumes that the world is external and independent of the researcher. Positivism is a phi-
losophy of science based in the view that in the social as well as natural sciences data 
derived from sensory experience and logical and mathematical treatments of such data 
are together the exclusive source of all authoritative knowledge (Burrell and Morgan, 
1988).  Positivists are of the view that reality is stable and can actually be looked at and 
described from an objective and detached point without necessarily interfering with the 
phenomena being studied (Levin, 1988). This often involves manipulation of reality with 
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variations in only a single independent variable so as to identify regularities in, and to 
form relationships between, some of the constituent elements of the social world.  
 The approach of positivism to the social world in social research is basically about 
combining deductive logic with empirical and mainly quantitative methods in order to 
seek generally applying regularities. Positivism focuses on measurement and depends 
on facts to discover social phenomena and relationships. Hypotheses testing and 
measurements are elements of this methods research (Payne and Payne, 2004).  This 
study takes the positivist paradigm in which the hypotheses are developed based on the 
notion of the impact of the corporate governance on the bank’s financial performance 
that can be investigated and empirically examined using the researcher’s tools of analy-
sis and the theoretical conjectures. Burrell and Morgan (1994) stated that positivists 
seek to explain and what happens in social world by searching world for regularities and 
causal relationships between its constituents. This study adopted a positivist approach, 
because a positivist approach seeks facts or causes of social phenomena. The reason-
ing is deductive because the hypotheses were derived first and the data were collected 
later to confirm or negate the propositions.  
 This study employs the use of the secondary data for gathering and analyzing the data 
to address its objectives. The philosophical approach adopted in this study was useful in 
dealing with the effects of board structure, foreign ownership and bank size on bank 
performance. In summary, the research philosophy of this study is informed by the fact 
that the study does not seek to produce a new theory but to test existing hypotheses 
based on analysis of quantitative data, thus the deductive approach is more appropriate 
for this research. 
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4.3 Research Methodology 
  Researchers around the world have employed two main research approaches, namely 
the quantitative and the qualitative research methods (Adams et al., 2007). The qualita-
tive method presents a descriptive and non-numerical approach to collect the infor-
mation in order to present understanding of the phenomenon (Berg 2004). Adams et al., 
(2007) argue that qualitative method employs methods of data collection and analysis 
that are non-quantitative, aims towards the exploration of social relations, and describes 
reality as experienced by the respondents. Babbie (2012) points out that qualitative 
method is an active and flexible method that can study subtle nuances in the attitudes 
and   behaviours for investigating the social processes over time. On the other hand, 
Adams et al., (2007); Hussey and Hussey (2009) and Bryman (2012) point that the 
quantitative approach uses different types of statistical analysis and provides stronger 
forms of measurement, reliability and ability to generalize. Quantitative approaches refer 
to the research that is based on the methodology principles of positivism and neo-
positivism and adheres to the standards of a stick research design developed prior to 
the actual research (Adam et al., 2007). Moreover, Berg (2004) argues that the quanti-
tative method can deal with longer time periods with larger number of samples leading 
increasing the generalization capacity. However some researchers found that the quali-
tative approach suffers from a number of problems. First, it uses and selects a small 
sample which will not represent the entire population (Hakim, 1987). Second, transpar-
ency and reliability are still low in qualitative methods (Berg, 2004).  
  Finally qualitative methods are time consuming; it may result in inefficient tools to get 
adequate explanations (Bergs, 2004). Quantitative research design is used in this study. 
The quantitative method of data collection was adopted because of the availability of 
data, convenience as well as the nature of the research design which required past and 
documented facts as basis for performance evaluation. 
The justification for adopting a quantitative method in this study stems from three plau-
sible reasons – (i)  the fact that  existing theories make it easier to formulate hypotheses 
that can be tested using Statistical tools; (ii) provides a framework for addressing the 
relationship among variables in the study; and (iii) useful for dealing a cause and effect 
143 
relationship..  Furthermore, this study applied deductive positivism approach whereby 
the pre-existing theoretical basis is identified and relied upon in developing the hypothe-
ses, the empirical findings demonstrate whether the tested hypotheses are accepted or 
rejected. To achieve this objective, this study used the multiple regression as the main 
tool of analysis in which the researcher pursued the positivist understanding of the con-
duct of methodological processes that is “unaffected by the individual perceptual differ-
ences (Ardalan, 2012). Hair et al., (2009) stated that “the appropriate method of analy-
sis when the research problem involves a single metric variable presumed to be related 
to two or more independent variables”. Therefore multiple regression analysis is chosen 
as the main tool of analysis in this study. Multiple regression model is one of the most 
common methods of analysis that have been used by previous researchers (Anderson 
and Leeh, 2003; Rant, 2011; Al-Sahafi, 2015; Dinga et al., 2009; Asm’a Al Amarneh, 
2014) to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm performance. 
4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
              Descriptive statistics have been widely used in academic research on corpo-
rate governance (Abdullah 2004; Laing & Weir 1999; Lam & Lee 2008; Vafeas, 2000). 
Descriptive statistics measure central tendency and dispersion. The most commonly 
used measures of central tendency are mean, mode and median. The mean is the most 
important measure of central tendency (Veal, 2005). The descriptive statistics used 
were the mean, maximum and minimum. The mean was calculated to measure the cen-
tral tendency of the variables in 2006 and 2014.  Descriptive statistics are also useful to 
make general observations about data collected. They report on the trends and patterns 
of data and provide the basis for comparisons between variables. In this study descrip-
tive statistics provided a comparison of changes in the data for 2006 and 2014. They 
show the extent to which banks have accepted the universal banking license concept on 
corporate governance and the trends of firm performance variables. The mean is the 
sum of all observations divided by the number of values. The equation is as follows: 
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                  Equation 1: Sample Average 
                                      __∑x__ 
                                          N   
                                     x̄= sample mean 
                                     n=number of observations 
                                    ∑x= sum of all the observations 
 Descriptive statistics show the mean, minimum and maximum values of the dependent 
variables (ROA, ROE), and independent variable (board size, board composition, board 
committees, bank size, and foreign ownership) and control variable (cost to income, 
bank age). 
     
4.5 Panel Data Methodology  
  In analyzing the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance 
of universal banks in Ghana, the panel data methodology was adopted. The use of 
panel data regression methodology in this study is based on three fundamental justifica-
tions. (i) The data collected had time and cross sectional attributes and this will enable 
us to study bank financial performance over time (time series) as well as across the 
sampled universal banks (cross-section). (ii) Panel data regression provide better re-
sults since it increases sample size and reduces the problem of degree of freedom. (iii) 
The use of panel data would avoid the problem of multicollinearity, aggregation bias and 
endogeneity problems (Solomon et al, 2012).  Panel data are said to be repeated ob-
servations on the same cross section, typically of individual variables that are observed 
for several time periods (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999; Wooldridge, 2003; Bauma-et 
al,2003). Panel data analysis is an important method of longitudinal data analysis be-
cause it allows for a number of regression analyses in both spatial (units) and temporal 
(time) dimensions. It also provides a major means to longitudinally analyze the data es-
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pecially when the data are from various sources and the time series are rather short for 
separate time series analysis. Even in a situation when observations are long enough 
for separate analyses, panel data analysis gives a number of techniques that can help 
examine changes over time common to a particular type of cross-sectional unit. 
  According to Mills (1999), the spatial dimension in a panel data set is cross section di-
mension and in this case consists of Ghanaian universal banks in this thesis. The tem-
poral dimension in this thesis relates to a number of observations of a set of variables 
representing these universal banks over a particular period of time. As indicated earlier 
data for 2006 to 2014 on corporate governance practices and bank performance 
measures was collected for this thesis and therefore covers a period of nine years.  The 
nature of our panel data is in line with previous studies (Adusei, 2011; Kyereboa-
Coleman & Biekpe (2006); Henry, 2008; Beiner et al., 2006) that ensured that require-
ments for balanced panel data analysis are met. In this thesis, panel data regression 
model in its form was estimated as below: 
 
                     Equation 2: 
                                       Yit = β0 + β1Xit + ………+ βkXkit + uit ………………… (2) 
 
4.6 Test of Panel Regression Assumptions 
 Before analyzing the data, it was screened for econometric problems that might affect 
later analysis. Regression models are evaluated according to five tests prescribed by 
econometricians (Gujarati, 2003; Green, 1993). In order to predict the appropriateness 
of models, diagnostic tests such as normality, multicolinearity, autocorrelation, linearity 
and heteroskedasticity have to be conducted in order to confirm that the regression 
analyses meet the validity requirements. Ignoring the regression assumptions can con-
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tribute to wrong validity estimates. When assumptions are not met, the findings may re-
sult in errors, over-or underestimation of significance. In addition, Breusch-Pagan La-
grange Multiplier (LM) test will be used to decide between a pooled OLS regression and 
alternative regression (Fixed Effects & Random Effects). Furthermore, the Hausman 
specification was conducted to choose between the Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
that are appropriate for the regression model. 
    First, the multicollinearity assumption is tested by conducting a correlation matrix 
among the variables. Strictly speaking, multicollinearity refers to existence of perfect or 
exact linear relationship amongst some or all explanatory variables. Econometric refer-
ences have indicated that collinearity increases estimates of parameter variance, yields 
high R-square in the face of low parameter significance, and results in parameters with 
incorrect signs and implausible magnitudes (Mela & Kopalle, 2002). Gujarati (2004) and 
Green et al., (1998) respectively suggest 0.8 and 0.9 as a threshold of bivariate correla-
tions for the harmful effect of collinearity.  The Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation 
Coefficient (r) is a measure of the degree of association between variables. It takes a 
value between -1 and 1. A value of (r) near to 1 indicates a strong positive association, 
whereas a value of (r) near to-1 indicates a strong negative linear association. The 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient between variables X and Y is computed as follows: 
 
                 Equation 3:  Pearson Correlation Coefficient Formula (r) is as follow: 
 
   
        
                                Where, n= number of observations 
                               ∑X = sum of all the observations X 
                             ∑Y= sum of all the observations Y, 
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                              ∑XY = sum of product of variables X and Y, 
                             ∑X2 = sum of squares of variable X, 
                             ∑Y2 = sum of squares of variable Y, 
                             (∑X) 2 = sum of all the observations X squared, 
                            (∑Y) 2 = sum of all the observations Y squared 
 The Pearson’s correlation matrix between variables include in the analysis alongside 
with their corresponding significance level. However, Pearson’s correlation analysis 
shows only the direction and degree of association among variables and it does not 
permit the researcher to make causal inferences regarding the relationship between the 
identified variables. Pearson’s correlation matrix was used in previous studies by 
(Vafeas, 2000; Guest, 2009; Adams & Mehran, 2008; Belkhir, 2005; Sanda-et-al., 2005 
and Bino and Tormar, 2010) to measure the extent and direction of the linear relation-
ship among independent (corporate governance variables and dependent variables per-
formance measures). 
 Second, the normality assumption is tested by using Jarque Bera Statistic Test. Hair et 
al, (1998) argue that one common violation in multiple linear regression modeling is that 
of normality. Normality failures can lead to misleading inferences and unreliable estima-
tions. Assessment of normality of a data is a prerequisite for statistical test   because 
normal data is an underlying assumption in parametric testing. In this study, we used 
Jarque –Bera Statistic Test to conduct this normality test (Bowman and Shenton (1975) 
Jarque and Bera (1987) and we look for p-value for JB statistic. In null hypothesis, the 
assumption will be error term is normally distributed and if, so the p-value is greater 
than (a) 0.05, we should not reject the null hypothesis. We found that, Ho: error terms 
are normally distributed. The decision rule is to reject Ho if the p-value of the F-statistics 
<=0.05, otherwise do not reject the Ho.                                                              
 Third, to further strengthen the result of the absence of multicollinearity, the study in-
tends to carry out a residual diagnostic test of Variance Inflation Factor. Gujarati (2004) 
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illustrated that the existence of multicolinearity makes the assessment and the hypothe-
sis testing about regression coefficients indeterminate. This is because multicolinearity 
makes the regression coefficient unstable and difficult to interpret. Thus, the standard 
errors for the coefficients are magnified making the coefficient statistically insignificant. 
Furthermore, multicolinearity can cause the coefficients to change signs, and makes it 
more difficult to identify the correct model. The variance inflation factor (VIF) is com-
monly used to identify the presence of multicollinearity. VIF illustrates the degree for 
every independent variable that has been explained by other independent variables to 
eliminate collinear variables. In other words, the change in one variable will change the 
coefficient. If VIF is bigger than 10 this indicates there is a problem with multicollinearity, 
but if it is less than 10, then it indicate no collinearity problem (Gujarati, 2003). 
  Fourth, a serial correlation test was conducted by using Breusch-Godfrey LM test.  Se-
rial correlation occurs when error terms from different time periods (or cross-section ob-
servations) are correlated. Therefore, it can be said that the error term is serially corre-
lated. Serial correlation occurs in time-series studies when the errors associated with a 
given time period carry over into future time periods. This usually happens because 
there is an economic relationship between the observations, such as in time series data 
when observations are measurements of the same variables at different points in time, 
or in cluster sampling when observations are measurements of the same variables on 
related subjects (e.g. more than one member of the same family, more than one firm 
operating in the same company). 
 Fifth, we conducted a heteroskedasticity test. It occurs if different observations’ errors 
have different variances, such as Var (εi) = σi
2. The assumption of heteroskcedasticity 
refers to equal variance of errors across all levels of independent variables. This means 
that errors are spread out consistently between variables (Keith, 2006). Thus, het-
eroskedasticity occurs when the variance of a disturbance is not constant. If the 
squared residuals get larger or smaller as a particular independent variable gets larger 
or smaller, then probably we will suffer from heteroskedasticity.  When heteroscedastici-
ty is marked it can lead to distortion of the findings and weaken the overall analysis and 
statistical power of the analysis, which can result in an increased possibility of errors, 
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erratic and untrustworthy F- test results and erroneous conclusions. This study used the 
Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity. 
  Sixth, according to Keith (2006) linearity is the most important assumption as it directly 
relates to bias of the whole analysis. Linearity defines the dependent variable as a linear 
function of the predictor (independent variable) (Darlington, 1968). Keith (2006) opine 
that if linearity is violated all estimates of regression coefficients, standard errors, and 
tests of statistical significance may be biased. For the purpose of this study, the 
Breusch Pagan LM (Reset test) will be conducted. The detection of linearity is examined 
by F (statistic) and its associated significant levels.  If the diagnostic tests indicate no 
serious violation of the linear regression assumptions of linearity, normality, autocorrela-
tion, collinearity and heterscedasticity, suggesting that it is appropriate to carry out mul-
tivariate regression analysis 
  Seventh, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) version of the BP test is a general principle for 
testing hypotheses about parameters in a likelihood framework. The Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test helps to decide between a pooled OLS regression and 
the alternative effects (Fixed Effects and Random Effects). The hypothesis under the 
test is expressed as one or more constraints on the values of the parameters. To per-
form an LM test only an estimation of the parameters subject to the restrictions is re-
quired. This is in contrast with Wald tests, which are based on unrestricted estimates, 
and likelihood ratio tests which require both restricted and unrestricted estimates. The 
name of the test is motivated by the fact that it can be regarded as testing whether the 
Lagrange multipliers involved in enforcing the restrictions are significantly different from 
zero. 
  Finally, the Hausman Test is used to differentiate between the two estimation methods 
(Fixed Effects and Random Effects). 
 
 
 
150 
 4.7 Regression and Panel Methods (Econometric Modeling) 
 
                           Equation 4 : General Model for Regression 
 
                                                𝛱𝒊𝒕= 𝜶 + Σ𝜷𝒋𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (𝟏) 
Where Πit is the dependent variable measuring profitability and estimated by ROA 
and ROE for bank i at time t, with i =1, . . .,N, j=1……,J and t =1, . . ., T, N denotes 
the number of cross-sectional observations and T the length of the sample peri-
od. There is a constant term measured by the scalar α. Xit’s are the explanatory 
variables and ɛit is the error term (disturbance). 
As there are two dependent variables, there will be two linear models with each 
dependent variable as a function of the explanatory variables. Thus, the analysis 
has been conducted using a Fixed Effect models using the Gretl software. The 
following equations summarize our econometric model. 
Equation 5:     General Model with ROA as dependent Variable 
                          𝑅𝑂𝐴𝒊𝒕= 𝜶 + 𝛽1BOSIZE + 𝛽2BOCOMP + 𝛽3BOCOMM + 𝛽4FOREIGN          
+ 𝛽5BANKSIZE + 𝛽6AGE + 𝛽7CIR + (𝟐)𝜺𝒊𝒕,  
Equation 6:       General Model with ROE as dependent Variable 
                          𝑅𝑂E𝒊𝒕= 𝜶 + 𝛽1BOSIZE + 𝛽2BOCOMP + 𝛽3BOCOMM + 𝛽4FOREIGN +      
                           𝛽5BANKSIZE + 𝛽6AGE + 𝛽7CIR + 𝜺𝒊𝒕, (3) 
 
            Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the proposed research hy-
potheses. This is a statistical method that is used for analyzing the relationship between 
a single dependent variable and several independent variables. In multiple regressions, 
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hypotheses are tested and the independent variables whose values are known are used 
to predict the value of dependent variables (Hair-et-al, 2010). In this study, we used 
multiple regressions since we attempted to predict an outcome from various predictors 
(Field, 2005). Usually, the investigator seeks to ascertain the causal effect of one varia-
ble upon another. The regression line is described algebraically by the regression equa-
tion that expresses the relationship between two variables or more. Therefore  multivar-
iate  regression analysis were employed  to test the association and strength of associa-
tion between the dependent variables (ROA; ROE) and the independent variables;  
ownership structure , board size, board composition, board committees and bank size, 
while the control variables were bank age and cost to income ratio. 
           In addition to the Ordinary Least Squares method of estimation, a panel data an-
alytical framework will be used to investigate the relationship between the governance 
mechanisms and bank financial performance with a proposal to address the potential 
problems of endogeneity. Thus, random effects or fixed effects as described later in this 
section.  According to Mills (1999), the spatial dimension in a panel data set is a com-
posite of the cross section dimension and in this case consists of the Ghanaian univer-
sal banks in this thesis. In contrast, the temporal dimension in this thesis relates to a 
number of observations of a set of variables representing these firms over a particular 
period of time. As indicated earlier, data for 2006 to 2014 on corporate governance 
practices and bank financial performance measures was collected for this thesis and 
therefore covers a period of nine years.   
            Fundamentally, there are three standard panel data regression models that 
arose from the general model described in equation (1) above with specific assumptions 
in relation to the explanatory variables, the properties of the error term, and the associa-
tion between the explanatory variables and the error term. In addition, further assump-
tions need to be made regarding the variability of the regression coefficient across firms. 
In this respect, and as has been indicated earlier, a panel data regression model in this 
thesis may be estimated by Pooled OLS, Random Effects or Fixed Effects and are dis-
cussed as follows: 
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             The Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assume constant coefficients, that 
is, referring to both intercepts and slopes. In the event that there is neither a significant 
firm-specific effect nor significant temporal effects, it could be possible to pool all of the 
data and run a Pooled OLS regression model. Thus, the typical assumptions of constant 
variance and uncorrelated observations must continue to hold. However, this model is 
not appropriate if t, the time period is small (Gujarati, 1995). Basically, the estimated 
Pooled OLS regression will be biased because of unobserved heterogeneity (Xit and uit 
are correlated). But the bias may be lower because the Pooled OLS regression relies on 
between firm comparisons as well as within variation compared to the cross-sectional 
OLS regression. In this thesis the Pooled OLS regression is estimated in the following 
general term: 
 
                      Equation: 7 
                                       Yit=   β0 + β1Xit + uit ………………… (7) 
Basically, the estimated Pooled OLS regression will be biased because of unobserved 
heterogeneity (Xit and Uit are correlated). But the bias may be lower because the 
Pooled OLS regression relies on between firm comparisons as well as within variation 
compared to the cross-sectional OLS regression. 
Also, Random Effects model assume that the unobserved differences are not correlated 
with any of the explanatory variables. That is, vi are treated as random constant terms 
(Greene, 2012) where the intercept is a random outcome variable. The specific benefit 
of using the Random Effects model is that, the regressors allowed time-invariant varia-
bles to be included. In this instance, the random error vi is heterogeneity specific to a 
cross sectional unit and in this case, firms. This random error is assumed to be constant 
over time. The equation of the random effects regression becomes: 
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                  Equation: 8 
                                          Yit = β0 + βiXit + vi + Uit …………………….. (8) 
 
 Where vi is between-firm error and it is within-firm error. Thus, vi are      assumed   to 
be random variables and that Cov (Xit, vi) = 0. But if Cov (Xit, vi) ≠ 0 the random effects 
estimator will be biased.  Lastly, the fixed effects model assumes constant slopes but 
different intercepts for cross sectional (group) units, and in this case individual banks. 
Thus, the intercept is the cross section (group) specific that differs from bank to bank. 
Further, the error term (ᵋit) is assumed to be correlated with the explanatory variables. 
Even though there are no significant temporal effects when using Fixed Effects model, 
there are significant differences among banks. Thus, the Fixed Effects model is em-
ployed whenever one is only interested in analyzing the impact of variables that may 
vary over time. In this respect, it may be used to explore the relationship between the 
explanatory variables (corporate governance variables) and performance within a bank. 
This means that each bank has its own individual characteristics that may or may not 
affect the explanatory or the dependent variables. If these individual characteristics 
within a bank may impact or bias the explanatory variables or the dependent variables, 
then one needs to control these individual firm characteristics. In this thesis, the fixed 
effects model is in the following general form: 
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                            Equation: 9 
                                                    Yit = βiXit + vi + ᵋit …………………….. (9) 
 
Where vi is the unobservable firm-specific effects which differ between firms and 
are time-invariant. In this respect, this thesis made use of the Hausman specifica-
tion test on whether the random effects estimator is appropriate or not. 
 4.8 Choosing between Pooled OLS, and (Random and Fixed 
Effects) 
          In a panel data analysis, the assumptions underlying pooled OLS model are not 
likely to be met, and in particular, when there is unobserved heterogeneity which differs 
across the sampled universal banks. Thus, ignoring the heterogeneity makes the pooled 
OLS estimator inconsistent because the likely firm specific-effect cannot be addressed 
by the pooled OLS regression model. In this thesis, LM test helped to decide between 
pooled OLS regression and the alternative random or fixed effects regression. The null 
hypothesis in the LM test is that there was no significant difference across firms (i.e. no 
panel effect). The results whether the pooled OLS regression model, random or fixed 
effects regression was appropriate. 
4.9. The decision between Random and Fixed Effects Regression 
Model          
 Given the suitability of the random effects or fixed effects as a method of estimation in 
this thesis, and following McKnight and Weir (2009), the Hausman specification test was 
used to differentiate between the two estimation methods for the hypotheses testing in 
chapter six. In this respect, and as explained in subsection 5.5.2 of chapter five, the 
Hausman specification test null hypothesis is that there is no correlation between the 
unique errors and the independent variables used in the regression model, suggesting a 
test of strict exogeneity. The decision was as follows: if there is no correlation between 
the unique errors and the independent variables, random effects regression model is 
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suitable. Otherwise, use the fixed effects model if there is a correlation between the 
unique errors and the independent variables. 
4.10 Specification of the empirical model 
 For the purpose of empirical model specification for data analysis, the assumptions of 
panel regression models discussed above need to be tested in order to determine the 
best fit empirical model specification for the unique data set used in this thesis. Unlike 
Kajola (2008) who failed to test these assumptions before choosing pooled OLS as a 
method of estimation, and as is explained in chapter five, this thesis is choose between 
pooled OLS regression and the alternatives of Random effects and Fixed effects. 
Breusch and Pagan (1980)’s used the Langrange Multiplier test to determine whether or 
not there is heterogeneity. If the pooled OLS estimator is found to be inconsistent and 
biased due to unobserved variables, then, the choice between random effects or fixed 
effects is decided by the Hausman specification test to help distinguish between the 
consistency and efficiency of the estimators.  
           Fundamentally, if this thesis had employed pooled OLS regression and the un-
observed variables are uncorrelated with the error term (uit) and the independent varia-
bles when the random effects regression is suitable, the OLS estimator would have 
been consistent but not efficient. However, if there are no unobserved variables which 
are unlikely to hold in this thesis, then OLS will be efficient. Otherwise, the random ef-
fects regression will be more consistent and efficient. In the same vein, if a pooled OLS 
regression is employed when a fixed effect regression is suitable, the OLS estimator will 
be inconsistent while the fixed effects model will be consistent. Also, if a random effect 
regression is used when fixed effects regression is suitable, then the random effect 
model will be inconsistent. In this respect, one needs to be very careful in choosing a 
suitable estimator in this thesis. The suitability of the empirical model specification in 
this thesis iwas determined after first applying Breusch and Pagan (1980)’s Langrange 
Multiplier test. This test statistics enables the researcher to make the choice between 
the suitability of pooled OLS regression and the alternative random and fixed effects re-
gression.  
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 Following that, the Hausman specification test was used to distinguish between random 
and fixed effects regressions for the empirical analysis in chapter six. The Hausman 
specification test (Hausman, 1978) compares Fixed Effect and Random Effects models. 
If the null hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regres-
sors in the model is not rejected, a Random Effect is better than its Fixed Effect coun-
terpart. 
4.11 Sample data criteria and Selection 
 This study covers the universal banking firms operated in Ghana that provided full in-
formation for the period from 2006 to 2014. The study used 21 out of 26 universal 
banks. In all, 189 bank year observations were obtained after editing the annual reports 
of the 21 universal banking companies, made up of 11 foreign banks and 10 local 
banks. The period under study was from 2006 to 2014. The period marks a significant 
period of reform within the Ghanaian banking industry and the full implementation of 
universal banking business license in 2006 that created a level-playing service platform 
for all commercial banks in the country. The universal banking business license (UBBL) 
replaced the traditional 3 pillar banking model in Ghana which were commercial, devel-
opment and merchant banking (Bawumia, 2010). It gave freedom to all banks to engage 
in all permissible banking business and products without restrictions or compartmentali-
zation. The data and information relate to the five questions of this research on board 
structure, foreign ownership and bank size. Furthermore, extra data was manually col-
lected from the Ghanaian universal banks’ annual reports and Ghana Banker Associa-
tion/ PricewaterCoopers annual banking survey reports.  In addition, they report that in-
formation and data based on annual reports’ entries are doubled checked by the re-
searcher.  
  Both database provided a summary of ownership structure, balance sheet, income 
statements, financial ratios, a number of directors including non- executive directors and 
the name of the audit firms. These were chosen based on the following criteria; any 
bank that could not provide nine years annual reports was excluded from the sample. 
As a result, five universal banks primarily local banks were excluded because of non- 
availability of their annual reports covering the study period. Following previous studies 
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(Yermack, 1996; Cheng et al., 2008) this study used the same criteria that have been 
used in selecting the sample. Cheng et al., (2008) argued that to criteria above assisted 
in meeting the needs for a panel data analysis for firms with several sequential years of 
data. Furthermore, the sample ends in 2014 because this is the most recent year for 
which data was collected. 
4.12 Data Collection Methods and Data Types 
  The secondary data and information required for the study were collected from hard-
copies of annual reports and audited bank financial statements of the 21 banks. Other 
information were also obtained from the website of PriceWater House Coopers/ Ghana 
Banker Association annual survey reports on banks in Ghana, as well as their websites 
over the period 2006-2014. Since the study required background information such as 
age, size and the ownership structure of the banks the websites were surfed to glean 
such data where they could not review. 
 4.13 Financial Performance Variables (Dependent Variables) 
 Historically, different measurements have been used in order to examine firm perfor-
mance by different studies (Cochran &Wood, 1984; Ittner and Larcher, 2003). Most of 
the studies examine  firm performance used a diversity of financial performance 
measures such as Tobin’s Q. (Managena et al., 2012; Trabelssi, 2010; Al-Hawary, 
2011;  Bino &Tomar,2007), ROA ( Heentigala, 2011; Ranti; 2011 Ntim, 2009; Staikouras 
et al., 2008), ROE (Baussaad and  Karmani, 2015; Wiredu et al., 2014; Gordini, 2014). 
The above measures can be categorized into two main groups: market based on one 
hand, and accounting based on the other. Daily and Dalton (2003) suggested that the 
accounting based measures consider the current financial performance of a company, 
while on the other hand, market based measures consider the investor perception of the 
company. Haniffa and Huduiab (2006) argued that there is no consensus in the litera-
ture on which measure is the best indicator of financial performance. In addition, they 
reported that every measure has its own strengths and weaknesses. Thus, there is no 
specific measure to be the best proxy for financial performance. 
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Market based measures of firm performance are particularly problematic in the context 
of emerging markets, where most firms are characterized by debt-financing rather equi-
ty financing.   The market share price of firms reflects their market value with the proviso 
that the capital market is efficient according to the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Gomper 
et al., 2003). Ghana is one of the developing countries where the stock market is yet to 
be developed into a comparable manner with established ones in developed econo-
mies. For instance, the impacts of publicly disclosed /available information will influence 
the market after a lag time which will manifest in share prices. Financial performance is 
subject to a great degree of internal control; however, market valuation is subject to fluc-
tuations beyond management control, such as changes in market valuation and stock 
declines (Grossman & Hoskisson, 1998). Furthermore, Black et al, 2006) argued that 
market based measures like Tobin’s Q represent the financial estimation of governance 
structure by outsiders. Tobin’s Q ratios used as proxies for market based measures is 
defined as the market value of equity divided by replacement cost (Yermach, 1996). 
Haniffa & Hudaib (2006) argued that Tobin’s Q ratio measure the effective value for the 
shareholders. 
  Different researchers have pointed out advantages of using accounting based 
measures (ROA and ROE) in examining the firm performance. Kyereboa-Coleman & 
Biekpe (2006) defined ROA as the total net income divided by the book value of total 
assets while Zemzem & Kacem defined ROE as the total net income divided by the 
book value of equity.  Generally, higher ROA and ROE denote an effective use of firm 
assets and equities in increasing the value of shareholder wealth by management.  
However, the use of accounting based measures has been criticized from different per-
spectives. First, Ross et al., (2008) argued that ROA and ROE are historical measures. 
Krivogorsky (2006) pointed that accounting measures are grounded in historical cost 
accounting. Second, Alexander et al., (2007) and Mangena and Tauringana (2007) ar-
gued that accounting based measures are subject to changes and alterations in ac-
counting methods, techniques and policies. Finally, Ross et al., (2008) point out that ac-
counting based measures ignores risk.  Despite the   shortcomings of accounting 
measures, from a shareholder's point of view, ROA and ROE are considered to be im-
portant ratios because they focus on the return of the shareholders and assets. The ac-
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counting based measure such as ROA and ROE are directly related to management’s 
ability to efficiently utilize firm assets. 
  One major difficulty with Tobin’s Q measure is that a large proportion of shares of uni-
versal banks are not listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange and cannot be traded freely, 
and therefore do not have market prices during the sample periods. Given this con-
straint, we adopt for this study, ROA and ROE as proxies for bank financial performance 
from the accounting based measures. Return on Assets is an indicator of how profitable 
a company is or how efficient is the management at using its assets to generate earn-
ings, and is sometimes referred to as return on investment. It is calculated by dividing a 
company net income by its total assets: 
Return on Assets (ROA) = (Net Income)/ (Total Assets) 
  Kyereboa –Coleman & Biekpe (2006) defined as the total income divided by the book 
value of total assets and it is considered as a primary measure of firm performance. 
This ratio is the most used ratio to integrate accounting based performance as proxy for 
firm performance (e.g. Lam and Lee, 2008). 
Return on Equity (ROE) = (Net Income)/ (Total Equity) 
  Zemzem & Kacem (2014) defined ROE as the net income divided by the book value of 
equity. Return on Equity measures the profit of a company by revealing how much profit 
is generated with regards to the amount of money invested by the investor. It is calcu-
lated by dividing a company net income by its total equity. It is known as Return on Net 
Worth. All of the financial information that is related to ROA and ROE variables is ex-
tracted from balance sheets that are provided from the bank annual reports. 
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Figure 3. Return on assets 
Source: Researcher’s Own Compilation (Various Literature) 
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FIGURE 4 RETURN ON EQUITY 
 
Source: Researcher’s Own Compilation (Various Literature) 
 
 
4.14 Control Variables 
  In addition to the variables that are used to hypothesize the relationships, a number of 
variables that are important in determining the financial performance of banks in the lit-
erature are also considered in this study, such as bank age and cost to income ratio. 
From the previous variables, control variables have been introduced to explain the firm 
performance variation.  Different studies (Morck et al., 1988; Yermack, 1996; Gomper et 
al., 2003; Black et al., 2006; Chenhall and Moers, 2007) used different control variables. 
List of control variables used in this study (e.g. bank age, cost to income ratio). The re-
searcher acknowledges that, it could also be argued that other relevant factors may ex-
ist. However, by reviewing the previous literature there is no specific formula for the 
control variables. Therefore, by following different studies it is common practice to in-
clude the below control variables. Cost-to-income ratio was extracted from the Banks’ 
annual reports. 
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4.14.1 Bank Age 
  Bank age has used in a number of studies in terms of the number of years a firm has 
been incorporated (Boone et al., 2007; Berger and Udell, 1998). They pointed out that 
firm age is a valuable indicator of expected growth opportunities. For example, 
Claessen et al., (2003) confirmed that older and larger firms have more liquid trading, 
better disclosure, receive more attention from analysts and have more diversified activi-
ties, leading  to lower risk of financial distress but  less  growth opportunities  Age has  
been  used as  a  proxy  for  the  time   a  bank  has  been  in  business.  A  bank  that  
has  been  in  business  for  long  should  perform  better  than  a new  bank  because of  
a learning  effect. 
4.14.2 Cost-Income Ratio 
   Pasiouras et al., (2007) defined cost to income ratio as a cost of running a bank rep-
resented by occupancy expenses, staff costs and other related expenses. Cost –to-
income ratio is used as a proxy for operating efficiency. It is calculated as total operating 
cost/total income. The ratio encompasses major elements of operating costs such as 
administrative costs, staff salaries and benefits, property costs, etc. It generally shows 
the cost of running the bank relative to the earnings of the bank. A negative relationship 
is expected out of cost-to-income ratio and profitability since the higher the costs and 
expenses, the more inefficient the bank would be, culminating in low profitability. The 
ratio was adopted by Liu and Wilson (2010), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), and Guil-
len et al., (2014). In Ghana, both Gyamerah and Amoah (2015) and Owusu-Antwi et al., 
(2015) employed cost to income ratio as measures of efficiency.  A negative relationship 
is expected between cost-to-income variable and the dependent variables. 
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4.15 Independent (Corporate Governance) Variables 
4.15.1 Board Size 
  The empirical findings in previous studies are mixed regarding the relationship be-
tween board size and firm performance. Some studies (e.g. Andres and Vallelado, 
2008; Guest, 2009; Adusei, 2011; Pathan et al., 2007) found evidence consistent with 
the view of agency costs; that small boards are related with firm performance. The pre-
vious studies argued that as board size increases, the problems of coordination and 
communication increase, thus decreasing the ability of board members to monitor man-
agement behavior and thereby increasing the agency problem and resulting in lower 
firm performance. In the same vein, large boards will reduce the monitor and control 
function of the board by giving managers space to pursue their own interests rather than 
those of the principals. However, some studies (Adams & Mehran, 2012; Busta, 2008; 
Henry, 2008; Lehn et al., 2009) found that large boards affect firm performance positive-
ly, consistent with the resource dependency theory, due to improved linkages to  exter-
nal resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
          In addition, large boards allow directors to exchange more highly qualified coun-
sels and present extra scope for the possibility of correlation with different external link-
ages access to resources. Thus, from the mixed results there is no consensus as to 
whether larger or smaller boards are better. Therefore, this study will investigate the re-
lationship between board size and firm performance. Following, Yermach (1996), Ah-
med et al., (2006) and Bennedsen et al., (2008), Board size (labelled as (BOSIZE) is 
defined as the number of directors who are on the board, as shown in Table 9. The 
number of directors was extracted from the Ghanaian universal banks’ annual report. 
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Figure 5. Board size 
 
Source: Researcher’s Compilation; (Various Literatures) 
 
4.15.2 Board Composition /Non -Executive Directors (NEDs) 
          A  commonly  used  approach   to  operationalize    board  composition  is  the  
proportion  of  non- executive  directors  to  total  directors (Abdullah 2004; Leng 2004; 
Kiel and  Nicholson, 2003).  In this study, board composition is defined as the number of 
non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors on the board which will 
also be used in this study.  The empirical findings in previous studies are mixed regard-
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ing the relationship between board composition and bank performance. Some studies 
(e.g. Erkens et al., 2012; De Andres et al., 2005; Wier &Laing, 2001;  Al-Sahafi et al., 
2015; Bino &Tomar; 2007) found evidence that non-executive directors impact positively 
on bank performance. Their studies support the industry views that the appointment of 
non-executive directors to bank boards as a positive corporate governance practice. 
This is because the presence of non-executive directors can potentially improve the in-
dependence of a bank board and its decisions. Erkens et al., (2012) found a positive 
relationship between non-executive directors and bank performance. Their studies sup-
port the assertion that the representation of non-executive directors increases the effec-
tiveness of monitoring; hence the performance of the bank should improve. However, 
some studies (Adams, & Mehran 2003; 2011; Romano et al., 2012; Kyereboa-Coleman 
&Biekpe, 2007; De Anders and Vallelado, 2008; Sanda et al., 2005) reported that board 
composition is negatively correlated with bank performance. Thus, from the mixed re-
sults, there is no consensus as to whether non-executive or executive directors are bet-
ter. Therefore, this study will investigate the relationship between the board composition 
and bank performance. In this study, board composition (NEDs) is considered as a per-
centage of the number of the total directors on the board as shown in Table 4.1. The 
number of non-executive director was extracted from Ghanaian banks’ annual reports. 
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Figure 6. Board composition 
  
 
 
  Source: Researcher’s Compilation (Various literatures) 
 
4.15.3 Board Committees 
 
The empirical findings in previous studies are mixed regarding the relationship between 
board committees and firm financial performance. Some studies (e.g. Bussolli, 2013; 
Puni, 2015; Heentigala, 2011) found a positive relationship between board committees 
and firm financial performance. They support the monitoring hypothesis that board 
committee are usually made up of independent directors, making them better placed to 
protect shareholders’ interest by effectively scrutinizing managerial actions (e.g. Klein, 
1998; Vefeas, 1999). In the same vein, by their relative small size board committees are 
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able to meet frequently. This provides sufficient time for meaningful dialogue and in 
reaching consensus decisions quicker (Karamanous and Vefeas, 2005). 
 
However, some studies (Shungu et al., 2015; Bozec, 2005; Zemzem & Kacem, 2015) 
found that the presence of board committees impact negatively on firm financial perfor-
mance. They support their arguments that the establishment of board committees im-
poses extra costs in terms of managerial time, travel expenses and additional remuner-
ation for the members of the committees (Vefeas, 1998). They further argued that board 
committees can result in excessive managerial supervision, which can inhibit executive 
initiative and vision (Goodstein et al., 1994; Conger et al., 1998). Thus, from the mixed 
results there is no consensus as to whether the presence of board committees impact 
negatively or positively on performance. Therefore, this study will investigate the rela-
tionship between board committees and firm financial performance. Following Shungu 
et al., 2015 and Heentigala (2011) is defined as the number of board committees in a 
firm. 
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Figure 7. Board committees (number of committees) 
 
 Source: Researcher’s Compilation (Various Literature) 
4.15.5 Foreign Owned Banks 
Previous studies have found mixed results between foreign ownership and bank per-
formance (Al-Manaseer et al., 2012; Bonin et al., 2005, Kim and Rasiah, 2010; Barako 
& Greg, 2007, Lawer –Tetteh, 2014; Majnoni et al., 2003). Authors such as Al Manaseer 
et al., (2012; Majnoni et al., 2003; Micco et al., 2007and Kobeissi (2004)  found a posi-
tive impact on foreign ownership on bank performance due to improved monitoring. 
They also argued that foreign banks in developing economies may have access to su-
perior technologies especially information technologies for collecting and assessing 
‘hard quantitative information as well as monitoring their customers (Buch & Delong, 
2004). Kim and Rasiah (2010) found that bank performance is positively related to for-
eign ownership in emerging markets. They also argued that foreign banks may offer ex-
pertise in risk management and a more superior culture of corporate governance, result-
ing in more efficient banks (Bonin et al., 2004).  The financial sector reforms in particular 
(since the 2000s) have also attracted more foreign capital and investments in the Gha-
naian banking industry. Furthermore, the three laws, Ghana Investment Promotion Cen-
ter Act 1994 Act 478; Banking Act 2004 Act 673 and Foreign Exchange Act 2006 Act 
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726 have provided for equal treatment for both domestic and foreign investors in Gha-
na. Previous studies (Barako & Greg, (2007); Lawer-Tetteh, (2014) Asma’a Al-Amarneh 
(2014), reported that foreign owned banks impact negatively on bank performance. 
They argued that poor performance of foreign banks in the emerging markets was due 
to la ack of understanding about local markets, and local culture which this study inves-
tigates with regard to Ghanaian universal banks. Foreign ownership (labeled as foreign) 
is defined as 51% of the total percentage of shares owned by foreign investors, as 
shown in Table 4.1 below.   
 
Figure 8 Foreign banks (number of foreign banks in 
countries)
 
Source: Researcher’s Compilation (Various Literature) 
4.15.6 Bank Size 
Different researchers report an ambiguous relationship between the bank size and bank 
performance  (Ranti, 2011; Al-Sahafi et al., 2015; Al-Manaseer et al., 2012; Babatunde 
and Olaniran, 2009; Ferde, 2012; Adusei, 2011; Rachdi, 2014; Taskin, 2012; Hoque et 
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al., 2012 and Bino &Tomar, 2007).  Researchers such as Al-Sahafi et al., (2015), 
Adusei (2011); Trujillo-Ponce (2013) argued that larger banks have better opportunity 
than the smaller ones in creating and generating funds internally and accessing external 
resources. In addition, larger banks might benefit from economies of scale by creating 
entry barriers with a positive effect on bank performance. Serrasquueiro and Nunes 
(2008) recommended larger firm sizes to benefit performance. This is because, large 
firms have better opportunity to raise funds and more diversified strategies. In addition, 
it has a wide variety of expertise management. Black et al (2006) showed that firm size 
positively affects firm performance. Trujillo –Ponce (2013) pointed that large banks can 
enjoy economies of scope for the bank resulting from the joint provision of related ser-
vices. 
 On the other hand, other researchers (Babatunde & Olanran, 2009; Al-Manaseer et al., 
2012; Ranti, 2011; Ferede, 2012; Hoque et al., 2012; Rachdi, 2014) reported a negative 
relationship between bank size and performance. They argued that larger banks might 
not be as efficient as smaller banks due to reduced control by management over strate-
gic and operational activities as bank size increases. As size increases, agency prob-
lems may increase, this may outweigh the efficiencies of large banks efficiency 
achieved through economies of scale and scope which in turn lead to bank inefficien-
cies. Garen (1994) argued that the cost of complying with corporate governance codes 
requirements will be comparatively low for the larger banks. However, this cost will in-
crease if the banks are subject to public media scrutiny. This is because; larger banks 
will be subjected to high levels of media scrutiny.  
   Other authors such as Jensen & Meckling (1976) argued that as firm size increases 
agency costs are likely to increase. The increase in costs is due to the need for more 
control that results from managerial discretion and opportunism. Moreover, the growth 
of a firm will result in increasing the internal control tools for forecasting and designing. 
This will raise the need for aligning the interest of managers and shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In line with previous studies (e.g. Al-Sahafi et al., 2015; 
Bennedsen et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 2009) who used total assets as a proxy for bank 
size, this study will measure  bank size by using the natural logarithm of total assets. 
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Total assets were extracted directly from the balance sheets provided by various annual 
reports. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 9 BANK SIZE 
 
Sources: Researcher’s Compilation (Various literatures)
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Table 4. 1 Variables used to study the corporate governance practices in Ghana 
Variable Notation Definition 
Return on Assets ROA Profit after tax / Total asset employed 
Return on Equity ROE Profit after tax / Total Equity 
Board Size BOSIZE total number of members of the board of directors 
Board Composition BOCOMP The proportion of Non-executive directors to the total 
directors on the board 
Board Committees BOCOMM The number of committees present in each bank. 
Bank Ownership 
(Local Bank and Foreign Bank) 
OWN 
(Dummy) 
Local if ownership is 51% and over and Foreign if own-
ership is 51% and over. 
Bank Size BNKSIZE natural logarithm of bank total assets 
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Bank Age  BANKAGE years of incorporation 
Cost to  Income Ratio CIR (operating expenses + other costs) / Net   income 
Ε Error Term Error term 
βi Beta Regression coefficients in the ROA Model 
Bj Beta Regression coefficients in the ROE Model 
Source:Researcher’sOwnCompilation
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4.16 Chapter Summary 
  This chapter presents the methodology used to conduct the research. This study ap-
plied the deductive positivism approach where the pre-existing theoretical basis is iden-
tified and relied upon in developing the hypotheses. Multiple regression analysis was 
chosen as the main tool of analysis in this study. Moreover, this chapter examined the 
diagnostic tests that might affect the corporate governance variables which may result 
in problems from understanding the significance of individual independent variables in 
the regression model. This chapter also described the data and variables of this study, 
explaining the sample, the criteria to select the data and the sources of the data. Three 
main types of data are used in this study: corporate governance variables, financial per-
formance variables and control variables. 
 Out of 26 universal banks in Ghana as at 31-12 -2006, the full data required was ob-
tained for a sample of 21 banks with 189 bank year observations. The data used in this 
study was collected from two sources: Banks websites and the annual reports of the 
Ghanaian universal banking firms. Bank financial performance was measured by using 
the accounting based measures such as ROA and ROE. Corporate governance varia-
bles were examined by investigating the effect of board size, board composition 
(NEDs), board committees, bank size, and foreign ownership. Finally, the study used 
two control variables (bank age and cost to income ratio). 
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Chapter Five: Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.0 Introduction 
  This chapter discusses the data and the test of panel regression assumptions, and 
empirical results. In particular, it seeks to achieve five main objectives. First, it presents 
the descriptive statistics for the dependent; independent and the control variables. Sec-
ond, a correlation analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between varia-
bles used in this thesis. Third, we also tested linear regression assumptions of multicol-
linearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity and linearity. From the results, 
there were no serious violations of panel data assumptions, and thus statistically appro-
priate to carry out multiple regression analysis. Fourth, it tests the panel regression as-
sumptions to determine whether pooled OLS and the alternative random or fixed effects 
regression model should be used as the method of estimation. Finally, we conducted 
the Hausman test to choose the appropriate model between Fixed effects and Random 
effects and the Fixed Effects was found to be appropriate for the study 
  . Sections 5.1 and 5.2 present the results of the descriptive statistics for the data that 
was used in the analysis of this study. Section 5.3 discusses diagnostic test results 
while Section 5.4.1 reports on the regression results of control variables while Section.  
5.4.2 .reports on results and discussion of board size on bank performance. Section 
5.4.3 discusses the results of board composition on financial performance while Section 
5.4.4 reports on results and discussion of board committees on bank performance.  
Section 5.4.5 discusses the results of bank size and financial performance while Section 
5.4.6 discusses the results of foreign ownership on financial performance. Section 5.4.7 
discusses the post financial crisis on financial performance .while Section 5.4.8 dis-
cusses the conclusions. 
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Table 5. 1 Variables used to study the corporate governances practices in Ghana 
 
Variable Notation Definition 
Return on Assets ROA Profit after tax / Total asset 
employed 
Return On Equity ROE Profit after tax / Total Equity 
Board Size BOSIZE total number of members of 
the board of directors 
Board Composition BOCOMP proportion of outside direc-
tors on the board 
Board Committees BOCOMM Number of committees in a 
bank 
Foreign Ownership 
 
Foreign Foreign ownership of over 
51% 
Bank Size BNKSIZE natural logarithm of bank 
total assets 
Bank Age  BANKAGE years of incorporation 
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Cost to  Income Ratio CIR (operating expenses + oth-
er costs) / Net   income 
Ε Error Term Error term 
βi Beta Regression coefficients in 
ROA and ROE Models 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
   This section deals with the descriptive statistics for the data that was used in the anal-
ysis of this study. Some of the main features of the data were described quantitatively 
(e.g. central tendency of the statistics such as mean, max and min, data dispersion 
such as standard deviation). The descriptive statistics of this study is presented in Table 
5.2.    
Financial performance 
Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables. The table shows 
that the ROA ranges from a minimum of -3.9% to a maximum of 7.9% with an average 
of 2.5% for the sampled universal bank. This result is better compared to the average 
reported by Zemzem & Kacem, 2014 (Tunisian banks, 2.00%) and Ranti, 2011 (Nigeri-
an listed banks, 1.78%). The ROE ranges from a minimum of - 27.9.38% and maximum 
of 52.1% with average of 17.7% for the sampled universal banks in Ghana. This is 
comparable to the mean reported by Dabor, Isiavwe, Ajagbe & Oke, (2015) Nigerian 
listed companies (17.9%) and Ranti, (2011) Nigerian listed banks (17.7%). 
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Table 5. 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ROA 189 0.0252804 0.0235824 -0.039 0.079 
ROE 189 0.176963 0.151365 -0.279 0.521 
BOSIZE 189 8.91005 1.79756 7.000 13.000 
BOCOMP 189 6.42328 1.66653 3.000 11.000 
BOCOMM 189 3.21693 0.473252 2.000 4.000 
Bank Size 189 16.8326 3.03602 10.881 21.846 
Foreign Ownership 189 0.523810 0.500759 0.000 1.000 
Bank Age 189 27.2910 28.9626 1.000 118.000 
CIR 189 0.698153 0.954825 -1.429 12.298 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
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5.2 Corporate Governance Variables 
  As per Table 5.2, the board size ranges from a minimum of 7 to a maximum of 13 with 
the overall mean of 8.9 of the sampled universal banks studied. With a maximum of 13 
and standard deviation 1.79, this result implies that on the average universal banks had 
relatively large board size. This finding is consistent with previous studies by Kyereboa-
Coleman and Biekpe (2006) who posited that Ghanaian listed companies had a mini-
mum of 5 directors and a maximum of 13 directors with an average of 8 members. 
However, this result is inconsistent with Ghana’s Company Act 1963 Act 179 which pre-
scribes the minimum number of 8 members and a maximum number of 16 for public 
companies, while the Bank of Ghana (2013) draft corporate governance regulation rec-
ommend a minimum of three directors without capping the maximum directors.  Argua-
bly, the mean board size of 8.9 is also consistent with the prior studies in Ghana   
(Adusei, 2011).  
  This result confirms that universal banks in Ghana, on average, have met the require-
ments of the Bank of Ghana’s draft corporate governance regulation (2013) but incon-
sistent with the recommendations of Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), 
based on their investigation of firm performance in relation to board size. They recom-
mended eight or nine directors, and specified that ten should be the maximum number. 
This relatively small size is due to the effect of more people inhibiting the process of 
making decisions (i.e. causing indecisiveness or incoherent decisions due to the fissipa-
rous decision - making process among many parties).  The Ghanaian bank average 
board size is bigger than those in Egypt and Malaysia is eight directors (Elsayed, 2007; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), but smaller than those in UK (Tanna et al., 2008); US (Belh-
kir, 2009) and Nigeria (Ranti, 2011). 
   As shown in Table 5.2, the mean board composition is 6.4, indicating that outside 
board members representing 64% of the total board membership.  Previous studies 
have shown that the more NEDs are present on a board, the more independent the 
board is, with correspondingly reduced information asymmetry between shareholders 
and managers (Black et al., 2006a). Brickley et al., (1997) found that boards tend to per-
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form better with the monitoring and advisory function of NEDs on behalf of sharehold-
ers. The proportion of the NEDs in Ghanaian boards is bigger (e.g. compared to other 
countries: the US mean = 54%, Yermack, 1996; Malaysia mean = 50%, Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006). Thus, the average composition of boards having 64% of non-executive 
directors is above the recommendation by the Bank of Ghana’s draft on corporate gov-
ernance regulation (2013), which stipulates that there should be at least 60% of NEDs, 
which is in line with international practices (BCBS,2006, 2010 and 2015). In the overall 
sample, bank boards are relatively independent as they are mostly dominated by non-
executive directors. This finding is also consistent with the Ghana’s SEC code which 
prescribes that at least 50% of board members must be non-executive directors for 
listed companies. 
  Table 5.2 reports that the board committees ranges from a minimum of two commit-
tees to a maximum of four committees, with an average committee of 3.2. This figure 
indicates that about 82.5% of the sampled universal banks have complied with the Bank 
of Ghana regulation on the establishment of a minimum of three specialized committees 
made up of risk, audit, compensation and nomination (Bank of Ghana’s draft regulation 
on bank governance, 2013). All other things being equal, the higher the number of 
board committees, the better the increase in efficiency. That is, deeper focus on specific 
areas such as audit, risk, management, ethics, compliance, remuneration and nomina-
tion (BCBS, 2010). This study is consistent with studies by Heenetigala (2011); Jiraporn 
et al (2009); Selvam et al (2006) who reported that  board committees improve the fi-
nancial performance of firms and that the formation of board committees is a means of 
improving board effectiveness and performance.  
 However, the findings is inconsistent with both Ghana’s Company Act 1963 Act 179 
and SEC code which require that public companies and listed firms should establish on-
ly audit committees of the board. The theoretical literature provides that board commit-
tees act in order to obtain the most effective operation of the board and are also im-
portant corporate governance tools to monitor corporate activities and can play a valua-
ble part in the protection of shareholder value (Van Den Berghe & Levrau, 2004; Kes-
ner, 1988).  
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  Bank size as proxied by a natural logarithm of a banks’ total assets increased from 
22.10(GH ¢ 4.02 bn) in 2006 to 24.66 (GH ¢ 51.40bn) in 2014 with an average size of 
23.72(GH ¢20.34 bn). The result is also consistent with previous Ghanaian studies by 
Adusei (2011) and Kyereboa-Coleman & Biekpe (2007). The size of a bank affects its 
financial performance in many ways. Large banks can exploit economies of scale and 
scope and thus being more efficient compared to small banks. In addition, small banks 
may have less power than large banks; hence they find it difficult to compete with large 
banks particularly in highly competitive banking markets. On the other hand, as banks 
become larger, they might suffer from inefficiencies, leading to inferior financial perfor-
mance.  
  The mean foreign ownership is 52.4% which gives the feel of a concentrated owner-
ship pattern in the banking sector of Ghana. The mean value also suggests that foreign 
owners will be able to exert better corporate governance practices on bank managers 
because of their voting power and influence. There is a relatively high proportion of for-
eign owned banks in Ghana, this could be largely due to the easing of entry into the 
banking industry after the liberalization of the financial sector in 1988. 
 
5.3 Diagnostic Test Results 
  The models specified were subjected to the necessary statistical tests such as colline-
arity, normality, homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and linearity. From the test results, 
there were no serious violations of multiple regression assumptions, and thus statistical-
ly appropriate to carry out multiple regression analysis. First, as shown in Table 5.3 the 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix Result was used to measure the degree of association be-
tween variables. The correlation between ROA and BOSIZE is negative (-0.0112). The 
correlation coefficients are relatively small, with the exception of that between BOSIZE 
and BOCOMP being highest value of (0.829) which could be attributed to the fact that, 
board composition represents the number of non- executive directors who are normally 
more than 50% of the directors on the board.  The highest inter- correlation between 
board composition and board size (0.829), but it appeared that there is a bi-variate cor-
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relation problem but not multicollinearity (Miles & Shevlin, 2008, p. 129). This indicates 
the absence of multicollinearity. 
  Second, to further strengthen the result of the absence of multicollinearity, the study 
carried out a residual diagnostic test of Variance Inflation Factor. The results of the VIF 
test as shown in Table 5.4 ranged between 1.027 and 3.810, which are all less than 10 
thereby; our model does not suffer from multicollinearity problem.
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Table 5. 3 Pearson correlation matrix 
ROA ROE BOSIZE BOCOMP BOCOMM     OWN BNKSIZE AGE CIR   
1 0.6418 -0.0112 0.0121 0.0092 0.0223 -0.0025 0.2984 -0.5864 ROA 
  1 -0.0486 -0.0259 0.0632 0.0689 0.1205 0.2281 -0.5424 ROE 
    1 0.829 -0.1118 0.0146 -0.0156 -0.2118 0.0505 BOSIZE 
      1 -0.0529 0.0576 -0.1014 -0.3571 0.0453 BOCOMP 
        1 -0.0105 0.0766 -0.0371 -0.0177 BOCOMM 
          1 -0.0888 0.0466 -0.1752 OWN 
            1 -0.1009 -0.0684 BNKSIZE 
              1 -0.1473 AGE 
                1 CIR 
** * Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation:   Gretl correlation results based on the data obtained from sample univer-
salbanks.
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Table 5. 4 Variance inflation factors minimum possible VALUE = 1.0, Values >10.0 
may indicate a multicollinearity problem 
      
      BOSIZE            3.433 
      BOCOMP         3.810 
      BOCOMM        1.027 
      FOROWN         1.050  
      BNKSIZE          1.080 
      AGE                 1.247 
      CIR                   1.067 
Source: Researcher’s own compilation 
 
 Third, as depicted in Table 5.5, the results of the p-value for Jarque-Bera statistics test 
were 0. 2717 and 0.7154 respectively and found to be greater than 0.05. The review 
conducted for numerical test on normality showed that Ho: error terms are normally dis-
tributed. The decision rule is that reject Ho if the p-value of F-statistics <=0.05. Other-
wise do not reject Ho. From this, we do not reject Ho which is significant at 1% and 5% 
levels for models 1 & 2 respectively. The implication of the results showed that the re-
gression variables are all normally distributed. Fourth, we conducted the linearity test 
using the LM statistics.  Detection of linearity is examined by the LM-statistic and its as-
sociated significant level. Where, H0: relationship is linear. The decision rule is that re-
ject Ho if the p-value of F-statistics <=0.05. Otherwise do not reject Ho.   From Table 5.5 
the LM-statistic for model 1 and model 2 are 19.5689 and 10.0133, with their respective 
p-values of 0.0574 and 0.1368. The results were found to be significant at 0.05 levels. 
Hence, there are no linearity issues. 
185 
 Fifth, the phenomenon of heteroskedasticity occurs when the residuals in a regression 
specification have unequal variance. Heteroscedasticity occurs when the variance of the 
error terms differ across observations. Thus, any increase or decrease of the variance is 
described as heteroscedasticity, which causes problems for statistical inference in 2 re-
gression models. Several tests for detecting heteroscedasticity have been proposed by 
scholars (e.g. Glejser, 1996; Breusch and Pagan, 1979; Evans &Kings1988).  According 
to White (1980), the presence of heteroskedasticity can lead to inefficient parameter es-
timates and faulty inferences. To circumvent the problems of inefficient parameter esti-
mates and faulty inferences, we tested for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch - Pagan 
test and the results revealed an absence of heteroskedasticity. Where, H0: errors have 
a constant variance. The decision rule is that reject Ho if the p-value of F-statistics 
<=0.05. Otherwise do not reject Ho. it is clear from Table 5.5 below the probabilities of 
(0.23) and (0.28) exceed the 5% level of significance. Hence we do not reject the null 
hypothesis that the model has constant variance, at 1%, 5% and 10% significance lev-
els. 
 Sixth, we conducted a serial correlation test because a serial correlation in panel data 
models biases and causes the results to be inefficient.  From table 5.5 below, the 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test with probability values of (0.091) and (0.179) 
for models I and II respectively indicate the absence of autocorrelation in the regression 
models since the probabilities of the F-statistic and obs*Rsquared are greater than the 
5% level of significance.  Finally, we chose between a pooled OLS and the alternative 
methods (Fixed Effects and Random Effects), by using Breusch and Pagan Langrange 
Multiplier Test, the result of test is highly significant as shown in Table 5.5. From the re-
sult, we concluded that Fixed Effect and Random Effect Models seem to be more ap-
propriate than pooled OLS model
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Table 5. 5 Diagnostic test results 
 ROA (Model I) ROE (Model II) 
Jarque –Bera Normality Test- (Chi-square) 
           (p-value) 
2.60623 
(0.2717) 
0.669868 
(0.7154) 
Heteroscedasticity –(chi-square) 
Breuch-Pagan       (p-value) 
9.29311 
(0.1232) 
8.63447 
(0.2800) 
Linearity – (LM) 
(p-value) 
19.5689 
(0.0574) 
10.0133 
(0.1360) 
Autocorrelation – (LMF) 
Breusch- Godfrey (p-value) 
11.3869 
(0.1000) 
10.4227 
(0.1790) 
Hausman Test –(chi-square) 
Fixed/Random Effects (p-value) 
16.9832 
(0.0175) 
15.6983 
(0.0280) 
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Breusch and Pagan LM Test chi          (2)1 P-
value 
17.42 
( 0.00) 
19.52 
  (0.00) 
Source:Researcher’sOwncompilation(Gretl)
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 Panel data models can be specified as a Fixed Effects or a Random Effect that helps to 
capture the effects of firm and time specific heterogeneities. In order to decide between 
Random Effects against Fixed Effects as an additional to the Ordinary Least Squares 
results, the researcher performed the Hausman test. The Test statistic result is statisti-
cally significant as shown above in Table 5.5. From the Table above, is the Hausman 
specification test to choose between Random Effects and Fixed Effects in respect of the 
specific governance mechanisms, and using ROA, and ROE as firm performance 
measures. The Hausman test gave X2 of 16.9832 (p-value=0.0175047and X2 of 
15.6983 (p-value=0.0280207) as shown in Table 6.5 suggesting that the hypothesis of 
no correlation between the unique errors and the specific governance mechanisms (i.e. 
BODSIZE, BOCOMP, BOCOMM, BANKSIZE, FOREIGN) as independent variables. 
Hence, at 5% significant level the Random Effects regression model is rejected in fa-
vour of the Fixed Effects regression model as a method of estimation in chapter five. 
Consequently the investigator estimated Fixed Effects Regression models. 
 
5.4 Estimation Results and Discussions 
 
               𝑅𝑂𝐴𝒊𝒕= 𝜶 + 𝛽1BOSIZE + 𝛽2BOCOMP + 𝛽3BOCOMM + 𝛽4FOREIGN + 
𝛽5BANKSIZE + 𝛽6AGE + 𝛽7CIR + 𝜺𝒊𝒕, (4) 
 
                𝑅𝑂E𝒊𝒕= 𝜶 + 𝛽1BOSIZE + 𝛽2BOCOMP + 𝛽3BOCOMM + 𝛽4FOREIGN + 
𝛽5BANKSIZE + 𝛽6AGE + 𝛽7CIR + 𝜺𝒊𝒕, (5) 
        This section deals with the main inferences which were drawn from the model re-
gression. We present our results separately according to his research questions into 
five sections (i.e. control variable results, board of director variables results, Bank size 
variable results and foreign ownership results). This does not mean that each section 
was run in the model separately; it is simply to facilitate the presentation of results and 
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to make the findings more understandable by focusing on each type of effect. The in-
vestigator considers that the results are highly significant at 0.01, significant at 0.05 and 
marginally significant at 0.1, which applies to all of the following tables and results. The 
coefficient value and p-value in brackets are presented. The Table in appendix 1 con-
tains all the results of this study. However, the researcher presents the results section 
with the appropriate table extracted from the original table, reporting the Fixed Effect 
results of the corporate governance mechanisms based on the accounting based per-
formance measures of ROA and ROE. 
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 5.4.1 RESULTS: BANK AGE AND COST TO INCOME RATIO AS CONTROL VARIABLE ON ROA. 
Table 5. 6  Results: bank age and cost to income ratio as control variables on performance (ROA) 
Dependent Variable  
ROA 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random 
Effects 
P-Value 
Bank Age 0.00017245*** 0.00525 0.0274548*** 0.00749 0.00018791
9* 
0.07435 
(-2.8257) (-2.7087) (-1.7949) 
CIR −0.00547441*** 0.00079 −0.0054319*** 0.0003 −0.0056687
9*** 
0.00018 
(-3.4137) (-3.6951) (-3.8289) 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level. 
(Source: Gretl: Researcher’s Own Compilation) 
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Table5. 7 results: Bank age and cost to income ratio as control variables on performance (ROE) 
Dependent 
Variable  
ROE 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random Ef-
fects 
P-Value 
BankAge 0.00114312*** 0.00457 0.0192493*** 0.00804 0.00117047** 0.0296 
  -2.8717   -2.6839   -2.1929   
CIR −0.0279128*** 0.00832 −0.0251096** 0.0169 −0.0273168*** 0.00872 
  (-2.6685)   (-2.4139)   (-2.6518)   
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significantlevel.
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From Tables 5.6 to 5.19 present the Fixed Effects regression results of the governance 
mechanisms and the accounting-based performance measures of ROA and ROE. The 
effects of the control variables on bank performance have different results across the 
performance variables (ROE and ROA). 
  Bank Age in the ROA and ROE models is shown to have positive and significant re-
sults for the sample. However, this result is treated with care given that the variable be-
came significant in the restricted regression as a controlled variable. Bank age was tak-
en as the number of years banks had been incorporated. It was expected that the 
smaller a firm‘s age, the higher its business risk and the less mature the company, 
therefore higher firm age was expected to correlate with improved financial perfor-
mance. The results show a positive and significant relationship between bank age and 
bank performance. The positive relationship shows that older firms outperform younger 
firms to a limited extent. 
Cost-to-income ratio 
  Also, the variable cost-to-income shows a highly significant effect throughout the tests. 
It has been significant at 1% with a negative coefficient. The negative influence of cost 
to income ratio on profitability of banks in our sample may be due to the lack of scale 
economies owing to the small system and average bank size (IMF, 2011, 11/131).This 
goes to affirm that it being a bank–specific variable affects profitability and for that mat-
ter the performance of banks in Ghana.  Given that all these exogenous variables are 
held constant (controlled);   governance variables are expected to influence the perfor-
mance of Ghanaian banks in a manner shown in the results discussed below. 
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5.4.2 Results and Discussion of Board Size on Financial Performance. 
 
Table 5. 8 Results and discussion of board size on financial performance (ROA) 
Dependent Variable (ROA) Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random Ef-
fects 
P-Value 
BOSIZE 0.0001197   0.02667   0.000153522   
(-0.6207) 0.5356 (-0.4077) 0.684 (-0.0601) 0.9522 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level. 
Source: Gretl. Researcher’s Own Compilation 
Table 5. 9 Results and discussion of board size on financial performance (ROE) 
Dependent Variable  (ROE) Pooled OLS P-
Value 
Fixed Ef-
fects 
P-Value Random Ef-
fects 
P-Value 
BOSIZE 0.0167539 0.1845 0.045276 0.32361 0.016384 0.27562 
(-1.3323) (-0.9901) (-1.0935) 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level 
(Source:Gretl;Researcher’sOwnCompilation)
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Given ROA and ROE as the performance variables, it can be seen from Tables 5.8 & 
5.9 that board size was found to have a weak positive and statistically insignificant rela-
tionship with profitability, which means that larger boards will help marginally to improve 
the level of profitability of Ghanaian banks, hence, the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
This finding although insignificant lends empirical support to prior studies in Ghana 
(Kyereboa-Coleman & Biekpe, 2006a, 2006b) and Kyereboa-Coleman and Osei (2008) 
and other international studies (Adams & Mehran, 2005; Henry, 2008; Kiel &Nicholson, 
2003, Jackling & Johl 2009 and Mangena & Tauringana,2008). For example, Kyereboa-
Coleman & Biekpe, 2006a) reported a positive and insignificant relationship between 
board size and ROA among Ghanaian listed firms. This finding supports the view that 
larger boards are better for bank performance because board members have a range of 
expertise to help make better decisions, and are harder for a powerful CEO to dominate 
and that the larger the board size, the better the performance. 
However, the findings differ from other prior Ghanaian studies (Kyereboa-Coleman & 
Amidu, 2008) as well as other international studies (Cheng, 2008; Coles et al., 2008; 
Cheng, 2008 and Guest, 2009) who reported statistically significant and negative rela-
tionship between board size and ROA. Arguably, larger board size is effective in the 
Ghanaian banking context, and therefore the optimum board size should be encouraged 
for effective bank performance.  
 Theoretically, the statistically insignificant and positive association between the ROA 
and ROE and board size indicates that the banking industry appear to perceive larger 
boards as effective. This may stem from the fact that larger boards tend to offer greater 
access to their banks’ external environment. This can reduce uncertainties and facili-
tates the securing of critical resources such as funding and external credit lines from 
their corresponding banks. It also implies that the banking industry seems to value  the 
ability of Ghanaian bank boards to secure more resources, which is often associated 
larger boards higher than their ability to effectively advice and monitor managers that is 
usually associated with smaller boards. 
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 The possible explanation for the weak positive and insignificant relationship between 
board size and ROA and ROE may be that the Ghanaian banks’ boards are relatively 
larger as a result of the local banks that are overloaded with more directors given the 
socio-political and cultural influence on board appointments without due regard for skills, 
expertise and competencies required for bank boards. Another explanation for this weak 
positive but statistically insignificant relationship may also be due to concentrated own-
ership structure of the Ghanaian banks. According to the World Bank ROSC report 
(2005; 2010), most businesses in Ghana are characterized by highly concentrated own-
ership (e.g. family, multinationals, and the government). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and 
La Porta et al (1999) asserted that developing countries suffer from high ownership 
concentration and weak protection of shareholders’ rights. 
Boards in Ghanaian banks are generally heavily dominated by majority or controlling 
shareholders, typically members of single family or a clique of families and government. 
This might result in the appointment of management and board members on the board 
based on the basis of political connections, friendship, cronyism and nepotism rather 
than experience, competencies and skills. Such cliques can use their power to influence 
management decisions and undermine the monitoring and coordination of the board, 
rendering the board impotent with regard to its impact on management and bank per-
formance.  In Ghana, the so called Ghanaian culture and its associated social norms, 
the politicization of board positions, the lack of enforcement of Bank of Ghana guide-
lines on board appointment and poor recruitment of board members have all contributed 
to lower performance of banks. .  The findings indicated that the Ghanaian banking in-
dustry appears to perceive that the larger boards are effective. This may stem from the 
fact that larger boards tend to offer less access to banks’ external environment. This 
can only minimize uncertainties and facilitates in securing of little resources such as fi-
nance and deposits. In the Ghanaian banking context, the weak results could be at-
tributed to the fact that larger bank board plays more of a symbolic role than fulfill their 
intended function of monitoring. 
The result of this study is not consistent with previous studies by Stepanova and 
Ivantsova (2012) who argued that more directors may add skills, experience and 
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knowledge which in tend leads to better bank performance. This result also however 
deviates from the positive and statistically significant established by Babatunde & 
Olaniran (2009) and Adams & Mehran (2012).  Empirically, the positive and statistically 
significant relationship between board size and ROA and ROE offers empirical support  
the results of Adams & Mehran (2005), Beiner et al., (2006) Henry (2008), and 
Mangena & Tauringana (2008).   This finding is also consistent with previous interna-
tional studies of Kajola (2008); Adams & Mehran (2012); Sanda et al., (2010); Shiekh et 
al., (2012); Lehn et al., (2009) argued that larger boards are better than  smaller  ones 
in improving firm performance. They argued that in small boards the powerful position of 
the CEO enable him to override the decisions made by the board members in accord-
ance with their own interests leading to increase the agency and correspondingly un-
dermining the performance of the firm (Miller, 2003). Large bank board size also plays 
an important role in improving and enhancing outcomes of decisions because of ideas-
sharing and contributions, which might increase the likelihood of better firm performance 
(Lehn et al 2009). Therefore, banks with larger and more diverse boards are more likely 
to decrease the conflicts between management and shareholders, leading to increased 
shareholder returns and thus improved bank performance.  
 The results of this study also support the agency and resource dependence theories 
that larger boards may possibly be better for corporate financial performance (e.g. John 
and Senbet, 1998; Yawson, 2006).  Firstly, larger boards are associated with diversity in 
skills, business contacts, and experience that smaller boards may not have, which of-
fers greater opportunity to secure critical resources (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Similar-
ly, larger boards offer greater access to their firm’s external environment, which reduces 
uncertainties and also facilitates securing critical resources, such as finance, raw mate-
rials, and contracts ( e.g. Pearce and Zahra,1992; Goodstein et al., 1994). Secondly, 
larger boards enhance the knowledge base on which business advice can be sought, 
which increases managerial ability to make important and better business decisions 
(Yawson, 2006). Finally, a bank board’s monitoring capacity is demonstrated to be posi-
tively related with board size (John and Senbet, 1998). This is because a larger number 
of people with varied expertise will be better placed to subject managerial decisions to 
greater scrutiny and monitoring (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). This will help balance the 
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power of an otherwise dominant CEO. The positive influence of board size on profitabil-
ity of banks in our sample may be due to the fact that the large majority of banks in our 
sample do have nominating committees, or a predefined succession policy, so that they 
may appoint directors that do have necessary experience, skills and expertise 
 This finding is in contrast with several studies that indicated a negative relationship be-
tween board size and bank performance. For example, Stancic et al., (2012); Bektas & 
Kaymak (2009) and Pathan et al., (2007) argued that excessive boards lead to prob-
lems of coordination, control and flexibility in decision making. Furthermore, the results 
mean that smaller boards are effective in monitoring bank managers and can contribute 
to bank profitability more than larger boards. They also support the view that banks with 
larger boards tend to be ineffective as they may not be able to make good and informed 
decisions due to the fact that too many directors may be unproductive as communica-
tion may pose a serious challenge among members. Romano et al, (2012) argued that 
when boards grow, they become less likely to function effectively because it may create 
a diminished sense of individual responsibility and might be more involved in bureau-
cratic problems. . 
.
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5.4.3 Results and Discussion of Board Composition on Financial Performance 
Table 5. 10 Results and discussion of board composition on financial performance (ROA) 
Dependent 
Variable (ROA) 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Ef-
fects 
P-Value Random Effects P-Value 
BOCOMP 0.03387   0.04446   0.0142965   
(-0.1713) 0.8642 (-0.165) 0.8692 (-0.6184) 0.5371 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level 
(Source: Gretl: Researcher’s Own Compilation) 
Table 5. 11 Results and discussion of board composition on financial performance (ROE) 
Dependent 
Variable  
(ROE) 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Ef-
fects 
P-Value Random Effects P-Value 
BOCOMP −0.0104319 0.4197 0.016847 0.37273 −0.00940985 0.52116 
(-0.8089) (-8939) (-0.6428) 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level  
Source:(Gretl:Researcher’sOwnCompilation)
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 Tables 5.10 & 5.11 show that board composition was found to have a weak positive 
and statistically insignificant relationship with both ROA and ROE, hence, the null hy-
pothesis is not rejected. This finding lends empirical support to the findings of prior 
Ghanaian studies of Abor &Biekpe (2007); Abor and Adjasi (2007); Adusei (2011), 
Tornyeve & Wereko, (2012), Kyereboa-Coleman (2006a) and Kyereboa-Coleman & 
Amidu (2008) and other international studies (Gordini, 2012) Bino & Tomar,(2007) and 
Erkens et al (2012). For example, Kyereboa-Coleman and Amidu (2008) reported statis-
tically insignificant and positive relationship between NEDs and ROA among SMEs in 
Ghana. However, this finding is not consistent with prior Ghanaian studies (Kyereboa-
Coleman & Biekpe, 2006b) who reported statistically significant and negative relation-
ship between NEDs and ROA and other international studies (Bozec, 2005; Guest, 
2009). This finding means that the appointment of more non-executive directors to the 
board would marginally help to improve the level of profitability. The positive effect can 
be explained because the presence of NEDs on the Ghanaian bank boards’ enhance 
corporate competitiveness and provided new strategic outlooks for the firms (Abor & Ad-
jasi, 2007) 
  The findings seem to indicate that the BCBS (2006; 2010) style recommendation of 
Bank of Ghana’s regulation and the GSE’s Listing Rules (2006) that Ghanaian boards 
should be comprised of a majority of non-executive directors are applicable in Ghanaian 
banking context, but this findings is not consistent with the provisions made by the Gha-
na’s Companies Act 1963 Act 179 and SEC regulation (2003;2010) where only the min-
imum number of 3 is provided to constitute the board. It suggests that non-executive di-
rectors can potentially improve on the independence of corporate board and its deci-
sion. The positive coefficients, however, show that the Ghanaian banking industry views 
the appointment of more NEDs to bank boards as a positive corporate governance 
practice. Theoretically, the statistically insignificant and positive association between the 
NEDs and the ROA and ROE supports the agency and resource dependency theories. 
It suggests that NEDs bring independent judgment to board decisions (Chhaochhria and 
200 
Grienstein, 2009) and also offer the firm resources in the form of experiences, expertise, 
business contacts and reputation (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
 This will help to improve the level of profitability of the bank but at very slow rate. The 
position is premised on the assumption that non-executive directors are independent of 
management, but the subject of director independence in relation to the controlling or 
majority shareholders continue to be a major corporate governance challenge in the 
Ghanaian banking industry. The prevailing condition where controlling or majority 
shareholders are given the right to select, nominate or appoint outside directors present 
a conundrum to director independence. This observable fact is in line with the extant 
body of knowledge in that, controlling or majority shareholders in general jeopardize di-
rector independence since large shareholders tend to have an authoritative command in 
relation to outside director appointment (Berglof and Claessen, 2004).  
  The weak positive relationship between non-executive directors and bank performance 
may be attributed to the lack of independence, objectivity and experience on the part of 
outside directors. Again, board independence is often compromised because of the 
manner in which board appointments are made and the way they operate. There are 
those appointed because of their political party affiliations, family connections, and close 
association with CEO and board chairperson, and are not in position to challenge deci-
sions and as a result, most of outside directors become “captured” which may contribute 
to lower performance of Ghanaian banks. In addition, the NEDs might not be sufficiently 
independent to perform their monitoring role effectively, or they may be compromised by 
close relationship with managers and thus unable to interfere in management decisions  
Another possible explanation for the weak positive and statistically insignificant relation-
ship between board composition and bank performance may be that as a developing 
country, non-executive directors, especially those from diverse backgrounds, may lack 
the necessary qualifications, knowledge and experience in banking business to subject 
managerial decisions to proper scrutiny. 
  However, the result is also consistent with the recommendations of Ghana’s SEC code 
(2003; 2010) which encourages a higher percentage of non-executive directors on the 
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Ghanaian listed companies’ boards. The positive coefficient shows that the market 
views the appointment of NEDs to bank boards as a positive corporate governance 
practice. This is because the presence of higher NEDs can potentially improve the in-
dependence of board and its decisions. This position is supported by previous studies 
(Al- Sahafi et al., 2015; Bino & Tomar, 2007; Staikouras et al., 2008). The presence of 
majority non-executive directors on the board strengthens the independence of the 
board that enables them to play their monitoring role effectively. The results indicate 
that independence of the board is an important indicator of bank performance in relation 
to efficiency of management in generating of bank profit in Ghana. The independence of 
the board is necessary in implementing effective internal control systems, which ulti-
mately improves efficiency and performance. This finding is also consistent with previ-
ous international studies of Bino and Tomar (2007); Alonso and Gonzalez (2008); 
Staikouras et al., (2007) and Busta (2008). They argued that monitoring the actions of 
managers is a crucial component for management effectiveness, thus the greater the 
number of non-executive directors the more likely they are to increase board vigilance 
which minimizes the agency problem and increases firm performance. This finding is 
also consistent with agency, and resource dependence theories that support the majori-
ty of non-executive directors on boards. Given the agency theory proposition that 
boards dominated by executive directors are accountable to shareholders (Fama, 1980: 
Sonnenfeld 2002), the presence of non-executive directors on the board is suggested to 
be an effective internal governance mechanism used to partially reduce the agency 
problems in modern firms (Fama,1983; Jensen,1993).   Accordingly, non-executive di-
rectors bring to the board three important features.  First, the non-executive directors 
bring independent judgment to board decisions (Cadbury report, 1992; Chhaochharia, 
2009). Second, they offer a firm resources in the form of experience, expertise, busi-
ness contacts and reputation (Hanniffa and Hudiab, 2006; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 
2009). Third, the existence of competitive and efficient managerial labour markets both 
within and outside the firm ensures that non-executive directors perform their monitoring 
function effectively (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Finally, it has been argued 
that the appointment of non-executive directors help in reducing information asymmetry 
by credibly signaling insiders’ intent (Black et al., 2006). 
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 The results concerning NEDs are quite interesting; implying that  Ghanaian banks have 
complied with the recommendations of the Bank of Ghana’s draft corporate governance 
regulation (2013), SEC Code (2003) and BCBS (2015,2010, 2006) which requires that 
bank boards’ must be composed of a majority of  non-executive directors. This result 
also supports the agency theory which suggests that, boards composed of majority non-
executive directors are able to monitor the self-interest actions of managers, thereby 
minimizing agency costs (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1993), and max-
imizing shareholder wealth. This result also supports the Bank of Ghana’s view that in-
dependence is a desirable characteristic of non-executive directors.  This positive influ-
ence on profitability of universal banks in our sample may be due to the fact that non -
executive directors bring independent judgment to board decisions. 
  However, this result is in contrast with previous international studies ( Al-Manaseer et 
al., 2012; De Andres & Vallelado, 2008) who found a negative relationship between 
board composition and bank performance. They argue that non-executive directors may 
not have total commitment to the cause of the bank because of outside commitments. 
As a result, they may not be on top of issues affecting the bank and this would limit their 
contribution to performance of the bank. These studies support the  stewardship theory 
that  non-executive directors are part-time workers, this will undermine their ability to 
monitor and advise the board because of the lack of the information that they have, and 
the lack of information concerning daily activities inhibit NEDs’ ability  to apply their 
function to improve bank performance.
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5.4.4 Results and Discussion of Board committees on Financial Performance 
 
Table 5. 12 Results and discussion of board committees on financial performance (ROA) 
Dependent 
Variable (ROA) 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random Effects P-Value 
BOCOMM 0.0047666   0.27117***   0.011145**   
(-1.3928) 0.1654 (-3.5264) 0.0006 (-2.2092) 0.0284 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level 
Table 5. 13 Results and discussion of board committees on financial performance (ROE) 
Dependent Varia-
ble  (ROE) 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random Ef-
fects 
P-Value 
BOCOMM 0.0406862* 0.07 0.166312*** 0.00262 0.0563198** 0.04853 
(-1.8227) (-3.0564) (-1.9862) 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level 
      SourceGretl:Researcher’sOwnCompilation)
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  From Tables 5.12 & 5.13 show that board committees are statistically significant and 
positively related to ROA and ROE, which means that board committees will help to im-
prove the level of profitability. Hence, the null hypothesis is not rejected. This finding 
lends empirical support to the previous Ghanaian studies (Kyereboa-Coleman & Amidu 
(2008) and Abor and Biekpe (2007) who reported that audit and nomination committees 
are found to be statistically significant and positively related to ROA and ROE and other 
international studies (Vefas and Theodorou, 1998; Jirapon et al., (2009) Sun & Chan, 
2009; and Young & Buchlotz (2010). However, this finding is not consistent with previ-
ous Ghanaian studies (Puni (2015) who reported that board committees impact nega-
tively on both ROA and ROE as well as international studies (Adams & Mehran, 2005; 
Zemzem & Kacem, 2014 and Shungu et al., (2014). This finding indicates that board 
committees help to improve the level of profit of the bank at faster pace. The findings 
also indicate that Ghanaian banks that have established board committees tend to be 
associated with higher accounting returns. The findings suggest that banks with board 
committees (audit, risk, remuneration, and nomination committees) have positive effect  
on accounting return. 
 The statistical significance of these board committees in explaining ROA and ROE 
supports the Bank of Ghana’s draft governance regulation(2013) for the establishment 
of board committees as well as the BCBS (2006; 2010 and 2015) principles for corpo-
rate governance for banks. Theoretically, the establishment of board committees can 
improve the board discussions and processes, as well as the independence of the 
board and its decision. Arguably, this can potentially impact positively on bank financial 
performance by enhancing the effectiveness with which the board carries out its moni-
toring and advisory functions. Theoretically, the statistically significant and positive as-
sociation between board committees and financial performance supports the agency 
theory. It suggests that board committees enhance corporate accountability, legitimacy 
and credibility by performing specialist functions (Weir et al.,2002) 
  Furthermore, the Ghanaian banking industry seems to put a significant value on banks 
that have established board committees: audit, risk, remuneration and nomination 
committees. This generally implies that the BCBS style of Bank of Ghana’s regulation 
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and the SEC code (2003; 2010) that listed companies should establish audit, risk, nom-
ination and remuneration committees may be applicable.  Arguably, board committees 
can potentially impact positively on bank financial performance by enhancing the effec-
tiveness with which the board carries out its monitoring and advisory functions. The 
monitoring function of board committees resulted in increased banks’ profitability as 
measured by ROA and ROE, implying that investors and other shareholders consider 
board committees in their investment decisions for banks in Ghana.  The positive and 
statistically significant relationship between board committees and profitability has re-
vealed that the role of board committees in driving board control is relatively high in uni-
versal banks in Ghana. The findings suggest that the establishment of board commit-
tees leads to board effectiveness in relationship to board control function in banks, in 
that controlling or majority shareholders perform extensive internal controls in the 
banks.  
This is in line with extant literature that the concentrated ownership structure has influ-
ence on internal mechanisms of corporate governance such as board committees (Ber-
glof and Claessen, 2004). The result of this study also indicates that the effectiveness of 
board committees of those banks is due to the presence of majority or controlling 
shareholder which makes the principle recommendation with respect to board commit-
tees. This finding offers empirical support to the recommendations of many corporate 
governance codes and principles, including BCBS (2006; 2010; 2015; Ghana’s SEC, 
Code, 2003; Nigeria CBN Code, 2014) that call for the establishment of board commit-
tees. The results support the agency theory because the monitoring functions of the 
board committees lead to higher performance. The empirical results also support the 
argument that the presence of board committees leads to more responsible behavior by 
corporate boards and protect the interest of shareholders (Harrison, 1987). By contrast, 
other studies found that board committees impact negatively on bank performance (Ad-
ams & Mehran (2005); Zemzem & Kacem (2014) and Shungu et al (2014).  These stud-
ies suggest that the establishment of board committees imposes extra costs in terms of 
managerial time, travel expenses, and additional remuneration for the members of the 
committees (Vefaes, 1999). In addition, board committees can result in excessive man-
agerial supervision, which can inhibit executive initiative (Goodstein et al, 1994). These 
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studies highlighted that board committees may cause encroachment on the functions of 
the executive and the dilution of executive authority, or may pre-empt management re-
sponsibility (Rainsbury et al, 2008; Barker, 2002) and sometimes the committees are 
used as rubber stamp to confirm management decisions.  The positive influence of 
board committees on profitability of universal banks may be due to the fact that the 
large majority of universal banks in our sample do have board committees which act as 
independent monitors to alleviate agency problems, and maximize company value to 
shareholders through profitability and also increase the performance of share prices 
(Rezaee, 2009). This finding is also consistent with previous Ghanaian studies by 
Owusu (2012); Kyereboa – Coleman (2008) and other international studies by Pomeroy 
and Thorton (2008); Jirapon et.-al., (2009), Sun & Cahan (2009), that showed a positive 
and insignificant relationship between board committees and financial performance.  
    Board committees, whose responsibility is to be accountable to shareholders, typical-
ly perform the oversight function of the board. The primary role of audit, risk, remunera-
tion and nomination committees is to act as independent monitors to alleviate agency 
problems (Klein, 1998; Rezaee, 2009), to maximize the value of a company to share-
holders through profitability and to increase the performance of share prices. Agency 
theory was supported by the BCBS (2010,2015), which recommended separate com-
mittees for overseeing the remuneration of executive directors, reviewing  risk activities , 
auditing  financial statements and appointing executive and non-executive directors to  
boards, because shareholders have greater confidence when there are named commit-
tees to address the key responsibilities who disclose their existence to their investors 
(Davis,2002). The significant relationship between board committees and financial per-
formance reported in Ghana can be interpreted to support agency theory. 
 This finding is also consistent with  prior international studies of Anderson et al, (2004); 
Vefeas & Karamonous,(2005); Jirapon et-al, (2009) Sun & Chan,(2009) and Young & 
Buchloltz, (2010) who argued that board committees are important corporate govern-
ance tools to monitor corporate activities and also play a valuable role in the protection 
of shareholder value.  In contrast, Adams & Mehran (2005) Shungu et al., (2015), in 
their studies on board structure with board committees was negatively associated with 
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bank performance. These studies support the argument that board committees impose 
extra costs on managerial time, travel expenses and additional remuneration for mem-
bers of various committees (Vafeas, 1999). Board committees can result in excessive 
managerial supervision, which inhibit executive initiative and vision (Goodstein et al., 
2004). 
Sun and Cahan, (2009) suggested that the establishment of these committees can im-
pact positively on performance due to four main reasons. Firstly, unlike the main board 
or operating committees (e.g. finance/executive), monitoring board committees are usu-
ally entirely composed of independent NEDs, making them better placed to protect 
shareholders’ interests by effectively scrutinizing managerial actions (Klein, 1998; Ve-
feas, 1999b). Secondly, by their relative small size, board committees are able to meet 
more frequently. This provides sufficient time for meaningful dialogue and in reaching 
consensus decisions quicker (Karamanou and Vefeas, 2005, p.458). Thirdly, by their 
composition, board committees help in bringing individual director specialist knowledge 
and expertise to bear on the board decision-making process (Harrison, 1987). This also 
allows the main board to devote attention to specific areas of strategic interests and re-
sponsibility. Finally, board committees enhance corporate accountability, legitimacy and 
credibility by performing specialist functions (Weir et al., 2002). The principal function of 
an audit committee, for example, is to meet regularly with the firm’s external and internal 
auditors to review company financial statements, audit process and establish internal 
accounting controls. 
This helps reduce agency costs and information asymmetry by facilitating timely release 
of unbiased accounting information by managers to shareholders (Klein, 1998). Also, 
effective monitoring by the audit committee may help minimize financial fraud and in-
crease firm value. As a result, universal banks in Ghana have considered the im-
portance of implementing board committees as a mechanism for board structure, be-
cause effective monitoring has a positive influence on bank performance. Even though 
in prior research, the impact of board committees on bank performance is limited, the 
results of this study report that ROA and ROE are significantly related to board commit-
tees in Ghana, which supports agency theory and accountability to shareholders. The 
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results imply that in the Ghanaian banking environment, board committees are an im-
portant mechanism of corporate governance in Ghana which impact on bank perfor-
mance.
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5.4.5 Results and Discussion of Bank Size on Financial Performance 
 
Table 5. 14 Results and discussion of bank size  on financial performance (ROA) 
Dependent Var-
iable (ROA) 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random Ef-
fects 
P-Value 
Bank Size −0.000962791
* 
  0.0181107   −0.000305949   
(-1.8455) 0.10666 (-0.2686) 0.7886 (-0.5133) 0.6084 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level 
(Source: Gretl: Researcher’s Own compilation). 
Table 5. 15 Results and discussion of bank size on financial performance (ROE) 
Dependent Variable  ROE Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random 
Effects 
P-Value 
Bank Size −0.00571489* 0.0948 0.0143926 0.7633 −0.003849
83 
0.3145 
(-1.6794) (-0.3016) (-1.0086) 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level.  
Source:(Gretl:Researcher’sOwnCompilation)
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From Tables 5.14 and 5.15 reported a weak positive but statistically insignificant effect 
of the bank size on ROA and ROE; hence the null hypothesis is not rejected. This find-
ing lends empirical support to the findings of prior Ghanaian studies (Tornyeva & 
Wereko,2012; Gyemerah & Amoah, 2015 and Adusei, 2011) who reported statistically 
insignificant and positive relationship between bank size and ROA and ROE and other 
international studies (Al- Sahafi et al., (2015); Naceur & Omran, (2010) and Al-Khouri, 
2010). However, the findings differ from other prior Ghanaian studies by Kyereboa-
Coleman & Biekpe (2006a) and Abor & Biekpe (2007) who reported a negative and sta-
tistically insignificant relationship between bank size and ROA and as well as interna-
tional studies (Hoque et al., 2012, Ferede, 2012)  The weak positive but statistically in-
significant relationship between bank size and profitability may be attributed to the fact, 
as universal banks in Ghana become larger they are not able fully capable to realize 
economies of scale and also  reduce the cost of gathering and processing information 
which impacts on performance moderately. This finding is in line with those of Dietrich 
and Wanzenried (2011) that bank size should be positively associated with performance 
given that banks with larger size are able to diversify and move away from traditional 
deposit taking and market based activities thar lead to improved performance. 
 Furthermore, in Ghana, the weak positive result may also arise from the presence of 
bureaucratic processes and other costs related to managing large banks. This finding is 
in line with findings of Stirok Rumble, 2006; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). Larger 
banks are associated with having more diversification, capabilities, ability to exploit 
economies of scale and scope, and also being highly formalized in terms of procedures, 
but however, in the Ghanaian banking context, due to organizational rigidity brought 
about by bigger bank size and a lot of unnecessary bureaucracies, profitable opportuni-
ties that may require urgent attention will easily pass the bank and thus making them 
less profitable in relative terms and thus lowering the bank performance (Goddard et al 
2005; Bachuenvijit 2012).  This positive result indicates that large banks may benefit 
from economies of scale and scope (Joh, 2003). The size of a bank reflects its ability to 
achieve economies of scale as well as a market power. This finding is consistent with 
previous studies that show the same relationship (Al-Sahafi et al, (2015; Fallatah & 
Dickins, 2012; Pervan & Visic, 2012; Zeitun & Tian, 2007). This result can be attributed 
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to the fact that large banks have enough capital which allows them to expand their busi-
ness operations to new activities, and thus improves bank performance and lowers the 
concentration of risk. In addition, large universal banks in Ghana are better equipped to 
use new technologies and exploit the resulting cost savings and efficiency gains. . This 
also suggests that the larger the bank, the better the performance of the bank, because 
of the economies of scale arguments (Sufian, 2009). Besides, large banks receive an 
important bargaining power allowing them to reduce their input costs (Hauner, 2004). 
The implication is that an increase in the scale of operations of a universal bank results 
in an increase in its profits. 
 The size of universal banks in Ghana does allow them to exploit the economics of scale 
and have no difficulty also in accessing international financial markets. This finding is 
consistent with the argument that market structure affects financial performance ( 
Haron, 1996), and that if an industry is subject to economies of scale, larger banking 
institutions would be more efficient and  could provide services  at lower cost (Rasiah, 
2010). Furthermore, large banks have more resources more qualified staff and sophisti-
cated information systems that result in superior performance. The positive relationship 
between bank size and financial performance reported in the Ghanaian banking context 
can be interpreted to support industrial economic theory which postulates that if an in-
dustry is subjected to economies of scale, large institutions can be more efficient, thus 
are able to offer services at a lower cost (Rasiah, 2010). In general, large banks in 
terms of assets and liabilities have the advantage of providing a larger menu of financial 
services to their customers which can be associated with more competitive fees, rates 
and charges. . 
On the other hand, other researchers (Ferde, 2012; Al-Manaseer et al, 2012; Hoque et 
al, 2012; Rachdi, 2014) report that large banks are subject to more inspections and 
scrutiny. Thus, it might be costly for the controlling shareholders to extract private prof-
its. They argued that larger banks might not be as efficient as smaller banks due to re-
duced control by management over strategic and operational activities as bank size in-
creases.
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5.4.6. Results and Discussion of Foreign Ownership on Financial Performance  
 
TABLE 5. 16 Results and discussion of foreign ownership on financial performance (ROA) 
Dependent Variable 
(ROA) 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random Ef-
fects 
P-Value 
Foreign 0.47747   0.481163  0.286636   
(-13690) 0.1727 (-0.5854) 0.2654 (-0.4639) 0.6433 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level 
(Source: Gretl: Researcher’s own compilation). 
TABLE 5. 17 Results and discussion of foreign ownership on financial performance (ROE) 
Dependent Variable  
ROE 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random 
Effects 
P-Value 
Foreign 0.0137133 0.5474 0.18276 0.548 0.010938 0.7243 
(-0.6028) (-0.0549) (-0.3532) 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level 
Source:(Gretl.Researcher’sOwnCompilation)
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           Also, from the Fixed Effect results of tables 5.16 & 5.17 show a positive but sta-
tistically insignificant relationship between foreign ownership and the performance of the 
universal bank in Ghana in terms of ROA and ROE, hence the null hypothesis is not re-
jected. This finding lends empirical support to the findings of prior Ghanaian studies 
(Adams & Agbemade (2012); Opoku Agyeman (2015) who reported that foreign owner-
ship of banks impacted positively and significantly on ROE as well as other international 
studies (Claessens & Van Horen, 2012; Al-Manaseer et al., 2012; Micco et al., 2007). 
However, the findings differ from other prior Ghanaian studies (Ntow & Laryea- Afoley, 
2012)  as well as other international studies (Lensink & Naaborg, 2007; Barako & Greg, 
2007) who reported a negative and statistically significant association between foreign 
ownership and both ROA and ROE. 
 The possible explanation for the positive relationship between foreign ownership and 
bank performance in Ghana may attributed to the fact that,  foreign owners able be  to 
monitor management more closely due to the intrinsically greater risk they bear by in-
vesting in foreign markets; as part of this concern, foreign investors often favour the use 
of performance based incentives, which induce managers to act in the interest of princi-
pals. Additionally, foreign investors can bring access to new banking practices and 
technology, enabling reduced cost and operational efficiency which might contribute to 
improved bank performance. Finally, the legislative reforms in particular since the 2000s 
have attracted more foreign capital investment in Ghanaian banking sector. Further-
more, the banking law (Banking Act 2004 Act 673 as amended by Banking Act 2007 
Act738) has provided for equal treatment for both local and foreign investors, a unique 
feature that distinguishes the Ghanaian banking market among Ecowas region. 
 This finding supports that the presence of foreign banks has created a more competi-
tive environment and impacted on the overall performance of universal banks in Ghana. 
This affirms that foreign investors have the ability and the incentive to intervene (i.e. 
monitor and control) corporate governance to effect monitoring or complement existing 
poor monitoring by domestic investors (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Similarly, Hanousek et 
al. (2004) found that the greater incentive for monitoring among foreign investors leads 
to a positive impact on corporate performance. Mitton (2002) and Lins (2003) also found 
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that foreign investment has positive impacts on firm performance in emerging markets. 
This contrasts with the view of Doidge et al (2007) and Leuz et al (2010), who reported 
that foreign investors might not improve firm performance due to information asym-
metry, differing national economic environments and differences in corporate govern-
ance application and culture. 
  This is consistent with previous research (Ghazali, 2010; Kirkpatrick et al., (2006); Ox-
elheim and Randoy, 2003; Sulong and Nor, (2010); Taufil et al. 2013; Taylor, 1990), 
which found that foreign ownership influences firm performance positively due to im-
proved access to financial resources and managerial talent. In addition, they reported 
that foreign investors increase firm value by controlling managerial behaviour. Further-
more, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) asserted that technology transfer results in better 
firm performance, and this is enhanced by foreign investment. Moreover, Aggarwal et 
al., (2011) found that the presence of foreign institutional investors is associated with 
improved corporate governance, by eliminating poorly performing CEOs from the man-
agement. This may imply that foreign investors could force and influence the manage-
ment to improve corporate governance and transparency in firm operations. In other 
words, foreign investors have superior monitoring ability to decrease agency costs and 
thereby improve firm performance. 
The positive influence on foreign banks’ profitability may be explained by the following 
reasons.  The plausible explanation for this may be that foreign owners can be expected 
to monitor management more closely due to the intrinsically greater risk they bear by 
investing in foreign markets; as part of this concern, foreign investors often favour the 
use of performance-based incentives, which induce managers to act in the interests of 
principals (i.e. remuneration to mitigate the agency problem). Additionally, foreign inves-
tors can bring access to new practices and technology, enabling reduced cost and op-
erational efficiency, which might contribute to improved firm performance.  Foreign 
banks may also have better access to capital markets, superior ability to diversify risks 
and the ability to offer some services to multinational and transnational companies not 
easily provided local banks. Similarly, Kim and Rasiah (2010) found that foreign owned 
banks in developing countries have better corporate governance and risk management 
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practices that lead to positive impact on financial performance, as proxied by ROA and 
ROE.
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5.4.7   Results and Discussion of Post Crisis on Financial Performance 
 
TABLE 5. 18 Results and discussion of post-crisis on financial performance (ROA) 
Dependent Variable (ROA) Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random 
Effects 
P-Value 
Postcrisis 0.0132346***  0.00325879   0.0137218*
** 
 
(-4.256) 0.00003 (-0.6178) 0.0008 (-4.8586) 0.00005 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level 
(Source: Gretl: Researcher’s own compilation). 
TABLE 5. 19 Results and discussion of post-crisis on financial performance (ROE) 
Dependent 
Variable  ROE 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random Ef-
fects 
P-Value 
Post Crisis 0.0734674*** 0.00038 −0.00452359 0.90369 0.0744299*** 0.00021 
(-3.6221) (-0.1212) (-3.7829) 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level 
Source:(Gretl.Researcher’sOwnCompilation)
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Table 5.18 shows that the variable post- crisis had a positive but insignificant impact on 
the ROA of banks in Ghana. This implies that Ghanaian universal banks were not af-
fected negatively by the international macroeconomic challenges created by the down-
turn in the developed economies, were not also exposed to huge non-performing loans 
and securitization issues. This finding lends empirical support to Kocisova’s (2014) 
study who found that banks from Poland, Czech, Slovakia, and Hungary had a positive 
impact on their performance in terms of ROA, suggesting that banks from those coun-
tries were not integrated in the global financial systems. From the above, we can also 
conclude that Ghana’s limited participation and lack of integration with the global finan-
cial market appeared to have shielded the banking industry from the direct impact of the 
crisis. This notwithstanding, the global financial meltdown had a marginal impact on the 
Ghanaian underdeveloped market, according to the Bank of Ghana’s   Financial Stabil-
ity Report (vol., 5 no, 1/2009). The possible linkages with the global crisis by the indus-
try were the banks’ exposures to counterparties abroad which were mainly in the form of 
nostro balances and placement. 
On the other hand, Table 5.19, shows that the Variable Post-Crisis is insignificant in the 
ROE models for the total sample banks. The sign of the co-efficient is negative for only 
ROE which is in line with the hypothesis expected. The effect of the crisis on the banks 
especially foreign owned banks is well understood from the angle that these foreign 
banks are subsidiaries of their parent companies in developed countries. Since the fi-
nancial crises mostly affected the financial industry of the developed countries, it had 
direct bearing on their subsidiaries in developing countries such as Ghana. This result is 
in contradiction with Bentum (2012) who reported that Ghanaian banks were experienc-
ing profitability during the financial crisis
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5.4.8 Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the empirical results regarding the impact of the 
corporate governance mechanisms on bank financial performance. Specifically, the 
chapter presented the findings and a discussion of the descriptive analysis undertaken 
in this study, and dealt with the main inferences drawn from the multiple regressions 
(namely control variables, board of directors, board composition, board committees, 
bank size and foreign ownership). The empirical results, and decisions are summarized 
in the Table 5.20 below. In addition, tables are presented separately according to the 
research objectives.  All of the tables that contain all the results together of this study 
are presented in the above tables
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TABLE 5. 20 Empirical results summary of ROA and ROE 
Variables 
and Hy-
pothesis 
Return on assets (ROA) Return on Equity 
Independ-
ent Varia-
ble 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Hypothe-
sis 
Sign 
Actual 
Sign 
p-values Statistical 
significance 
Decision  
(Hypothe-
sis) 
Actual 
Sign 
p-values Statistical 
significance 
Board Size 1 + + p=0.6840
3 
 
Insignifi-
cant 
Do not re-
ject 
+ p=0.323
61 
Insignificant 
Board 
Composi-
tion 
2 + + p=0.8691
8 
Insignifi-
cant 
Do not re-
ject 
+ p=0.372
73 
insignificant 
Board 
Commit-
tees 
3 + + p=0.0005
5 
significant Do not Re-
ject 
+ p=0.002
62 
significant 
Foreign 
Ownership 
4 + + p=0.2653
9 
Insignifi-
cant 
Do not re-
ject 
+ p=0.548
0 
Insignificant 
Bank Size 5 + + p=0.7886
0 
Insignifi-
cant 
Do not re-
ject 
+ p=0.763
33 
Insignificant 
Post –crisis 6 - + p=0.0008
3 
significant Reject - p=0.903
69 
Insignificant 
Source (:Grelt:Researcher’sOwncompilation)
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the conclusions of the thesis. It seeks to achieve five main ob-
jectives. First, it summarizes the research findings. Second, it highlights the limitations 
of the study. Third, discusses the policy implications of the research findings, and where 
applicable, makes appropriate recommendations. Fourth, the chapter summarizes the 
research contributions of the study. Finally, the chapter identifies potential avenues for 
future research. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents a 
summary of the research findings while Section 6.3 highlights the limitations of the 
study. Section 6.4 discusses policy implications of the research findings, and where ap-
plicable, makes appropriate recommendations while Section 6.5 briefly summarizes the 
research contributions of the study. Section 6.6 identifies potential research avenues for 
future research while Section 6.7 summarizes the chapter 
6.2 Summary of Research Findings 
The thesis sought to investigate the impact of corporate governance on financial per-
formance with respect to 21 Ghanaian universal banks over the period 2006 to 2014, 
using a Fixed Effect regression models.  Based on a literature review of empirical works 
on the Ghanaian banking industry, the study examined the impact of  corporate govern-
ance mechanisms via board of directors structure (e.g., board size, board composition-
the presence of NEDs and board committees), bank size (log of a bank’s total asset) on 
financial performance. In addition, the study has also investigated the impact of foreign 
ownership structure on bank performance in Ghana. Performance as used in the study 
was measured by Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE).The data set 
used in this study to examine these internal governance mechanisms was extracted 
from Ghanaian banks’ annual reports and their websites.  
The study ended up with a sample of 21 universal banks during the period 2006 to 
2014. Multiple regression panel data analysis was chosen as the main tool of analysis in 
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the study. The statistical method used to test these impacts was Fixed Effects models. 
The results show that board size, board composition, foreign owned banks and bank 
size were found to be statistically insignificant but positively related to profitability, while 
board committees were found to be positively and statistically significant related to prof-
itability. The study sheds new light on performance (profitability) determinants within the 
Ghanaian banking industry.  However, most of the findings are in line with other empiri-
cal studies in Ghana and the world at large. 
 
6.2.1 Board of directors (Size, Composition and Committees) 
The findings show that board size was found to have a weak positive, but statistically 
insignificant related to bank profitability. This result implies that board size impact mar-
ginally on the profitability of universal banks operating in Ghana. This means that the 
larger board size will help to improve the level of the bank but at very slow pace or rate.  
However, this finding is consistent with the argument that larger boards are associated 
with diversity in skills, business contacts and experience which could lead to better cor-
porate financial performance (John and Senbet, 1998). The positive influence of board 
size on bank profitability in our sample may be due to the fact that a large majority of 
banks in our sample do have nominating committee or a pre-defined succession policy, 
so they appoint directors with some experience in the banking business. This might re-
sult in the appointment of management and members for the board on the basis of ex-
perience and skills. Finally, this result supports the position of John and Senbet (1998) 
that corporate board monitoring capacity is positively related to large board size. This is 
because a larger number of people with varied expertise will be better placed to subject 
managerial decisions to greater scrutiny and monitoring (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
This will also help balance the power of an otherwise a dominant CEO. 
Board composition was found to have a weak positive relationship with profitability, 
which means that non- executive directors or independent directors will help to improve 
the level of bank profitability in Ghana. However, the board independence will help to 
improve the level of the bank but at very slow rate. 
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The findings show a positive relationship between board composition (NEDs) and bank 
performance, thus the result is consistent with agency theory which suggests that 
boards composed of a majority of outside directors are able to monitor the self-
interested actions of managers, thereby minimizing agency costs (Fama, 1980; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983) and maximizing shareholder wealth. The positive relationship be-
tween a majority of non-executive director representation and firm performance is based 
on agency theory, resulting in accountability to shareholders in this study. The results 
show that boards’ accountability to shareholders has resulted in increased profitability 
through ROA and ROE.  Therefore in Ghana, board composition is considered an im-
portant component of board structure in increasing bank performance. 
In addition, this result also implies that universal banks have complied with the recom-
mendations of BCBS (2006; 2010 and 2015) principles of enhanced corporate govern-
ance practices. The Cadbury Report (1992), Hampel Report (1998) and OECD (2004; 
2014; Ghana’s SEC code, 2003) principles recommended that boards should comprise 
of a majority of non-executive directors, because they bring independence of mind and 
judgment on issues of strategy and governance in the running the business, and also 
see themselves as assisting in enhancing the prosperity of the business and play an 
important part in improving the performance of the business (Cadbury, 2002). 
The results showed that board committee regressed positively on financial performance 
indicators (ROA and ROE) and was statistically significant at the 1 % level. The out-
come is consistent with Laing and Weir (1999) who reported that the monitoring function 
of board committee impacts positively on firm performance. The positive influence of 
board committees on profitability of universal banks in our sample may be due to the 
fact that the large majority of banks have board committees which act as independent 
monitors to alleviate agency problems (Klein, 1998; Rezaee, 2009), to maximize the 
value of the company to shareholders through profitability and to increase the perfor-
mance of share price. Agency theory was supported by the Basle Committee for Bank 
Supervision corporate principles (2010, 2015) and the Cadbury report (1992), which 
recommended separate committees for overseeing the risk management, auditing the 
financial statements, remuneration of executive directors and the appointment of execu-
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tive and non-executive directors to the board, because shareholders have greater confi-
dence when there are named  committees to address the key responsibilities who dis-
close their existence to the investor (Davis, 2002). The establishment of board commit-
tees leads to more responsible behaviour by corporate boards and protection of the in-
terests of the shareholders (Harrison, 1987). The results of this study report that ROA 
and ROE are significantly related to board committees in Ghana, which supports agen-
cy theory and accountability to shareholders. The results imply that board committees 
are an important mechanism of corporate governance in Ghana which impacts positive-
ly on bank financial performance. 
6.2.2 Bank Size 
The findings related to bank size and bank performance show a positive relationship 
which is consistent with the industrial economic theory which postulates that if an indus-
try is subjected to economies of scale, large institutions can be more efficient, thus are 
able to offer services at a lower cost (Rasiah, 2010) and with the argument that market 
structure affects financial performance (Haron, 1996). Furthermore, large banks have 
more resources, more qualified staff and sophisticated information systems that result in 
superior performance. In general, large banks in terms of assets and liabilities have the 
advantage of providing a larger menu of financial services to their customers which can 
be associated with more competitive fees, rates and charges. This result is consistent 
with previous Ghanaian studies by Adusei (2011); Kyereboa-Coleman & Biekpe (2007) 
who found that there is a positive relationship between the size of a bank and its profit-
ability
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6.2.3 Foreign Ownership 
 
Finally, the results showed that foreign ownership had a positive relationship on bank’s 
financial performance. This finding confirms that foreign investors have the ability and 
the incentive to intervene (i.e. monitor and control) corporate governance to affect moni-
toring or complement the existing poor monitoring by domestic investors (Gillan and 
Starks, 2003). This finding was consistent with those of Taylor (1990), Oxelheim and 
Randoy (2003), Kirkpatrick et al. (2006); Ghazali (2010); Sulong and Nor (2010) and 
Taufil et al., (2013) who found that foreign ownership influences firm performance posi-
tively. They argued that foreign investors give companies access to financial resources 
and managerial talent. Also, they reported that foreign investors increase firm value by 
controlling managerial behaviour. 
6.3 The Limitations of the Study 
Although the findings of any research are important, they invariably suffer from several 
limitations. From the studies, for example, the size of the sample is a limitation, it was 
realized that sample sizes were somehow small when the data was limited to only bank-
ing firms. The sample size of 21 universal banks is relatively small. The period of nine 
years is comparatively too short.  Financial companies have been excluded because 
firms in this sector are administered by a different set of instructions and rules (Abed et 
al., 2011). Additional periods of data could have drawn more significant variables than 
the ones provided. While this was the quest of the researcher, it was impossible to get 
significant accounting data on the Ghanaian banking industry before the year 2000. As 
a result, the period started with year 2006, three years after the full implementation of 
Universal Banking License in Ghana. Therefore, the size of the whole sample was 26 
banking firms. Similarly, the accumulated data sourced from Banks’ annual reports did 
not provide all the necessary information as an individual financial statement will pro-
vide. Since it was very impossible to accumulate all the individual annual financial 
statements of the banks because of their unavailability, the Banks’ annual reports data 
were the best alternative. 
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Furthermore, even though the annual report authenticates the data as fully audited, 
there were instances that the investigator traced and cross-checked some individual 
bank statements and realized certain transposition errors. Since not all financial state-
ments are available for cross-checking and corrections, it could be possible that there 
are some errors which could not be traced and corrected. The researcher would like to 
state here that he is aware of the (PricewaterHouse Coopers/ Banking Survey) data-
base but this contains more missing data on Ghanaian Banks than that available for the 
period of the study. Using all efforts, the Banks annual reports were the best option 
available. In addition, the method is purely quantitative in nature, other researchers may 
adopt a broader approach by triangulation of data through the use of both quantitative 
and qualitative method of data collection. This will help to adequately justify research 
findings and enhance applicability.   
Another limitation is the inclusion of only five variables of board structure; ownership 
structure and bank size i.e. the board size, board composition (NEDs), board commit-
tees, foreign ownership and bank size.  Broader understanding of the characteristics of 
a board could be gleaned from an appreciation of board meetings, board diversity, CEO 
duality, directorship ownership, education level, gender and nationality of its members, 
for example. Objectively quantifiable variables were selected, however, to avoid bias 
within the results, and the five variables chosen have been shown as key ones within 
previous studies. It is, therefore, considered that the corporate board is an important 
mechanism affecting firm performance; however, the study recommends that future re-
search should work out , the effect of various, further board characteristics upon bank 
performance. 
Finally, this study investigated the impact of corporate governance on bank perfor-
mance is limited as a result of historical accounting concept. Historical accounting re-
ports suffer from the following flaws: non-performing assets may be over-valued, create 
distortions due to the nature of depreciation policies adopted, inventory valuation and 
lack standardization in the handling of international accounting conventions (IFRS, IAS). 
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6.4 Policy Implications and Recommendations for the Ghanaian banking sector.  
The concluding chapter has discussed corporate governance and financial performance 
in the Ghanaian banking context which leads to the central argument that banks with 
effective governance mechanisms impact positively on financial performance because 
they usher in improvements in board independence, board committees, board size, 
bank size and foreign ownership. Clearly, the results of this study have provided some 
useful insights into the importance of bank governance, ownership structure and bank 
size in influencing the performance of banks.  The findings of this study show that im-
plementing good governance practices increases bank performance. As a result, this 
has significant implications for the banking sector, investors, policy makers and other 
stakeholders, due to the importance of the banking success to the economy of Ghana. 
Also, and where applicable, recommendations expected to about improvements will be 
made. 
6.4.1 Policy implications for the Bank of Ghana  
First, the finding is positive when it comes to board committees. The findings indicate 
that banks that have established board committees (risk, audit, nomination and remu-
neration) tend to be associated with higher accounting returns. These results support 
the view that the banking industry seems to put significant value on banks that have es-
tablished board committees. This generally implies that the BCBS (2010; 2015) style 
suggestion of the Bank of Ghana’s draft corporate governance regulation in 2013 that 
Ghanaian universal banks should establish risk; audit, assets and liabilities, nomination, 
remuneration, ethics and compliance committees may be applicable. 
Second, one implication of this findings is that universal banks in Ghana are cross-
regulated by the UK, France, South Africa, Nigeria, and Morocco banking regulators 
which tend to have better bank governance standards and codes than the banks only 
regulated by Bank of Ghana. This is consistent with theory because reputable UK, 
France and South Africa banking regulators often maintain more rigorous bank govern-
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ance standards. This implies that the Bank of Ghana may need to further upgrade or 
enhance its governance regulations to bring them up-to-date with international banking 
governance standards, especially to match those of the UK, France and South Africa 
banking markets as an important part of the general efforts at improving banking gov-
ernance standards in Ghanaian universal banks. Third, Bank of Ghana should encour-
age universal banks to implement good corporate governance practices through enact-
ing rules and regulations. For example, keeping the number of directors in a bank board 
to a minimum is recommended so long as the minimum size enables the board its su-
pervision and monitoring activities. Universal banks should be also encouraged to in-
crease their size in order to improve profitability due to economies of scale.  
Fourth, another implication of this study is that governance among sampled banks ap-
pears to differ on the basis of ownership (foreign and local banks) and bank size. This 
seems to suggest that there may be a need for level of judgment and flexibility in the 
applicability of the governance provisions in the Bank of Ghana’s draft corporate gov-
ernance regulation (2013), especially for local and newer banks. Arguably, this may 
help local and newer banks to meet their governance needs and also avoid incurring 
excessive costs. Based on the evidence that the observed variability in compliance with 
governance provisions or governance standards can largely be explained by size, it 
may arguably not be relevant for a smaller bank with a board size of seven directors, for 
example, to establish a separate nomination committee or to have a majority of non –
executive directors, to mention but a few. 
Finally, as an emerging market, good corporate governance practices are particularly 
important as this may not only help reduce bank failures, but may also help companies 
attract significant local funds or foreign direct investments (FDI). This may facilitate fast-
er economic growth and development in Ghana. In this respect, efforts by the Bank of 
Ghana, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Institute of Directors of Ghana, 
and the Private Enterprise Foundation, amongst other stakeholders, at improving gov-
ernance standards in Ghanaian companies may be seen as a step in the right direction. 
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6.4.2 Policy Recommendations 
First, one key policy recommendation is that the Bank of Ghana should formalize the 
2013 draft corporate governance regulation into  a national bank governance policy or 
code, which will lead to governance equality among universal banks in the country just 
like what SEC has done for the listed companies in Ghana. This could also be in line 
with the Central Bank of Nigeria bank governance code (CBN, 2006; 2014) for all banks 
operating in Nigeria. Furthermore, Bank of Ghana’s governance code or regulations 
could be made mandatory for all universal banks operating in Ghana. Since without 
such a policy framework, monitoring and assessment of universal banks’ corporate 
governance will be limited to only in-house organizational appraisals. In addition, this 
would help regulators enforce bank regulation and supervision on an equal platform to 
all universal banks. 
 
Second, based on the findings, more non-executive directors and board committees 
have a positive impact on universal banks’ performance in Ghana, but it is recommend-
ed that the Bank of Ghana and SEC develop capacity building for all banks’ directors to 
improve bank –level corporate governance, which in turn helps to avoid potential vul-
nerability in the financial system, and in enhancing the banking market and sector de-
velopment. The continuous capacity building is important as a majority of non-executive 
and independent directors coming from diverse backgrounds, lacked the relevant quali-
fication in banking, finance, risk, legal and accounting, and experience to subject mana-
gerial decisions to proper scrutiny. Organizing regular training workshops and develop-
ment conferences for existing and new non-executive directors to educate them about 
bank governance will be a step in the right direction. 
Third, the findings of this study is helpful in a sense that it suggests stimulating foreign 
banks entry into the Ghanaian banking sector due to the  positive link between foreign 
bank presence and financial performance. The Government and Bank of Ghana should 
create conditions for attracting more foreign banks to Ghana, in particular through effec-
tive regulation, and stable legislation. Moreover, the established positive link between 
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foreign banks and performance contributes to the debate surrounding the issue of for-
eign direct investments to Ghana. 
Finally, the findings of this study indicate that the economy of scale derived from bank 
size plays a crucial role in bank profitability. The benefit of size would reflect on the abil-
ity to reach wider markets. Universal banks should therefore be encouraged to look be-
yond local markets and strategically expand their operations to other geographical mar-
kets in the West African Sub-region and sectors of the economy. Furthermore, the loca-
tion of bank branches should be strategically paramount if the banks are to maximize 
return on investment. The agricultural and agro-processing sectors and small medium 
enterprises (SMEs) are still the potential and untapped markets for banks. In conjunc-
tion with branch expansion, banks should consider diversification their product portfolio. 
In this way universal banks can leverage on their assets to other ancillary services and 
maximize returns. 
6.4.3 Policy implications for Board and Management. 
The empirical findings provide another implication for the on-going policy debate in 
Ghanaian banking industry. Boards and senior managers should know that in order to 
implement good corporate governance, they should be concerned about inter relation-
ships among the five constructs; these are  bored size, board composition, board com-
mittees, foreign ownership, bank size and financial performance. The findings robustly 
confirm that banks that implement good corporate governance have a higher advantage 
of increasing their financial performance.  For this reason, both boards and senior man-
agers should be concerned about the inter-relationships between corporate governance 
and bank financial performance.  This study recommends that the banking entities 
should promote good corporate governance to send positive signals to potential inves-
tors and depositors. 
6.4.4 Policy Recommendation for Board and Management 
First, one key policy recommendation is that universal banks need to have a board 
made up of a majority of non- executive directors. Having a board of directors with a 
majority of outsiders has been shown to be important for improving the performance of 
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universal banks. It is established in this study that outside directors are often in the posi-
tion to guide bank management on how to be cost efficient. From the empirical findings, 
it has been revealed that outside directors bring independence of mind and judgment on 
issues of strategy and governance in the running of a banking business and that they 
also see themselves as assisting in enhancing the prosperity of the business, and plays 
an important role in improving the performance of the business (Cadbury, 2002). Sec-
ond, the establishment of board committees leads to more responsible behavior of bank 
boards and also protects the interest of shareholders. Another policy recommendation is 
the need for universal banks to have board committees (risk, audit, nomination, and re-
muneration). The results show that the presence of board committees impacts positively 
on bank profitability. 
6.4.5 Policy implications for academics and researchers 
             First, this study would also make a useful curriculum in the areas of bank gov-
ernance and academic programs on corporate governance abound. However, the re-
searcher is yet to find one on bank governance especially in the West African Sub-
region. Such an academic program would be useful in providing the necessary training 
in improving skills and expertise of bank board members, management to participate in 
board room discussions and decision making.  Second, a strong point of the research 
relates to the fact that it brings empirical evidence from a relatively a new cultural con-
text taking into account that most of the studies have taken place in the UK, USA, Can-
ada, India and Nigeria. This is the first study that reported on ownership types, board 
structure, bank size and financial performance on Ghanaian universal banks in the post-
financial sector reform period. This is significant in permitting a test of wider validity of 
findings derived from research conducted in a developing country context. It also pro-
vides further insights into cultural settings where corporate governance practices are in 
their infancy. 
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6.5 Summary of Research Contributions 
This study makes several new contributions, as well as extensions to the extant corpo-
rate governance literature. First, this study contributes to theory development of corpo-
rate governance literature in Ghana. As discussed in chapter 3, the competing theoreti-
cal perspectives on corporate governance (agency theory, stewardship theory, resource 
dependence theory, and stakeholder theory) offer different specifications on how boards 
should be structured or organized in terms of attributes such as board size, composi-
tion, leadership structure, committee structures, and multiple directorships. Not only 
that, but also the inconclusive findings in board research evident in the literature sug-
gest that there is no clear relationship between the decisions related to the structural 
design of boards based on these theoretical perspectives and performance outcomes 
like board composition and performance. In a way, this implies that there is no standard 
and perfect structure for boards of directors. 
 Instead, as argued in prior studies, the different theoretical perspectives on how boards 
of directors should be structured will depend on situational factors peculiar to the indi-
vidual firm (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1998). It may also be argued that the organi-
zation of boards in terms of size, composition, committee structures and multiple direc-
torships must be tailored to fit the firm’s legal environment, its size and possibly its cur-
rent development stage. Consistent with the argument by Donaldson (1998), each of 
the theories may hold valid with their respective domains. For instance, according to 
Donaldson (1998) and Donaldson & Davis (1991) the stewardship theory perspective 
may be proved correct as long as the working relationship or coalition between the 
managers and the owners of the business is cordially persisting and is perceived by 
managers mutually beneficial.  
Conversely, in the event where there is conflict between owners and managers or the 
interest of the two parties diverges, thus the assumptions of agency theory come into 
play. This means that the different perspectives of stewardship theory and agency theo-
ry may hold under different circumstances, in this sense, the different perspective of-
fered by each of the theories mentioned above are not necessary non-complementary 
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as we attempt to understand the potential organization of board of directors and perfor-
mance.  
  Second, one of the distinctive contributions is the development of a multi-theoretical 
approach to corporate governance, which attempted to depict and explain the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms and their influence on bank performance. In this 
current study, the review of different perspectives clarified that there is the need to 
adopt an integrated approach rather than a single perspective to understand and ex-
plain the effect of corporate governance on bank performance. This study is the first to 
the best of my knowledge that adopted a multi-theoretical approach on corporate gov-
ernance which provided a stronger basis in explaining the effect of corporate govern-
ance on financial performance of universal banks in the Ghanaian context.  
  Third, this study established that board committees are related to enhanced bank per-
formance. The reasoning here is that board committees are an important component of 
the board structure of universal banks in Ghana, providing independent professional 
oversight  of bank activities to protect shareholders’ interests (Harrison, 1987). The pri-
mary role of audit, risk, nomination and remuneration committees is to act as independ-
ent monitors to alleviate agency problems (Klein, 1998; Rezaee, 2009), to maximize the 
value of a company to shareholders through profitability and to increase the perfor-
mance of share prices. The establishment of board committees leads to more responsi-
ble behaviour by bank boards and protects the interests of the shareholder (Harrison, 
1987). This finding with respect to board committees is also in tandem with prior empiri-
cal studies by Puni (2015; Sun & Cahan (2009) who found that board committees bring 
about enhanced bank performance. 
 Fourth, the findings of this study make a case for having larger boards. Larger boards 
tend to be associated with diversity of skills, business contacts and experience that 
smaller boards may not have, which offers greater opportunity to secure critical re-
sources (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Similarly, larger boards offer greater access to their 
firm’s external environment, which reduces uncertainties and also facilitates securing 
critical resources, such as finance, raw materials, and contracts (Goodstein et al, 1994; 
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Pearce and Zahra, 1992). This finding with respect to larger board size is in tandem with 
prior empirical studies by Yawson (2006) who found that larger boards enhance the 
knowledge base on which business advice can be sought, which increases managerial 
ability to make better business decisions to improve performance. It is also supported 
by the position of Kiel and Nicholson (2003) that, a larger number of people with varied 
expertise would be better placed to subject managerial decisions to greater scrutiny and 
monitoring.  
 Fifth, the study established that board composition is related to enhanced bank perfor-
mance. The reasoning here is that having greater number of non-executive directors 
increases the independence of the board. The independence of the board is necessary 
in implementing effective internal control systems, which ultimately improves efficiency 
and performance. The finding supports the agency theory which suggests that outside 
directors are valued for their ability to provide advice, solidify business and personal re-
lationships, their ability to signal when the company is doing well, and for their title and 
prestige (Mace, 1971). Outside directors also play an important role as shareholder ad-
vocate when they control the boards in tender offers for bidders (Byrd & Hickman, 
1992), and in hostile takeover threats (Gibbs,1993) and in helping to reduce the likeli-
hood of financial statement frauds (Beasley,1996).  Also, in the opinion of Dalton et al., 
(1999), the independence of directors is an essential requirement for board effective-
ness. Clearly and board composition enhances board monitoring and effectiveness, 
which could lead to improved performance. 
  Finally, the study points to the fact that foreign banks exhibit better performance than 
domestic/local banks. Foreign banks have had long time experience in legal enforce-
ment and banking supervision that lead their attitudes and behavior to implementing 
better practices in good corporate governance. The findings of this study make a case 
for having foreign banks operating in emerging a country such as Ghana. Foreign banks 
tend to perform effective monitoring such as frequent internal auditing and reporting ac-
tions than local banks which tend to reduce agency costs and thus contribute to superi-
or performance. The finding is supported by the argument that foreign banks operating 
in Ghana have access to tried and tested management systems, superior technical and 
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managerial talents, and financial resources thus leading to a positive influence on bank 
performance. This finding with respect to foreign ownership of banks contributes to pre-
vious empirical studies from developing countries which also found that banks with for-
eign owners lead to better performance (Bonin-et al., (2004); Kobeissi (2004); 
Staikouras et al., (2008). 
6.6 Further Studies 
   There are several potential avenues for future research and improvement. First, the 
study has mainly examined the association between internal corporate governance 
structures (bank ownership types, bank size and board structures). Future studies 
should investigate how external corporate governance mechanisms, such as bank su-
pervisors or regulators, external auditors, credit ratings agencies, market for corporate 
control and the managerial labour market, amongst others that can affect the financial 
performance of banks in Ghana. Future research can also analyze interactions and in-
terdependences between internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and 
their impact on financial performance. 
 Second, also there are some pressing corporate governance issues that may be better 
addressed by future research or via a qualitative methodology.  For instance, the im-
portance of corporate governance in corporate decision making and performance can 
be explored by future research by observing boardroom interactions or by conducting 
interviews (i.e. structured, semi- structured and unstructured ) with key company stake-
holders such as executive and non- executive directors, company secretaries, senior 
management teams, customers, depositors and investors. Furthermore, future research 
can focus on the motivation and central drivers of corporate governance practices in the 
Ghanaian banking context. This could be done by conducting face to face interviews 
with major players in the Ghanaian banking industry including the Governor of the Bank 
of Ghana, President of the Ghana Bankers Association, Ghana Institute of Bankers, 
Ghana Institute of Chartered Accountants, Securities and Exchange Commission, Gha-
na Stock Exchange, President of Institute of Directors and the major external audit firms 
in Ghana. This may help to enhance the current understanding of how corporate gov-
ernance structure impacts on financial performance in a developing country. 
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   Finally, future research can also investigate the relationship between private domestic 
ownership, listed banks, board ownership, board diversity, board meetings, board re-
muneration and financial performance that can also include other control variables to 
the study such as, debt financing, capital intensity, bank risks, bank age  to ensure the 
robustness of the results. Other performance measures also can be used as a proxy for 
financial performance such as economic value added (EVA), Tobin’s Q, non-performing 
loans (NPL), Profit margin (PM), earnings per share (EPS), and return on investment 
(ROI). Then, the results can be compared to this study.The chapter has focused on 
providing conclusion on the thesis. Specifically, it sought to achieve five main objec-
tives.  
 First, it attempted to summarize the research findings of the study. The second objec-
tive of this chapter has been to highlight the limitations of the study, for example the 
sample size of 21 universal banks is relatively smaller and the nine year period exam-
ined is also comparatively short. Third, the chapter has discussed the policy implication 
of the research findings for Bank of Ghana, board and management, academics and 
researchers. Fourth, this chapter summarizes the contribution of the study. For exam-
ple, the study makes several contributions as well as extensions to the extent of corpo-
rate governance literature. For example it offers for the first time direct evidence on the 
relationship between corporate governance structure and Ghanaian universal bank’s 
financial performance in post sector reform period. 
  The fifth objective, the chapter has been to point out potential avenues for future re-
search. For example the study has examined the association between internal corpo-
rate governance structure and bank performance. Future studies can investigate how 
external governance mechanisms as the regulator, corporate controls and law amongst 
bothers affect bank financial performance. In conclusion, this study has discussed cor-
porate governance and financial performance of universal banks in Ghana, which leads 
to the central argument of the research and the importance of good corporate govern-
ance practices to the success of banking business. Board structure, foreign ownership 
and bank size in universal banks were considered important for effective corporate gov-
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ernance practices as well as for enhancing performance of banks in emerging market 
suchasGhana.
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APPENDIXES 
 
APPENDIX 1 Regression results with ROA as dependent variable. 
Dependent Varia-
ble  OA 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random Effects P-Value 
Const 0.00257674 
(0.1631) 
0.87066 −0.117293* 
(-1.714) 
0.07510 -0.0262688 
(-1.0490) 
0.29558 
BOSIZE 0.000119669 
(0.6207) 
0.53558 0.0263481 
(0.4077) 
0.68403 0.000153522 
(0.0601) 
0.95215 
BOCOMP 0.000338724 
(0.1713) 
0.86417 0.0439397 
(0.1650) 
0.86918 0.00142965 
(0.6184) 
0.53710 
BOCOMM 0.00476656 
(1.3928) 
0.16539 0.27117*** 
(3.5264) 
0.00055 0.011145** 
(2.2092) 
0.02842 
Foreign 0.0047747 
(13690) 
0.17270 0.0451163 
(0.5854) 
0.26539 0.00286636 
(0.4639) 
0.64327 
BankSize −0.000962791
* 
(-1.8455) 
0.106661 0.0181107 
(0.2686) 
0.78860 −0.000305949 
(-0.5133) 
0.60840 
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BankAge 0.00017245*** 
(2.8257) 
0.00525 0.00274548*** 
(2.7087) 
0.00749 0.000187919* 
(1.7949) 
0.07435 
CIR −0.00547441*
** 
(-3.4137) 
0.00079 −0.0054319*** 
(-3.6951) 
0.00030 −0.00566879*** 
(-3.8289) 
0.00018 
Postcrisis 0.0132346*** 
(4.2560) 
0.00003 0.00325879 
(0.6178) 
0.00083 0.0137218*** 
(4.8586) 
0.00001 
Observations 189  189  189  
LSDV R-squared  0.269749  0.512022    
Within R-squared  0.237294  0.310436    
LSDV F(27, 161)  8.311337  6.256778    
Model I Diagnostics Test 
Heteroskedasticity- (Chi-quare) 
Breusch-Pagan  LM  (p-value) 
  9.29311 
(0.1232291) 
 
Hausman Test - (Chi-square) 
Fixed/random Effects (p-value)                           
  16.9832 
(0.0175047) 
 
Autocorrelation- (LMF) 
Breucsh-Godfrey   (p-value) 
  11.3869 
(0.100) 
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APPENDIX 2 Regression results with ROE as dependent variable. 
Dependent Vari-
able  ROE 
Pooled OLS P-Value Fixed Effects P-Value Random Effects P-Value 
Const 0.0002955 0.99772 −1.18276** 0.01161 −0.0848996 0.52931 
-0.0029 (-2.5529) (-0.6303) 
BOSIZE 0.0167539 0.18446 0.0452763 0.32361 0.0163836 0.27562 
-1.3323 -0.9901 -1.0935 
BOCOMP −0.0104319 0.41966 0.0168474 0.37273 −0.00940985 0.52116 
(-0.8089) -8939 (-0.6428) 
BOCOMM 0.0406862* 0.07001 0.166312*** 0.00262 0.0563198** 0.04853 
-1.8227 -3.0564 -1.9862 
Foreign 0.0137133 0.5474 0.18276 0.548 0.010938 0.72434 
-0.6028 -0.0549 -0.3532 
BankSize −0.0057148
9* 
0.09481 0.0143926 0.76333 −0.00384983 0.31453 
(-1.6794) -0.3016 (-1.0086) 
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BankAge 0.00114312*
** 
0.00457 0.0192493*** 0.00804 0.00117047** 0.0296 
-2.8717 -2.6839 -2.1929 
CIR −0.0279128*
** 
0.00832 −0.0251096** 0.0169 −0.0273168*** 0.00872 
(-2.6685) (-2.4139) (-2.6518) 
Postcrisis 0.0734674**
* 
0.00038 −0.00452359 0.90369 0.0744299*** 0.00021 
-3.6221 (-0.1212) -3.7829 
Observations 189   189   189   
LSDV R-squared 0.245884   0.406928       
Within R-squared 0.212367   0.227686       
LSDV F(27, 161) 7.336247   4.091397       
Mode II Diagnostics tests 
Heteroskedasticity-(Chi-square) 
Breusch-Pagan          (p-value) 
    8.63447   
-
0.27997
5 
Hausman Test - (Chi-square)     15.6983   
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Fixed/random Effects (p-value)                           
-
0.02802
07 
Autocorrelation- (LMF) Breucsh-
Godfrey   (p-value) 
    10.4227   
-0.179 
Figures reported in brackets are robust standard errors; *** 1% significant level, **5% significant level and *10% 
significant level.
242 
APPENDIX  3 Universal banks used in sample 
Bank Year Incorporated Ownership 
Agricultural Development bank 1965 Local 
Bank of Africa 1997 Foreign 
Barclays Bank Ghana Ltd. 1917 Foreign 
Cal Merchant Bank 1990 Local 
Ecobank Ghana Ltd. 1990 Foreign 
Fidelity Bank Ghana 2004 Local 
First Atlantic Bank 1994 Local 
Ghana Commercial Bank 1953 Local 
Guaranty Trust Bank 2004 Foreign 
HFC Bank 1990 Local 
Access Bank /IBG 2005 Foreign 
FNB Bank Ghana 1996 Foreign 
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National Investment Bank 1963 Local 
Prudential Bank 1996 Local 
SG SSB Ghana 1975 Foreign 
Stanbic Bank Ghana 1999 Foreign 
Standard Chartered Bank Ghana 1896 Foreign 
Unibank Ghana Ltd. 1997 Local 
UBA Ghana 2004 Foreign 
Unique Trust Bank 1995 Local 
Zenith Bank Ghana 2005 Foreign 
Excluded  Banks in sample     
Merchant Bank Ltd.* 1972 Local 
Intercontinental Bank** 1996 Foreign 
TTB*** 1996 Local 
BSIC (Ghana)**** 2006 Foreign 
Bank of Baroda**** 2006 Foreign 
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*the Merchant Bank did not publish its accounts for the years 2012, 2013, and 2014. 
** The Intercontinental Bank was taken over in 2011. 
*** TTB was taken over by Ecobank, in 2012. 
****the BSIC Bank was licensed in 2006 and could supply the 9 years data. 
****the Bank of Baroda was licensed in 2006 and could not supply the 9 years data. 
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